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the acts of a hospital patient. In Rollins, this Court 
articulated a modification to § 319 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, limiting the scope of duty imposed to protect others 
from bodily harm caused by persons under control of the state 
to those who are "reasonably identifiable by the custodian 
either individually or as members of a distinct group." 
Valley Mental Health submits that the law announced in 
Rollins is controlling precedent in Higgins, buttressing the 
defendants' contention that they owed no duty to the plaintiff. 
Sincerely, 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
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Re: Kathy Lynn Hiqqins, et al. v. Salt Lake County, et al. 
Case No. 900255 
Dear Honorable Justices: 
Kathy Higgins, pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah R. App. P., 
submits this response to the letter of amicus curiae Valley Mental 
Health claiming Rollins v. Peterson, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 is 
"controlling." 
The Rollins case is not controlling because it examines 
Section 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the duty of 
the State Hospital to protect an "unidentifiable" person. By 
comparison, one basis for "duty" in this case is the "special 
relation" exception of Section 315 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts; that is, Salt Lake County Mental Health (hereinafter SLCMH) 
had a recognized "special relationship" with Caroline Trujillo, its 
dangerous and mentally ill patient, which imposed a duty to meet 
accepted and recognized standards of care to properly treat 
Caroline Trujillo and victims such as Shaundra Higgins. As 
alternative bases for "duty," Kathy Higgins also asserts SLCMH had 
a professional duty and a duty arising from two court orders that 
placed Caroline Trujillo into its care and required it to property 
treat Caroline Trujillo. 
More importantly, Rollins indicates that if the victim is 
reasonably "identifiable," which means the injured person (either 
individually or as a member of a distinct group), suffered the type 
of bodily harm that the medical professional knew or should have 
known was likely to occur, then a duty is owed. Rollins is, 
therefore, contrary to the standard argued by Valley Mental Health 
in its brief that a specifically identified victim is required for 
a duty to arise. (Brief of Valley Mental Health, pages 6, 11, 13 
and 23-24) . 
C L Y D E , P R A T T & S N O W 
The Honorable Justices of the 
Utah Supreme Court 
July 31, 1991 
Page 2 
The Rollins case, therefore, supports Kathy and Shaundra 
Higgins1 position that Shaundra Higgins was "identifiable" (Reply 
Brief of Appellant to Appellee Salt Lake County Mental Health, page 
18) as a person about whom Caroline Trujillo had been brooding for 
months (Id.) and as a person foreseeably endangered by Caroline 
Trujillofs condition (Reply Brief of Appellant to Amicus Curiae 
Valley Mental Health at 13-15). 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
James L. Warlaumont 
JLW:lb 
cc: Ronald E. Nehring, Esq. 
Patricia J. Marlowe, Esq. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is vested in the Utah Supreme Court under 
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah and Rules 
4(a), 54(b) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the lower court erred in determining 
as a matter of law that appellees owed no 
duty to appellants? 
2. Whether appellants' claims are barred by the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, §63-30-1 et. 
seq. U.C.A. and e.g. §63-30-10 U.C.A.? 
3. Whether appellant Kathy Higgins' claim is 
barred by her failure to file a notice of 
claim upon Appellee Salt Lake County pursuant 
to §63-30-11, U.C.A. and §63-30-13, U.C.A.? 
4. Whether Kathy Higgins can state a claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress? 
All of the above are issues of law and this Court 
resolves all such legal issues without deference to the lower 
court's rulings on appeal from summary judgment. Ferre v. 
State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149 (Ut. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following provisions of Utah Code Annotated are 
determinative of the issues in this appeal and these statutes 
are reproduced in the addendum: 
§26-17-1.2; §26-17-5; §26-17-7; §63-30-1 et seq.; §63-30-10; 
§63-30-10(2); §63-30-11; §63-30-13; §64-7-7; §64-7-28(4); 
§64-7-32; §64-7-34; §64-7-34(2); §64-7-36; §64-7-36(3); 
§64-7-36(8); §64-7-36(10); §76-2-301; §77-18-1; §78-3a-55 
-vi-
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On April 10, 1984, Carolyn Trujillo, a chronically 
mentally ill person, stabbed Shaundra Higgins, a 10-year old 
girl who lived in Trujillo's neighborhood. Prior to the 
stabbing, Carolyn Trujillo had been a voluntary patient at 
several of Salt Lake County's mental health facilities, as well 
as, an involuntary patient at the Utah State Hospital. 
Shaundra Higgins sued Salt Lake County Appellees and 
others for the physical and mental injuries she sustained as a 
result of being stabbed. Kathy Higgins, Shaundra's mother, 
though not present during the stabbing, sued for her emotional 
distress claimed to have been caused by the stabbing. 
In November, 1986, Third District Court Judge Russon 
granted Summary Judgment, in separate orders, to the Defendant 
Utah State Hospital and the State of Utah's Department of 
Corrections because he found that these defendants had no 
responsibility for Carolyn Trujillo at the time of the 
stabbing. The Court also found that the Department of 
Corrections' (Adult Probation and Parole) termination of 
Carolyn Trujillo's probation was a discretionary function. (R. 
791-797; 810-15). The Higginses appealed from these adverse 
judgments and later compromised their claims with the 
aforementioned defendants. 
In August, 1989, after extensive and prolonged discovery, 
Salt Lake County Appellees moved for summary judgment on the 
basis that they owed no duty to the Higginses; that no special 
relationship existed between Salt Lake County Appellees and 
Carolyn Trujillo; that Salt Lake County Appellees' acts or 
omissions were not the proximate cause of injury to the 
Higginses; that Kathy Higgins' claim was barred by her failure 
to file a notice of claim (§63-30-11 and §63-30-13 U.C.A.) and 
that §63-30-10 U.C.A. barred Appellants' lawsuit. (R. 
1143-1213) Third District Judge Sawaya ruled that the Salt 
Lake County Appellees owed not duty to Appellants and granted 
judgment in favor of the Salt Lake County Appellees on April 
23, 1990. (R. 2345, 2349-2351). This is Appellants7 appeal 
from that Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
THE UTAH MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM IN 1984. 
1. In Colyar v. Third District Court, 469 F.Supp 424 
(D. Utah 1979) the United District Court for the Central 
Division of Utah, invalidated that part of Utah's civil 
commitment statute which allowed the commitment of 
non-dangerous mentally ill persons who lacked insight 
concerning their need for treatment or who lacked the capacity 
to provide themselves with the basic necessities of life. 
2. Mentally ill persons in Utah have a constitutional 
right to refuse medication absent a court order or an emergency 
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and this right was clearly established in 1980. Bee v. 
Greaves. 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984); 910 F.2d 686 (10th 
Cir. 1990). 
3. During 1984 and before, a comprehensive community 
mental health system administered by the State Division of 
Mental Health under the policy direction of the State Board of 
Mental Health was provided for throughout the State of Utah. 
[§26-17-1.2 U.C.A. (1977)]. 
4. Salt Lake County, pursuant to §26-17-7, et seq., 
U.C.A., established three community mental health centers: 
Granite (GMH), Copper Mountain (CMMH) and Salt Lake (SLCMH). 
These centers were later consolidated to form Salt Lake County 
Mental Health. (R. 2373, Depo. Whittaker, p. 16). 
5. Mental health services in the State of Utah, through 
Community Mental Health Centers, were available regardless of 
ability to pay. (§26-17-5 U.C.A.). 
6. During 1984, civil commitment/hospitalization in the 
State of Utah was to the State Division of Mental Health 
(§64-7-7 U.C.A.; R. 2371, Depo. Steadman, p. 76). 
7. Involuntary commitment/hospitalization in the State 
of Utah in 1984 was governed by §64-7-32 and §64-7-36 U.C.A. 
8. Temporary Involuntary Emergency Hospitalization in 
1984 was accomplished by an application of a responsible person 
with personal knowledge of the proposed patient accompanied by 
certification of a physician or a designated examiner. 
(§64-7-34 U.C.A.). 
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9. Carolyn Trujillo's mother, stepfather or aunt could 
have filed an application for Temporary Involuntary Emergency 
Hospitalization in February, 1984, pursuant to the 
aforementioned statute along with the certificate of a 
physician or designated examiner. 
10. Temporary Involuntary Emergency Hospitalization in 
1984 also could be accomplished without certification of a 
physician or designated examiner by application of a mental 
health officer or a peace officer [§64-7-34(2) U.C.A.]. 
11. Designated Examiners were licensed physicians 
(preferably psychiatrists, or other licensed mental health 
professional who were designated to Utah State Division of 
Mental Health to sign applications for every hospital and to 
examine and diagnose proposed patients. (§64-7-28(4) U.C.A.). 
12. In 1984, a person in the State of Utah could not be 
civilly committed/involuntarily hospitalized unless District 
Court found by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed 
patient had a mental illness which posed immediate danger or 
physical injury to the proposed patient or others, and he 
lacked the ability to engage in a rational decision-making 
process regarding the acceptance of care and that there was no 
appropriate less restrictive alternative to a court order of 
hospitalization and the hospital or mental health facility 
could provide adequate and appropriate care [§64-7-36(10) 
U.C.A.]. 
13. In 1984, involuntary hospitalizations were not 
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ordered if persons consented to voluntary care. [§64-7-35(3) 
and (8) U.C.A]. 
14. In 1984, directors of mental facilities had the 
discretion whether to admit a voluntary and mentally ill person 
to their facilities (§63-7-29, U.C.A.). 
15. In 1984, mental health personnel had no legal right 
to prevent a voluntary patient from leaving a treatment 
facility unless mental personnel believed the release would be 
unsafe for the patient or others and in which a patient could 
be held for up to 48-hours (§64-7-31, U.C.A.). 
SALT LAKE COUNTY'S COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN 1984. 
16. Once a person became a client of County Mental 
Health, he or she was assigned to the out-patient unit which 
serviced the geographic area where the client lived. Each 
out-patient unit had its own psychiatrist and staff of trained 
psychiatric nurses, social workers and mental health 
specialists. Each client has assigned a "primary therapist" 
who had overall responsibility for the client's ongoing care 
and treatment. The primary therapist met with the client on a 
regular basis, supervised the client's medication program, and 
provided other forms of therapy as needed. (R. 2375, Depo. 
Whittaker, pp. 45, 175-278; R. 2371, Depo, Steadman, p. 28) 
17. In 1984, certain specialty mental health services 
and facilities were available in Salt Lake County to handle 
emergencies which might arise when the out-patient units were 
closed in the evenings and on weekends, or when close 
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supervision was needed. One of these special facilities was 
the Adult Residential Treatment Unit ("ARTU") located at 46 
South 700 East. ARTU was a group home residence to which 
County Mental Health out-patient therapists could refer clients 
who were in need of a more structured treatment environment. 
Clients lived on the premises while participating in medication 
management, behavior modification and group programs supervised 
by the on-site staff. (R. 2375, Depo. Whittaker, pp. 10-12). 
18. In 1984, ARTU was also the base for County Mental 
Health's 24-hour "crisis line" service. Anyone could call this 
service whenever he perceived he or others were "in crisis" and 
needed help. (R. , Depo. Fisher, pp. 8; 11-12; 19-20; 
28-29). 
19. In 1984, County Mental Health had expanded its 
available services through contracts with other health care 
providers and specifically contracted for bed space was 
contracted with University Hospital and Pioneer Valley Hospital 
for County Mental Health clients who needed in-patient 
treatment. In 1984, 20 beds were available at the University 
and 17 at Pioneer Valley Hospital. (R. 2380, Depo. Ericksen, 
p. 74). 
20. ARTU typically treated people like Trujillo, who are 
chronically mentally ill and who had problems with daily 
living. County Mental Health clients were commonly referred to 
ARTU in lieu of hospitalization, in part because it had to 
abide by the legal requirement that all mental health patients 
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be treated in the least restrictive environment possible to 
preserve their civil liberties. (R. 2373, Depo. Whittaker, pp. 
84-85; R. 2371, Depo. Steadman, p. 79; R. 2376, Depo. Ely, p. 
89) . 
CAROLYN TRUJILLO AND HER MENTAL ILLNESS 
21. Trujillo first had contact with one of Salt Lake 
County's mental health employees in late 1975, at age 17, while 
she was involuntarily committed and hospitalized in the 
in-patient unit at University Hospital. [R. 2371, Depo. 
Steadman, pp. 37,39.] 
22. Trujillo had been diagnosed repeatedly since 1975 as 
suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, a chronic mental illness 
for which there is no cure and little effective treatment. 
Individual psychotherapy is usually ineffective and the illness 
is generally treated with medication therapy. [R. 2371, Depo. 
Steadman, pp. 163, 174; R. 2376, Depo. Ely, M.D. pp. 132-34]. 
23. Since 1975, Trujillo has been involuntarily 
committed and held in the in-patient unit of the University 
Hospital four times, most recently in February, 1979, and twice 
in the Utah State Hospital in Provo. (R. 2179, 2180 and 2199) 
24. During Trujillo's hospitalization in the University 
hospital in late 1975, she was assigned to County Mental 
Health's Downtown Unit because of her geographical 
location/residence and defendant Cheryl Steadman, R.N., became 
her primary therapist after Trujillo7s release from 
hospitalization. (R. 2371, Depo. Steadman, p. 39 ). 
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CAROLYN TRUJILLO'S CRIMINAL HISTORY, 
25. Adult Probation and Parole Investigator Jack Bowers, 
provided the following information about Carolyn Trujillo's 
juvenile record in a postsentence report to the District Court 
in April, 1985: (R. 1233, Exhibit 1 p. 3) 
DATE 
12-29-70 
02-09-72 
10-16-72 
02-23-73 
04-04-73 
06-21-73 
06-22-73 
OFFENSE 
Ungovernable 
Attempted Suicide 
Ungovernable 
Ungovernable 
Ungovernable 
Ungovernable 
DISPOSITION 
Non-Judicial Closure 
Non-Judicial Closure 
Non-Judicial Closure 
Non-Judicial Closure 
Non-Judicial Closure 
Non-Judicial Closure 
No Action Taken Theft, Class B 
26. Persons in Utah are not criminally responsible 
before age 14 (§76-2-30, U.C.A.) and their juvenile records are 
not open to public inspection (§78-3a-55, U.C.A.) 
27. The aforementioned Adult Probation and Parole 
provided the District Court with the following information 
about Carolyn Trujillo's adult record: (R. 1233, Exhibit 1 p.3) 
AGENCY 
SLCPD 
SLCPD 
U Of U 
PD 
SLCPD 
DATE 
09/08/76 
03/17/78 
03/22/78 
12/27/79 
OFFENSE 
Loitering for 
purpose of 
prostitution 
Trespassing; , 
and Battery 
Felony Theft 
Retail Theft 
the 
Assault 
DISPOSITION 
Case dismissed; 
insufficient 
evidence 
Declined to Prosecute 
Fined $20; or 4 days 
in jail 
9 days jail suspended 
$45 fine 
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SLCPD 05/27/81 False Information Declined to Prosecute 
OGDEN 
PD 07/16/81 Assault Probation; Evaluation 
SLCPD 09/15/81 Aggravated Assault Probation; Continued 
treatment; 
Restitution 
SLCPD 04/10/84 Attempted Criminal Utah State Hospital; 
Homicide 0 to 5 USP 
CAROLYN TRUJILLO'S FIRST 1981 CRIMINAL CHARGE, 
28. A woman named Janet Jones told Ogden City Police 
that when she attempted to walk past Carolyn Trujillo on July 
16, 1981, that Carolyn struck at her and the small child she 
was carrying with her sweatshirt, causing a small scratch on 
the child's head. (R. 1143, Attachment 1). 
29. As a result of the aforementioned incident, Carolyn 
was charged with assault and disorderly conduct, and Ogden City 
moved to merge the assault charge with the disorderly conduct 
charge. On July 17, 1981, Carolyn pleaded guilty to disorderly 
conduct. (R. 1143, Attachment 2). 
30. On February 22, 1982, the Circuit Court sentenced 
Carolyn to sixty days in jail, but the sentence was suspended 
and she was placed on probation for one year to the Department 
of Corrections ' Adult Probation and Parole upon the conditions 
that she take her medication and participate in a program with 
Jean Marlor. (R. 1143, Attachment 2; §77-18-1 U.C.A.). 
31. On January 20, 1983, Karen Cole Shepherd, a District 
Agent for Adult Probation and Parole, recommended that Carolyn 
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Trujillo's probation be terminated because she had reported 
regularly, had been taking her medications and had been 
attending her treatment sessions. (R. 1143, Attachment 3). 
32. On January 28, 1983, Carolyn's probation was 
terminated by the Third Circuit Court in Ogden based upon the 
motion of Adult Probation and Parole. (R. 1143, Attachment 4); 
(R. 791-797). 
CAROLYN TRUJILLO'S SECOND 1981 CRIMINAL CHARGE. 
33. On September 15, 1981, Carolyn Trujillo stabbed a 
woman in the buttocks with a pocket knife while the woman was 
crossing the street. (R. 1233, Exhibit 1 Addendum)) 
34. On September 18, 1981, Carolyn was charged in the 
Fifth Circuit Court in Salt Lake County with aggravated 
assault, third degree felony, for the stabbing and on October 
9, 1981, she was committed to the Utah State Hospital for a 
thirty-day evaluation to determine her competency to stand 
trial, and was found incompetent to stand trial until December 
1, 1981. (See R. 1143, Attachment 5). 
35. In a letter dated November 10, 1981, Utah State 
Hospital Psychiatrist Austin and Utah State Hospital 
Psychologist Howell informed the Third District Court that they 
found minimal evidence of schizophrenic mental illness in 
Carolyn Trujillo and that she demonstrated signs of organic 
brain dysfunction compatible with mixed illicit drug abuse and 
that her personality structure was dominated by anti-social and 
passive aggressive features. They also advised the Court that 
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she was incompetent to stand trial at that time. (R. 1143, 
Attachment 5). 
36. On December 4, 1981, Carolyn appeared in Fifth 
Circuit Court pleaded no contest to the reduced charge of 
simple assault, a Class B misdemeanor, and was placed on 
probation for one year under the supervision of the Utah State 
Department of Corrections' Adult Probation and Parole. As one 
of the conditions of probation, Carolyn was ordered to enter a 
residential mental health program. (R. 1143, Attachment 6 and 
§77-18-1 U.C.A.); (R. 791-797). 
37. On January 20, 1983, Karen Cole-Shepherd, a District 
Agent for Adult Probation and Parole, requested termination of 
Carolyn Trujillo's probation even though "The defendant has had 
minimal involvement with her counseling at Salt Lake Mental 
Health. She, however, continues to take her medication and the 
staff of Salt Lake Mental Health feel they cannot expect a 
great deal more from Carolyn. They will continue to monitor 
her medication and urge her to attend therapy. It is the 
opinion of this agency that the defendant will not benefit from 
further supervision. She has reported regularly and no further 
violations of the law have been reported." (R. 1143, 
Attachment 7); (R. 791-797) 
38. On January 25, 1983, Carolyn's probation was 
terminated by the Fifth Circuit Court in Salt Lake City at the 
request of Adult Probation and Parole. (See R. 1143 Attachment 
7); (R. 791-797) 
-11-
TRUJILLO'S TREATMENT AT ARTU IN 1984. 
39. On February 25, 1984, Trujillo was taken by her 
parents to the University Hospital and then to ARTU. Larry 
Romero, an ARTU mental health specialist, interviewed Carolyn, 
her parents and aunt. On the basis of that interview, Romero 
wrote the following note: 
This 25 year old female was admitted 
through UMC ER after being brought in by her 
parents. Client reports that two days ago she 
began feeling self destructive after feeling 
like not living.... Family reports that client 
is to get a hospital bed when one opens up 
however she does not appear to be appropriate 
for hospitalization. It appears that this 
family needs a time out. It also appears that 
she is appropriate for residential treatment 
stay. Plan: Evaluate while here thru Monday. 
Make plan w/Cheryl Steadman, crisis people and 
residential staffing. (Emphasis added) 
Mr. Romero's note was countersigned by Lynn Whittaker, the 
Residential Coordinator for ARTU, who agreed with the 
assessment and plan. [R. 2373, Whittaker depo., pp. 4, 288]. 
40. ARTU notified Cheryl Steadman on February 28, 1984 
of Trujillo's admission for a crisis stay. (R. 2371, Depo. 
Steadman, p. 135). 
41. In 1984, Larry Romero had a two-year associate 
degree in social science, had been working for Salt Lake County 
since September, 1976 and had held various positions with 
mental health, including the crisis specialist position he held 
during 1983 and 1984 at ARTU. (R. , Depo. Romero, pages 
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42. Romero was a mental health officer of the State of 
Utah and thereby qualified to sign an involuntary commitment 
applications. Romero's criteria for signing a petition for 
involuntary hospitalization were whether the person was 
displaying verbal or non-verbal behavior of dangerousness to 
self or others. (R. , Depo. Romero, pp. 57-58). 
43. After Romero met with Carolyn Trujillo, her mother, 
step-father and aunt at ARTU on February 25, 1984, he felt 
Carolyn acted appropriately that she was not psychotic and that 
she was taking her medications. (R. , Depo. Romero, pp. 
80, 83 and 87). 
44. Carolyn Trujillo agreed to go to the evening-weekend 
program for therapy on Tuesday and Thursday in the evenings. 
(R. , Depo. Romero, Vol. II p. 48). 
45. Mr. Romero did not think that Carolyn was in need of 
hospitalization on February 25, 1984, because she was not a 
danger to herself or others. (R , Depo. Romero, pp. 77 
and 88, and Vol. II, p. 64). 
46. Mr. Romero did not have any reason to believe during 
February, 1984 and thereafter that Carolyn was a danger to the 
community, nor did he have any reason to petition for the civil 
commitment for Carolyn Trujillo. (R. , Depo. Romero, 
Vol. II pp. 68-69). 
47. ARTU typically treated people like Trujillo, who 
were chronically mentally ill and who had problems with daily 
living. Persons were commonly referred to ARTU in lieu of 
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hospitalization, in part because mentally ill persons had a 
statutory right to be treated in the least restrictive 
environment possible. [R. 2373, Depo. Whittaker, p. 84-85; R. 
2371, Depo. Steadman, p. 79; R. 2376, Depo. Ely, p. 89]. 
48. Joy Ely is a licensed psychiatrist who worked part 
time at ARTU during 1983 and 1984 and who had been employed by 
Salt Lake County since 1969. Dr. Ely was a designated 
examiner. (R. 2376, Depo. Dr. Ely, p. 23, 31 and 4 and 7; 
§64-7-28(4) U.C.A.). 
49. Dr. Ely interviewed Carolyn Trujillo on Monday 
morning, February 27, 1984, at ARTU and found that Carolyn did 
not exhibit overly psychotic features in the sense of delusions 
or hallucinations. (R. 2376, Depo. Ely, p. 67). 
50. Dr. Ely had no reason to believe that Carolyn was in 
need of involuntary hospitalization/civil commitment on 
February 27 or on March 1, 1984, nor does she recall that she 
had any reason to believe that Carolyn was dangerous to others 
on those dates. (R. 2376, Depo. Dr. Ely, p. 124, 129-130 and 
132) . 
51. Dr. Ely met with Trujillo for one-half hour on 
February 27, 1984 and she found Trujillo to be calm, 
non-delusional, and her behavior appeared to be under control. 
Trujillo told Dr. Ely that she felt much better, did not need 
hospitalization and wanted to go home. [R. 2376, Depo. Ely, 
pp. 64, 67-69]. 
52. Dr. Ely felt competent to evaluate Trujillo based on 
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the information available to her. She had had prior experience 
dealing with schizophrenia and confirmed that diagnosis of 
Trujillo. In Dr. Ely's opinion, Trujillo did not need 
hospitalization in February and March, 1984 and Trujillo was 
not dangerous to herself or others. [R. 2376, Depo. Ely, pp. 
58, 115-116; 124-125; 130-132 and 122-126]. 
53. The last time Romero saw Carolyn prior to the 
stabbing was on March 16, 1984. (R , Depo. Romero, 
Vol, II, page 74). 
54. Mr. Romero believes that Carolyn knew the difference 
between right and wrong, when she stabbed Shaundra Higgins on 
April 10, 1984, and although he did not see Carolyn after the 
March 16, 1984, he believes that if she were taking medication, 
that the stabbing was a criminal act and that if she were off 
the medication, it was a voluntary act that she made on her own 
while she was stable. (R , Depo. Romero, Vol. II, p. 
73-74). 
55. ARTU's Weekly Service Summaries reflect that Carolyn 
Trujillo was doing well immediately prior to April 10, 1984, 
when she stabbed Shaundra Higgins. (R. 1143, Attachment 9). 
56. ARTU's records reflect that Carolyn Trujillo 
attended group, recreational and milieu therapy sessions during 
the period February 25, 1984 through March 29, 1984. (R. 1143, 
Attachment 9). 
57. During Carolyn's stay at ARTU in 1984, ARTU staff 
regularly met and made regular assessments of all of ARTU's 
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patients' need for hospitalization. (R. 2376, Depo. Ely, p. 
123) • 
NURSE STEADMAN AND DR. KUENTZEL 
58. Nurse Steadman is one of only 20-25 nurses in the 
State of Utah who put in the 508 hours of group psychotherapy 
and supervision necessary to obtain a Nurse Specialist 
license. [R. 2371, Steadman depo., pp. 4-5, 166]. 
59. Nurse Steadman has had extensive experience in 
dealing with chronic mental illness and estimates since 1972 
she has seen 5,000-6,000 patients suffering from schizophrenia, 
half of whom are, like Trujillo, the paranoid type. [R. 2371, 
Depo. Steadman, p. 10-12, 18, 21 167]. 
60. Based upon Nurse Steadman's contact with and role as 
Carolyn Trujillo's primary therapist she feels she is well 
acquainted with Carolyn and that her symptoms were "typical" 
for the diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and that her 
illness was "moderate" in degree. In Nurse Steadman's 
experience, paranoid schizophrenia of the "mild" variety is 
seldom seen. [R. 2371, Depo. Steadman, pp« 23, 25, 168-70]. 
61. According to Nurse Steadman, Trujillo had never had 
good insight into her mental illness, a problem typical of 
schizophrenics. Like many schizophrenics, Trujillo sometimes 
had hallucinations or heard voices which told her to harm 
herself. Carolyn Trujillo did not suffer from constantly overt 
psychiatric symptomatology, delusions, hallucinations or 
paranoid ideation. (R. 2371, Depo. Steadman p. 156, 168). 
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62. Throughout her voluntary association with Salt Lake 
County's mental health centers, Carolyn Trujillo was 
non-compliant with her medications and treatment much of the 
time, but was able to comply with medication and treatment for 
some period of months. If Carolyn appeared unstable at times, 
it may or may not have been due to the fact she wasn't taking 
her medications, since there were times when Carolyn was 
unstable when she was taking her medications. Periods of 
instability are not uncommon with persons like Carolyn who have 
a chronic mental illness. (R. 2371, Depo. Steadman, p. 81, 
125.) . 
63. On March 10, 1982, Steadman received a phone call 
from someone at Adult Probation and Parole who informed her of 
the terms of Carolyn's probation. Even though it was not 
Steadman's obligation or role to call and advise the court or 
Adult Probation and Parole of Carolyn's non-compliance with 
probation terms, Steadman did inform Carolyn's probation 
officer about her non-compliance. (R. 2371, Depo. Steadman, p. 
89-91). 
64. Medication is not a cure; rather, it treats 
symptomatology and it treats symptomatology on different levels 
with each individual. Not every individual responds to 
medication in the same way. In some mentally ill persons, 
medication may alleviate all of their symptomatology, while in 
others it may alleviate only a tiny amount of the 
symptomatology. In Carolyn's case, the medications sometimes 
-17-
worked and sometimes didn't work. (R. 2371, Depo. Steadman, p. 
82) . 
65. In February 1984, Carolyn's mental health chart was 
transferred to ARTU and primary treatment was thereafter 
through ARTU with Steadman on the sideline. (R. 2371, Depo. 
Steadman, p. 146) . 
66. Nurse Steadman was "not surprised" at Trujillo's 
superficial suicide gesture in February 1984 and she did not 
consider the episode to be a dangerous act or an indication 
that Trujillo would try something more "lethal", but she agreed 
that an evaluation was in order and that the structured 
environment and programs at ARTU might be better for Trujillo 
at that time than out-patient care. [R. 2371, Depo Steadman, 
p. 137, 142, 172] 
67. An increase in suicidal ideation may or may not be 
related to decompensation. Suicidal gestures usually relate to 
depression (R. 2371, Depo. Steadman, p. 149). 
68. March 21, 1984, was the last time Steadman saw 
Carolyn prior to the stabbing. At that time she found Carolyn 
to be stable. (R. 1143, See Attachment 8). 
69. On April 11, 1984, Steadman received a phone call 
from a jail person who told her that Carolyn was in jail for 
stabbing a ten-year-old girl the night before and she was 
surprised. (R. 2371, Depo. Steadman, p. 154). 
70. During 1984, Carolyn was a voluntary patient of Salt 
Lake County Mental Health and as such, had the right to refuse 
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mental health treatment. Steadman did not petition for civil 
commitment for Carolyn in January, February or March of 1984 
because Carolyn did not meet the commitment criteria. (R. 
2371, Depo. Steadman, p. 177-182). 
71. Dr. Kuentzel obtained his medical degree from the 
University of Iowa in 1973, thereafter completed a year of 
rotating internship, three years of psychiatric residency, and 
in April 1980, became board certified in psychiatry and 
neurology. (R. 2370, Depo. Dr. Kuentzel, pp. 4-10). 
72. Mental health specialists, including Dr. Kuentzel, 
are unable to predict future violence based upon past history. 
(R. 2370, Depo. Kuentzel, p. 255). 
73. Dr. Kuentzel's duties in 1984 were to provide 
psychiatric coverage in terms of medication evaluation which 
meant he interviewed patients, established working diagnoses 
and treatment plans and if psychopharmacology were involved, 
supervised the administration of the medication. (R. 2370, 
Depo. Kuentzel, p. 24). 
74. Dr. Kuentzel was never Trujillo's therapist and 
never provided her with psychotherapy. (R. 2370, Depo. 
Kuentzel, p. 25). 
75. According to Dr. Kuentzel, the 1984 mental health 
notes show that Carolyn looked the best she'd ever looked in 
many years and indicated she was getting better. (R. 2370, 
Depo. Kuentzel, pp. 256-257). 
-19-
SCHIZOPHRENIA. 
76. Schizophrenia is a chronic illness for which there 
is no cure. Schizophrenia is a difficult illness to treat 
because it does not respond terribly well to medication. That 
is, schizophrenics do not become completely normal and 
absolutely symptom free. While schizophrenics can improve 
some, there is no guarantee of any future conduct. The 
severity of schizophrenia may increase or decrease during the 
course of the illness. (R. 2370, Depo. Kuentzel, pp. 147; 263). 
77. Schizophrenics, including Carolyn Trujillo, lack 
insight into their illness and their need for treatment and 
therefore are not medication compliant. (R. 2370, Depo. 
Kuentzel, pp. 153-154). 
78. Lots of persons who do not suffer from schizophrenia 
commit assaults and hence schizophrenia does not predict or 
guarantee assaultive behavior. (R. 2370, Depo. Kuentzel, p. 
253) . 
THE ASSAULT ON SHAUNDRA HIGGINS. 
79. On April 10, 1984, Shaundra Higgins was sent by her 
mother to the neighborhood 7-11 store to buy some items for 
dinner. (R. 2372, Depo. Higgins, p. 27). 
80. While Shaundra Higgins was in the process of 
returning home from the store through an alley running behind 
the Higgins' home, she was suddenly and without warning 
attacked and stabbed by Trujillo. (R. 1233, Exhibit 1) 
81. The Higgins family had never met Trujillo and had no 
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idea who she was at the time of the assault. They were also 
unacquainted with any member of Trujillo's family. [R. 2372, 
Depo. Higgins pp. 22 and 23]. 
82. Plaintiff Kathy Higgins did not witness the assault 
on her daughter. Her first notice that something had happened 
was when she heard Shaundra/s scream. [R. 2372, Depo. Higgins 
p. 31]. 
83. Mrs. Higgins ran to the backyard where she found her 
daughter. When she first saw Shaundra, she did not know what 
had happened, did not see Trujillo and did not feel she was in 
any danger at the time. (R. 2372, Depo. Higgins, p. 32). 
84. Mrs. Higgins was never attacked or frightened by 
Trujillo. The damages she claims as a plaintiff in this action 
are for "stress, [and] anxiety." [R. 2372, Depo. Higgins p. 
59, lines 2-9]. 
85. Counsel filed a Notice of Claim upon Salt Lake 
County for Shaundra Higgins. (R. 1143, Attachment 11). 
86. Mrs. Higgins has never served a Notice of Claim upon 
Salt Lake County for her injuries (R. 1143, Attachment 11). 
87. Carolyn Trujillo was arrested by the Salt Lake City 
Police Department on April 10, 1984 and told them that she had 
stabbed a young girl. (R. 1233, Exhibit 1). 
88. Carolyn Trujillo gave the following (written) 
statement of her version of what happened to the presentence 
investigator on April 15, 1985: 
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"I was in my room at my Mom's house I started 
to feel some pain in my stomach and head and 
then started to hear voices telling me to hurt 
someone and ran out of the house and ran down 
this or walked down this alley and seen this 
girl and stabbed her thats all." 
89. Carolyn Trujillo states she had been taking her 
medication, serentil regularly and on April 10, 1984 when 
voices told her to hurt someone, (R. 1233r Exhibit 1; R. 1143, 
Attachment 10) . 
90. Carolyn Trujillo had not been using illicit drugs 
prior to or on April 10, 1984. (R. 1143, Attachment 10). 
91. Carolyn Trujillo's stepfather, Richard Navarro, 
called ARTU on April 10, 1984 and stated that Carolyn had 
stabbed a 10-year old girl and had been taken into police 
custody. Mr. Navarro also stated that he had not seen any 
unusual behavior prior to the stabbing and that Carolyn had 
been taking her medication (R.2371, Depo. Steadman Exhibit #24). 
92. State Hospital psychologist examined Carolyn 
Trujillo pursuant to court order on May 30, 1984, and 
thereafter advised the court that Carolyn Trujillo was mentally 
ill on April 10, 1984, but that her mental illness did not 
prevent her from forming the intent to intentionally and 
knowlingly stab/injure Shaundra Higgins. (R. 1143, Attachment 
10) . 
93. Carolyn Trujillo was found guilty and mentally ill 
to attempted criminal homicide, manslaughter, a third degree 
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felony and sentenced to the Utah State Prison for 0-5 years. 
(R. 1233, Exhibit 1). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Appellants claim that there were disputed material facts 
which precluded summary judgment, however they failed to 
identify any such disputed material facts and their failure to 
do so demonstrates the absence of any disputed material facts. 
NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP 
An exception to the general rule that there is no duty to 
control the conduct of a third party arises when a "special 
relationship" exists between the parties. Special 
relationships arise when one assumes responsibility for the 
safety of another or prevents another from utilizing his normal 
opportunities for self-protection. Salt Lake County Appellees 
contend that no "special relationship" existed between Salt 
Lake County Appellees and Carolyn Trujillo because Carolyn was 
a voluntary patient. Further, Salt Lake County Appellees did 
not have the right to control Carolyn's actions and where no 
right to control exists, there is no duty. 
In similar cases, the courts have refused to recognize a 
duty by health care professionals to warn, detain, commit or 
control patients whose participation is voluntary. Hokansen v. 
U.S. . 868 F.2d 372 (10th Cir. 1989); Hinkelman v. Boraess 
Medical Center, 43 N.W.2d 547 (Michigan 1987). 
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NO PUBLIC DUTY 
As community mental health care providers, Salt Lake 
County Appellees owed no duty to appellants. If Salt Lake 
County Appellees owed any duty to the public such a public duty 
does not create a duty owed to Appellants. 
NO DUTY FROM COURT SENTENCES 
Salt Lake County Appellees had no duty to treat and 
control Carolyn Trujillo at anytime especially not on April 10, 
1984. Additionally, Salt Lake County Appellees had no legal 
right or control over Carolyn Trujillo by reason of Carolyn's 
two court sentences and probations. Appellants' claim in this 
regard is absolutely ridiculous and frivolous. 
KATHY HIGGINS FAILED TO FILE NOTICE OF CLAIM 
Appellant Kathy Lynn Higgins' claim for infliction of 
emotional distress is barred because she failed to file a 
Notice of Claim required by §63-30-11, U.C.A. of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Failure to file a timely Notice of 
Claim forever bars the prosecution of the claim. (U.C.A. 
§63-30-13). Thus, Appellant Kathy Lynn Higgins' claim must be 
dismissed. Yeates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 
(Utah 1980). 
KATHY HIGGINS HAS NO CLAIM 
Appellant Kathy Higgins seeks recovery for the emotional 
distress she has experienced by reason of injuries her daughter 
Shaundra received from Carolyn Trujillo's assault. Appellant 
Kathy Higgins did not witness the assault, nor did she ever 
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fear injury to herself. Hence, she was not in the "zone of 
danger" and has no cause of action. 
S63-30-10. U.C.A. BARS THIS ACTION 
§63-30-10, U.C.A. retains immunity for the Salt Lake 
County Appellees for their discretionary acts or omissions. 
The Salt Lake County Appellees alleged failure to commit or 
otherwise treat Carolyn Trujillo properly was discretionary and 
hence Salt Lake County Appellees are immune from suit. 
§63-30-10, U.C.A. also retains immunity from suit for 
injuries which arise out of the assault, battery and infliction 
of mental anguish. Hence, Appellants' claims are barred. 
NO DENIAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Appellants claim that the trial court's granting of 
summary judgment deprived them of various constitutional 
rights, this is without merit. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellants assert that they are not seeking to hold 
mental health providers strictly liable for all harmful acts 
committed by their mentally ill and dangerous patients. 
Rather, they claim that they are only seeking to hold mental 
health providers responsible for injuries caused by their 
breach of duties to control and properly treat their mentally 
ill and dangerous patients. These assertions are untrue. 
Appellants are seeking to hold mental health care providers 
liable to third parties for the criminal acts of nondangerous 
voluntary patients. Furthermore, Appellants seek to establish, 
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contrary to constitutional law, the existence of duties to 
civilly commit and medicate nondangerous patients who are not 
civilly commitable and to predicate these duties upon the 
opinions contained in the affidavits of paid mental health 
consultants, as well as, to establish duty in this case based 
solely upon foreseeability. 
Appellants state that this Court has heretofore 
recognized that psychotherapists and other mental health care 
providers owe a duty to third parties to use reasonable care in 
diagnosing and treating patients who are in their control, who 
are known or should be known in accordance with the standards 
of the psychiatric profession, to be dangerous and to take 
precautions to control their dangerous patients. This Court 
has never so ruled and even if this Court were to so rule, such 
a duty would be inapplicable in this case because, contrary to 
Appellants' statements in their brief, Carolyn Trujillo did not 
voluntarily submit to the control of the appellees by seeking 
hospitalization in February, 1984, nor was Carolyn Trujillo in 
the control of Salt Lake County Appellees at the time she 
stabbed Shaundra Higgins, nor was she in the custody of Salt 
Lake County Appellees by reason of two court sentences. 
POINT I. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED 
TO THE SALT LAKE COUNTY APPELLEES 
As is more fully discussed below, the lower Court 
properly granted Summary Judgment to the Salt Lake County 
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Appellees because there were no disputed material facts 
precluding summary judgment and the lower Court correctly ruled 
that Appellees owed no duty to Appellants. 
A. THERE WERE NO DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Appellants claim that although duty is a legal question, 
it is also highly fact-dependent and can only be properly 
determined in the context of a full trial of the facts 
according to the majority of courts deciding third-party 
liability cases. This is a false assertion since numerous 
courts have decided duty in a Summary Judgment context as did 
the lower court in the present case . See, for example: Currie 
v. U.S.. 836 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1987); Bradford v. Metropolitan 
County, 522 S.2d 96 (Fla. 1988); Ferree v. State of Utah, 784 
P.2d 149 (Utah 1989); Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 
(Utah 1986); Owens v. Garfield. 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989); 
Hokansen v. U.S.. 868 F.2d 372 (10th Cir. 1989). 
Appellants also claim there were many disputes of 
material facts which precluded summary judgment; however no 
recitation of any such disputed facts is made and Appellants' 
failure to do so establishes that there were no such disputed 
material facts which precluded summary judgment. Should 
Appellants identify disputed material facts in their Reply 
Brief, this Court should disregard the same because allowing 
Appellants to delay identifing disputed facts until that time 
deprives Appellees of the opportunity to demonstrate the 
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absence of any such disputed material facts. 
In essence, Appellants herein are claiming that duty 
should have been resolved as a fact issue by a jury which 
considered the testimony of Appellants' paid experts against 
the testimony of the Appellees. Appellants' argument is 
frivolous since duty was unarguably a legal issue to be decided 
by the trial court. 
B. SALT LAKE COUNTY APPELLEES OWED NO DUTY TO 
APPELLANTS 
Appellants contend that there are three possible bases 
giving rise to a duty to them: (1) the special relationship 
between Salt Lake County Appellees and Carolyn Trujillo; (2) 
Salt Lake County Appellees' status as community mental health 
care providers and (3) Salt Lake County Appellees' custodial 
relationship with Carolyn Trujillo while she was on probation. 
None of these bases support any duty. 
(1) THERE WAS NO DUTY CREATED BY REASON OF ANY 
SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP 
Appellants acknowledge in their brief that the general 
rule of law set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts §315 is 
that there is no duty to control the conduct of a third person 
to prevent him from causing harm to another; however, they 
claim that most courts have recognized the special relationship 
exception to this rule of nonliability involving a voluntary 
mental health patients and mental health care providers. This 
is untrue as the Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989) 
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case cited, and discussed at great length, by Appellants holds 
otherwise. Id, 1209-1212. 
According to the Perreira decision supra, courts have 
failed to impose any duty on mental health care providers for 
the actions of their voluntary patients for several reasons: 
the difficulty in forecasting whether a patient presents a 
serious danger of violence to others; the providers' limited 
opportunity to observe and determine the patient's violent 
propensities, lack of control over voluntary patients, as well 
as, the lack of specific threats against readily identifiable 
victims. [Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728; Brady 
v. Hopper, 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984)]. Also, courts which 
have focused on the control issue have found that the ability 
or right to control in a voluntary patient-mental health care 
provider relationship to be so lacking that there is no special 
relationship to give rise to a duty to protect third parties. 
rHasenai v. U.S., 541 F.Supp. 999 (D.Md 1983)] (768 P.2d at 
1209-1210). 
Appellants contend that courts have only refused to find 
duty in voluntary patient cases where the voluntary patient is 
resistant to treatment and has little or no history of 
violence. Cited in support of this contention are Cooke v. 
Berlin, 735 P.2d 830 (Ariz. App. 1987); Bradv v. Hooper, 751 
F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984); and Hasenai v. U.S. , 541 F.Supp. 99 
(D.Md. 1983). Assuming, arguendo, that this is an accurate 
representation of said holdings, and that this Court were 
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inclined to adopt such an approach to duty, it could not hold 
in this case that there was a duty owed to appellants since the 
undisputed facts show that Carolyn Truiillo was always 
treatment resistant and had little history of violence prior to 
her assault on Shaundra Hicrcrins. 
Appellants' assertion that most of the jurisdictions that 
have considered whether there is a duty to control voluntary 
patients have held there is a duty to control voluntary 
patients is inaccurate. The 10th Circuit Court in Hokansen v. 
U.S.. 868 F.2d 372 (1989) found otherwise: 
In any event, where voluntary patients are 
concerned most jurisdictions have declined to 
impose upon mental hospitals a common law duty 
of the type urged by the plaintiffs here. See, 
e.g., Hinkelman v. Borgess Medical Center, 157 
Mich.App. 314, 403 N.W.2d 547 (1987) (Duty to 
control vested by involuntary commitment. No 
such duty for voluntary patients); Case, 523 
F.Supp. at 319) (No liability for United States 
under FTCA in Ohio for actions of voluntary 
outpatient); Hasenei v. United States, 541 
F.Supp. 999 (D.Maryland 1982) (United States 
not liable for release of voluntary outpatient 
by Veteran's Administration psychiatrist under 
section 315 duty to control) ; see also Anthony 
v. United States, 616 F.Supp. 156 (S.D. Iowa 
1985) (no duty to confine voluntary alcoholism 
patient without a commitment order); but see 
Bradley Center, 296 S.E.2d at 693. Even were 
we to consider the special relationship theory 
properly raised, we can see nothing in Kansas 
law or precedent to suggest that the Kansas 
Supreme Court would go so far under §315 
analysis as to impose an affirmative duty to 
detain or seek an involuntary commitment in a 
case similar to this. Id. p. 378-379 
Appellants suggest that several of this Court's past 
decisions are consistent with "this analysis" (Appellants' 
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Brief p.38). It is unclear what approach to duty is claimed to 
have been previously adopted by this Court—duty to warn when a 
specific threat is made to an identifiable victim or a duty to 
establish control over a patient with violent propensities who 
seeks hospitalization. Salt Lake County Appellees contend that 
neither approach was adopted by this Court in Doe v. Arguelles, 
716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1983) nor in Little v. Division of Family 
Services. 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983). 
In Doe, plaintiff sued the State of Utah and others on 
behalf of her minor ward who had been raped, sodomized and 
stabbed by Arguelles, who was on conditional release from the 
youth detention center (YDC). This Court found that YDC 
statutorily retained legal custody and control over Arguelles 
when he was on conditional release and hence had a duty to 
oversee Arguelles while on conditional release. No statute 
made the Salt Lake County Appellees the legal custodians of 
Carolyn Trujillo at any time. 
Little involved an action against the Utah Division of 
Family Services (DFS) for the wrongful death of plaintiff's 
infant while in foster care DFS had petitioned for and received 
an order allowing it to take the infant and place it in foster 
care. This court recognized that DFS had the right and the 
duty to protect the infant based upon the fact that DFS 
statutorily had legal custody and control of the infant. In 
the present case there is no statutory basis for finding that 
the Salt Lake County Appellees had legal custody and control 
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over Carolyn Trujillo at any time. 
This Court's decision in Owens v. Garfield. 784 P.2d 1187 
(Utah 1989) does not support the finding of a special 
relationship and any duty to Appellants because absent in this 
case was the legal right to control Carolyn Trujillo at or 
before the stabbing in April, 1984. Also, there is no evidence 
in this case that the Appellants relied upon the Salt Lake 
County Appellees to adequately treat Carolyn Trujillo and to 
prevent injury to them. 
Appellants claim that the uncontestable evidence in this 
case establishes that the Salt Lake County Appellees had the 
ability to control Carolyn Trujillo in April 1984, by virtue of 
two court-ordered sentences and that in April, 1984 Salt Lake 
County Appellees had agreed to and assumed a duty to treat 
Carolyn Trujillo and to make full and accurate reports to 
probation authorities. No evidence supports these assertions. 
In fact, in April 1984, Carolyn Trujillo was not in the care of 
the Salt Lake County Appellees by virtue of Court ordered 
sentences nor was Carolyn Trujillo on probation since her 
probation had been terminated in January, 1983 by both state 
courts. Even if Trujillo had been on probation in April, 1984, 
she would have been "in the custody" of Adult Probation and 
Parole, which was part of the Department of Corrections, 
pursuant to §77-18-1, U.C.A. Also Salt Lake County Appellees 
were never under any duty at any time to report Carolyn 
Trujillo's progress in mental health treatment to Adult 
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Probation and Parole or to the state courts by reason of her 
court-ordered probations. 
Secondly, even if Carolyn Trujillo had voluntarily sought 
and requested care hospitalization at a Salt Lake County mental 
health treatment facility in February 1984, this did not place 
her in the legal custody of the Salt Lake County Appellees. 
Thirdly, while Carolyn Trujillo may have been entitled to 
mental health care pursuant to the Community Mental Health Act, 
the responsibility to supervise her treatment at any mental 
health facility was that of the Utah State Division of Mental 
Health, not that of the Salt Lake County Appellees pursuant to 
§64-7-7, U.C.A. 
Appellants last argument that the Salt Lake County 
Appellees had the right to control Trujillo" during 1984 
because of the voluntary admission and release or denial of 
release statutes (§64-7-29 and §64-7-31 U.C.A.) is ridiculous 
and no discussion warranted. 
(2) THERE WAS NO DUTY OWED TO THE PUBLIC 
Appellants contend that courts have universally 
recognized that health care providers owe a duty to the public 
to protect the public from their patients' infectious or 
contagious diseases. This duty is claimed to have been 
extended to impose upon mental care providers a duty to protect 
the public from harm caused by the criminal acts of their 
mentally ill persons who voluntarily seek community mental 
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health services. No Utah cases are cited in support of any 
such duty to the public. Furthermore, none of the cases cited 
by Appellants in their brief are factually similar to theie 
case. Also/ not all of the cases cited by Appellants recognize 
that public duty creates a duty to individuals and even if 
cases from other states did so, Utah caselaw holds that duties 
owed to the public are not owed to individuals. Obrav v. 
Malmbercr, 484 P.2d (Utah 1971; Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 
612 (Utah 1984). 
In Clark v. State. 472 NYS.2d 170 (1980), the 
psychiatrist continued the patient as an outpatient even 
through he had received information from two of the patients' 
close friends about the patient's deteriorating condition. In 
the present case, no close friends of Carolyn Trujillo informed 
the Salt Lake County Appellees that her condition was 
deteriorating prior to her criminal assault on Shaundra Higgins. 
The VA psychiatrists in the Jablonski v. Pauls. U.S. 712 
F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983) case did not warn the deceased that 
their outpatient, who was deceased's boyfriend, was dangerous 
even through deceased had told them that she feared her 
boyfriend/outpatient and that her boyfriend/outpatient's 
behavior was unusual and the psychiatrists had the opportunity 
to so warn. Also, the psychiatrists believed that the patient 
was dangerous and that there was an emergency but that there 
was no basis for emergency hospitalization. The 
boyfriend/outpatient had had a history of crimes upon his wife, 
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had recently attacked the deceased's mother, and the Court 
found that there was potential harm which was directed at a 
readily identifiable person, the deceased, and the 
psychiatrists had a duty to warn her and their failure to do so 
was a proximate cause of deceased's death. In the present 
case, the victim Shaundra Higgins, had had no relationship with 
Carolyn Trujillo, had not expressed concerns to Salt Lake 
County Appellees about Carolyn Trujillo's behavior and neither 
Shaundra Higgins nor her mother was readily identifiable as a 
potential victim of Carolyn Trujillo nor did Carolyn Trujillo 
have a past history of violence toward young neighborhood girls 
prior to the April 10, 1984 stabbing. 
The patient shot and killed decedent in Mcintosh v. 
Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. 1973). The physician knew that his 
patient was obsessed with the decedent and had previously shot 
BB's at her car or her boyfriend's car, yet the physician 
failed to warn decedent, her parents or the appropriate 
authorities. No such evidence of past danger to Appellants nor 
perception of danger to Appellants was present and hence there 
is no basis for any duty to warn. 
In Greenberg v. Barbour, 322 F.Supp 745 (E.D.Pa. 1971), 
the court denied summary judgment to a psychiatrist who had 
been informed of the dangers and homicidal state of a person 
who sought care at the state hospital and who failed to 
adequately convey the information to another doctor who in turn 
failed to consummate the person's admission. Salt Lake County 
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Appellees were not in possession of any such information about 
Carolyn Trujillo, nor did they fail to admit her to care. 
In Perreira v. State, 768 P. 2d 1198 (Colo. 1989), the 
defendants released an involuntarily committed patient who 
later shot and killed a policeman. The court did not determine 
that defendants owed a duty to the public; rather, they found a 
duty based upon the special relationship created by reason of 
involuntary commitment. Also present in that case was the fact 
that the patient was extremely delusional toward policemen and 
blamed them for his past problems. Hence, the deceased 
policeman was a readily identifiable victim. In the present 
case, there was no special relationship because Carolyn 
Trujillo was not an involuntarily committed patient and she had 
not had any delusions toward young neighborhood girls prior o 
her assault on Shaundra Higgins. 
Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988) imposed a duty 
to protect potential victims upon a state hospital psychiatrist 
who had released a patient from voluntary commitment more than 
five months before the patient, while psychotic, drove his car 
into that of plaintiff's deceased. This case is not factually 
similar to Appellants1. 
The court in Petersen v. State, 671 P. 2d 230 (Wash. 
1983), found a duty to take reasonable precaution in a case 
where a psychiatrist released an involuntary patient with a 
history of drug induced schizophrenia even through the patient 
had used drugs and operated a vehicle while out on a pass, the 
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evening before his release and who, five days after his 
release, while under the influence of drugs, was involved in an 
accident which injured plaintiff. Carolyn Trujillo had not 
been engaged in assaultive behavior before her discharge from 
ARTU, nor did she engage in assaultive behavior within five 
days after her release from HRTU. 
In Lipari v. Sears, 497 F.Supp. 185 (D.Nev. 1980) the 
court found a duty to detain a dangerous patient when the 
patient's leaving was against medical advice. In the present 
case, although Carolyn Trujillo was asked to stay at ARTU and 
declined to do so, no one believed her to be dangerous and 
hence no one had any legal basis to detain her by instituting 
an involuntary commitment proceeding. 
The Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 
P.2d 334 (1976) case is factually dissimilar from the present 
case because, although it involved a voluntary treatment 
relationship, the patient had made threats to kill an unnamed 
girl who was readily identifiable to the psychiatrist. In this 
case, Carolyn Trujillo had not made any threats of bodily 
injury to anyone and hence there was no danger to anyone much 
less to readily identifiable victims. 
Appellants state that this Court has cited with approval 
cases which impose a duty of care to the public. This is a 
blatant misrepresentation. Little, Owens, and Doe, supra, do 
not cite Payton. Peterson or Semler, supra, in recognition of a 
public duty; rather, this Court cited the Pavton, Peterson and 
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Semler cases in discussion and recognition of the difference 
between discretionary acts for which there is immunity from 
lawsuit and ministerial acts for which there is no immunity. 
(3) CAROLYN TRUJILLO'S 1981 SENTENCES IMPOSED 
NO DUTY UPON THE SALT LAKE COUNTY APPELLEES 
Appellants contend that because of the Salt Lake County 
Appellees' role in the Utah criminal justice system in 1981 and 
their voluntary "acceptance" of Carolyn Trujillo as a patient 
in accordance with the court sentences, their failure to 
provide Carolyn Trujillo with mental health treatment or 
failure to see that Carolyn Trujillo met the conditions of her 
probations to receive mental health treatment, that the Salt 
Lake County Appellees breach of said duties resulted in injury 
to Appellants. These contentions are fallicious because the 
Salt Lake County Appellees were not involved in the criminal 
proceedings against Carolyn Trujillo in 1981 and had no duty to 
treat Carolyn Trujillo nor to insure that Carolyn complied with 
the terms of her two probations. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT KATHY LYNN HIGGINS' CLAIM IS BARRED 
BECAUSE SHE FAILED TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM 
Section 63-30-11, U.C.A, of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act requires any person who has a claim for injury 
against a governmental entity (county) or its employees to 
file, prior to commencing a lawsuit, a Notice of Claim in 
accordance with the requirements of §63-30-13, U.C.A. The 
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Notice of Claim must be file within a year after the claim 
arises, and the failure to file a timely Notice of Claim 
forever bars the prosecution of the claim. (§63-30-13 U.C.A.) 
In the case before this Court, Appellant Kathy Lynn 
Higgins claims damages for infliction of emotional distress. 
Although Appellant Kathy Lynn Higgins caused a Notice of Claim 
to be filed on behalf of her minor child, Shaundra, she failed 
to file a Notice of Claim on her own behalf against Salt Lake 
County or to include her own claim in the Notice filed on 
behalf of her daughter. Hence, Appellant Kathy Lynn Higgins' 
lawsuit against Defendant Salt Lake County is barred and her 
claim/lawsuit must be dismissed. Yeates v. Vernal Family 
Health Center. 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980), Varoz v. Sevey, 506 
P.2d 435 (Utah 1973) and Edwards v. Iron County. 531 P.2d 476 
(Utah 1975). 
POINT III 
SECTION 63-30-10 BARS THIS ACTION 
Appellants7 action against the Salt Lake County Appellees 
is barred by the provisions of §63-30-10, U.C.A. which 
prohibits all lawsuits for injuries arising out of the exercise 
of a discretionary function, as well as, out of assault and 
battery, or the infliction of mental anguish. 
The claimed omission of Salt Lake County Appellees to 
commit Carolyn Trujillo was a discretionary act for which they 
are immune from lawsuit under §63-30-10, U.C.A. 
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In Connell v. Tooele City. 572 P.2d 697 (1977), plaintiff 
brought an action claiming negligence on the part of the clerk 
and her deputy, as well as, Tooele City. Plaintiff alleged in 
his Complaint that he was issued a citation for speeding which 
was entered on the docket books of Tooele City Court in two 
different places and given two separate case numbers. He was 
subsequently found guilty of the offense and fined and paid the 
fine. A conviction was entered under both case numbers on the 
docket books, but payment of the fine was entered only in one 
case. A bench warrant was issued in the second case and 
plaintiff was arrested but later released when he produced a 
receipt for payment of the fine. Plaintiff was again arrested 
when a clerk failed to enter payment of the fine on the second 
docket and to recall the bench warrant. Defendant Tooele City 
moved to dismiss the Complaint against it on the grounds that 
it was immune from suit under the provisions of §63-30-10(2), 
U.C.A. for injuries arising out of false arrest. This Court, 
affirmed the lower court's decision that Tooele City was immune 
from lawsuit and found that the legislature intended to retain 
the immunity of the governmental entity in a case. Although 
the plaintiff's had alleged negligence of the clerk in keeping 
her books, all the injuries claimed by plaintiff arose out of 
plaintiff's arrest, one of the excepted torts set forth in 
§63-30-10(2), U.C.A. 
In the present case, Appellants' injuries arose out of an 
assault by, and the infliction of mental distress by Carolyn 
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Trujillo. Hence Appellants' claims are barred by §63-30-10, 
U.C.A. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT KATHY HIGGINS HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION 
Appellant Kathy Higgins' claim is for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. Since she was not present at 
the time Carolyn Trujillo stabbed Shaundra, she was not within 
the "zone of danger" and did not fear for her own safety and 
hence has no cause of action. Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 
785 (Utah 1988) 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT FOR APPELLEES DID 
NOT VIOLATE THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTIONS 
Appellants raise Article I, Section 11, of the Utah 
Constitution in support of the proposition that they have been 
unconstitutionally denied a remedy by the trial court's summary 
judgment in this case. Citing this court's analysis of the 
Utah Open Court Provision in Berry v. Beech Aircraft. 717 P.2d 
670 (Utah 1985), Appellants contend that they were denied 
judicial process and "remedies designed to protect basic 
individual rights without sufficient justification." Id. 
Berry dealt with legislative abrogation of a cause of action by 
enactment of a statute of repose which did not occur in this 
case. Also, it is clear in Berry that the Utah Open Court 
Provision does not guarantee a cause of action to every 
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potential litigant and that causes of action and remedies may 
be denied with "sufficient justification". Additionally, 
lf[t]he term "rights" when used with reference to Section 11, is 
used loosely...What Section 11 is primarily concerned with is 
not particular, identifiable causes of action as such, but with 
the availability of legal remedies..." Id. at 676 n.4 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Salt 
Lake County Appellees was not an abrogation of Appellants' 
rights similar to the legislative enactment in the Berry case 
because there was "sufficient justification" to excuse 
liability in this lawsuit. Specifically, there should be 
liability limitations for mental health care providers who are 
only remotely able to predict the often dangerous behavior of 
their voluntary patients. Furthermore, this limitation on 
liability "reasonably and substantially advances" the purpose 
of avoiding a chilling effect upon the practice of mental 
health disciplines. Id. at 683. 
Condemarin v. The University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 
1989) , was a Section 11 case analyzing a legislative expansion 
of governmental immunity and it is distinguishable from the 
case at hand which simply recognized, reaffirmed and applied 
the existing law in Utah on third party liability. Hence, the 
trial court's ruling that there was no duty owed to Appellants 
did not broadly affect the "availability of legal remedies" to 
Appellees. Berry, supra. Nor did the trial court's 
recognition of the prevailing Utah law on third party liability 
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abrogate Appellants' remedy by expanding or contracting of the 
rights of either party. 
Appellants' rights were not unconstitutionally affected 
by the trial court's action in granting summary judgment to the 
Salt Lake County Appellees. The Berry court observed: 
"[o]bviously, Section 11 rights also are subject to reasonable 
rules of procedure for the ajudication [of] rights." Berry, at 
677, n.5. Summary judgment has long been a rule justified by 
"the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
action" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 and 
generally proper only when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and...the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(C). 
Appellants claim that recovery for personal injury is a 
substantive right guaranteed by Due Process under the Utah 
Constitutions' Open Courts Provision and the United States 
Constitution and allege "there is no meaningful alternative 
allowed to seek redress for injury" and the ruling favors 
psychotherapists/mental health care providers' economic 
interest in avoiding liability over the Appellants' interest in 
recovering damages." (Appellants' Brief p. 50). 
The meaning of Due Process in the context of the Open 
Courts Provision has been addressed by this Court. In 
Condemarin v. The University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989) 
this Court observed: "[A]rticle I, Section 11...we determined 
that the clear implication of this language is "that an 
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individual may not be arbitrarily deprived of effective 
remedies designed to protect basic individual rights." 
[emphasis added]. This language makes it clear that rights 
assured under Section 11 are protected if arbitrarily deprived, 
and implies that Appellants are not always guaranteed a remedy 
under Due Process. 
The Condemarin court approved an analysis used to weight 
the competing interests of individual remedies and public 
policies for limiting them: 
"The analytic process presented in Berry under 
Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution 
was referred to as a "balancing analysis"... 
A legislative determination to interfere 
with, limit or abrogate the availability of 
remedies for injuries to person, property, or 
reputation requires an important state interest 
and a rational means of implementation 
[intermediate scrutiny]." 
Condemarin at 358. This intermediate level of scrutiny for Due 
Process claims balances remedies against limitations. The 
result is that not every cause of action is recognized: i.e., 
not every remedy is guaranteed. 
Additionally, Salt Lake County Appellees contend that 
ruling that there was no duty owed to Appellees did not defeat 
a substantive right so fundamental that there was a denial of 
Due Process under the United States Constitution: 
we cannot accept the contention that this 
statute deprived [the] victim of her life 
without the due process of law because it 
condoned a parole decision that led directly to 
her death. The statute neither authorized nor 
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immunized the deliberate killing of any human 
being. It is not the equivalent of a death 
penalty statute which expressly authorizes 
state agents to take a person's life. This 
statute merely provides a defense to potential 
state tort-law liability. 
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980). See also Bowers 
v. Devito. 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982): 
"there is no constitutional right to be 
protected by the state against being murdered 
by criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the 
state fails to protect its residents against 
such predators but it does not violate the due 
process clause of the 14 th Amendment or, we 
support, any other provision of the 
Constitution." 
Cited in Dimas v. County of Quay, N.M. . 730 F.Supp. 373, 380 
(D.N.M. 1990). 
In summary, there was no arbitrary deprivation of 
Appellants7 due process rights or remedies as a result of the 
trial court's ruling on duty inasmuch as public policy mandates 
reasonable limitations on liability in this area. Second, the 
right to be free from personal injury does not necessarily 
attach to governmental entities nor inure to Appellants in such 
a way that denial of a remedy on their cause of action amounts 
to a denial of Due Process. 
Appellants also contend that the ruling below results in 
the disparate treatment of victims and arbitrary immunization 
of mental health care providers from liability. Salt Lake 
County Appellees respond that there is a reasonable 
relationship between the goals of the nonliability and the 
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means used to achieve it, to give the rule of law 
constitutional legitimacy under both the Utah Constitution and 
the United States Constitution: 
The determination of reasonableness must take 
into account the extent to which the 
constitutional right—in this case the right to 
sue for a full recovery under Article I, 
Section 11—is diminished and the extent to 
which the burden imposed actually furthers the 
legislative goals, as well as the importance of 
those goals. 
Condermarin at 373 (Stewart). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's judgment for the Salt Lake County Appellees. 
DATED this */d-A day of February, 1991. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
PATRICIA J. W^LOWE A^ 
Deputy County Attorney " 
Governmental Services Division 
Attorney for Salt Lake County 
Appellees 
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Addenda 
26-17-12 D i v i s i o n of m e n t a l h e a l t h - C r e a t i o n - D u t i e s and 
responsibHi t ies.-There is created the division of mental health which 
shall be within the department of social services under the administration 
and general supervision of the executive director of social services, and 
under the policy direction o* the board of mental health The division of 
mental health shall be the mental health authority for the State of Utah and 
shall have the following duties and responsibilities 
(1) To review and coordinate mental health .unctions within the division and with related 
activities of other state agencies 
(2) To assist and consult with local mental health authorities and with local mental 
health advisory councils in the establishment of community mental health programs, 
which may include prevention, rehabilitation, case-finding, diagnosis and treatment 
of the mentally ill, and consultation and education for groups and individuals 
regarding mental health 
(3) To collect and disseminate information pertaining to mental health 
(4) To develop, administer, and supervise a comprehensive state program for care of the 
mentally disabled, both within state and local hospitals and on an out-patient basis 
(5) To have general direction over tha Utah State Hospital at Provo 
(6) To perform such other acts as are necessary to promote mental health in the state 
26-17-5 Distribution of funds for mental health programs. —(1) The division of 
mental health shall provide an equitable distribution of funds appropriated 
or otherwise available for mental health programs among those counties 
and cities eligible to perform these services for the division of mental health 
and which are seeking contracts to provide mental health service The 
division shall recommend an appropriation for comprehensive community 
mental health based on a per capita figure for the population residing within 
the jurisdictions of local mental health authorities. The per capita rate shall 
be based on state general fund monies appropriated by the legislature and 
federal grants designated by the division of mental health with the approval 
of the legislature 
26-17-7 Mental health services authorized-Felony to attempt to change 
individual's belief about God.-Commumty mental health services are 
authorized to be provided by cities and counties in accordance with the 
provisions of this act Such services shall include one or more of the 
following outpatient mental health clinics, rehabilitation services for 
persons suffering from mental disorders, consultant and educational 
services, and other activities necessary to protect and promote mental 
health It shall be a felony to give psychiatric treatment, nonvocational 
mental health counseling, case-finding testing, psychoanalysis, drugs, 
shock treatment, lobotomy, or surgery to any individual for the purpose of 
changing his concept of, belief about, or faith in God. 
64-7-7 
men ta7heZ S H ^ T * ° f m e n t a , , y m Persons.-The division of 
mpntf i i f a V e t h e r e sP°n s 'b ihty for supervision and treatment of 
mentally ill persons in the state, who have been admitted to its care under 
t h e D r O V I S I O n S Of th><, XCt W h p f h p r r ^ r i m n , „ t h o h „ c n , * o , rsr * l e « » , h I L 
(4) "Designated examiner" means a licensed physician, preferably a psychiatr ist, 
designated by the division of mental health as specially qualified by training or 
experience in the diagnosis of mental or related illness or another l icensed mental 
64-7-32 I n y o l u n i a r y hosp i ta l i za t ion p r o c e d u r e s . —No person shal l be 
involuntarily hospitalized by reason of mental illness except under the 
following provisions 
(1) Emergency procedures for temporary hospitalization upon medical or designated 
examiner certif ication as provided in subsection (1) of section 64-7-34 
(2) Emergency procedures for temporary hospitalization without endorsement of 
medical or designated examiner, certif ication as provided in subsection (2) of section 
64-7-34 
(3) Hospitalization on court order as provided in section 64-7-36 
64-7-34 Temporary admission to menta l health fac i l i ty—Requirements and 
procedures —Costs. — (1) Any individual may temporarily be admitted to a 
mental health facility upon 
Written application by a responsible person who has reason to know, stating a 
belief that the individual is likely to cause serious injury to self or others if not 
immediately restrained, and the personal knowledge of the individual's condition 
or c ircumstances which lead to such belief, and 
A certif ication by a l icensed physician or designated examiner stating that the 
physician or designated examiner has examined the individual within a 
three-day period immediately preceding said certification and is of the opinion 
that the individual is mentally ill and, because of the individual's mental i l lness, 
is likely to injure self or others if not immediately restrained 
Such an application and certif icate shall authorize any mental health or peace 
officer to take the individual into custody and transport the individual to a mental 
health facil ity 
(2) If a duly authorized mental health officer or peace officei observes a person involved 
in conduct which leads the officer to have probable cause to believe that such person 
is mentally ill, as defined by this act, and that, because of such apparent mental 
il lness and conduct, there is a substantial likelihood of serious harm to that person or 
to others pending proceedings for examination and certif ication as provided in this 
act, the officer may take the person into protective custody A peace officer may 
transport a patient pursuant to this provision either on the basis of his own 
observation or on the basis of the observation of a menial health officer reported to 
him by the mental health officer Immediately thereafter, the officer shall transport 
the person to a mental health facility and there make application for the person's 
admission therein The aphcation shall be upon a prescribed form and shall include 
the following 
(a) 
(b) 
,a) A statement by the office, t h . , . J ^ X ^ I Z I Z h « l * oHiC^r reported 
l e s s , a'subsmnhal and immediate danger to self or others, 
(b) The specific nature of the danger. 
(e) A summary of the observations upon which the statement of danger ,s based. 
( d ) A statement of facts which caiied the person to the attention of the officer. 
( 3 ) Any person admitted under this - ; « ^ ^ / r e x p S n 0°,' S i f X excluding Saturdays Sundays arid ega h o h d a y . A t ^ ^ P ^ „ 
X % r ^ o < £ % t Z ™ ^ u S P ~ a „ b . released, except when 
fhe patfent has made voluntary application for adm.ss.on. 
M ) cos, o, a„ diagnosis > ^ ^ « ^ V ^ * K M ? , 
which such person is found unless »>- £ ° ™ " " » •
 w n i c n e v e n t , h e state 
S ^ S s ^ X ^ S c ^ «o Pay .he same In which even, tha, 
person shall pay. 
64-7-36. Involuntary hospi tal izat ion— ' Ixaminat ton of patient— Hearireg— 
Power of court— Findings— Costs.— (1) Proceedings for the 
involuntary hospitalization of an individual may be commenced by the filing 
of a written application with the district court of the county in which the 
proposed patient resides or is found, by a responsible person who has 
reason to know of the condition or circumstances of the proposed patient 
which lead to the belief that the individual is mentally ill and should be 
involuntarily hospitalized. Any such application shall be accompanied by: 
(2) 
(a) A certificate of a licensed physician or a designated examiner stating that within 
( }
 a seven-day period immediately preceding the certification the physician or 
designated examiner has examined the individual and is of the opinion that the 
fndMdual is mentally ill and should be involuntarily hospitalized, or 
/hi A uurittpn statement by the applicant that the individual has been requested to 
(
 buTha refused ? submit to an examination of mental condition by a licensed 
X s i S a n or designated examiner. Said application shall be sworn to under oath 
and shall state the facts upon which the application is based. 
Prior to issuing a judicial order, the court may require the applicant to consult a 
mint*! health facili v or may direct a mental health professional from a mental health 
facmty to tnterviewVeApplicant and the proposed patient to determine the existing 
facts and report them to the court. 
(3) 
(4) 
If the court finds from the application, any other statements under oath, or any 
Lnorts from a mental health professional that there is a reasonable basis to believe 
hat he proposed oalient-s mental condition and immediate danger to self, others or 
property require involuntary hospitalization pending examination and hearing, or if 
thP nronosed oatient has refused to submit to an interview w.th a mental health 
p r o f e s s ^ the court or to go to a treatment facility voluntarily, the 
Court may issue an order directed to a mental health officer or peace officer to 
immediately take the proposed patient to any mental health facility, or a temporary 
S r q V n c y facility as provided in section 64-7-38(2), there to be detained for the 
X o o s e of examinationuWithin 24 hours of the issuance of the order for examination 
'he dinlca director of a mental health facility or a designee shall report to the court 
oralS o in writing whether the patient is, in the opinion of the examiners, mentally .11. 
whether the patient has agreed to become a voluntary patient pursuant to section 
64-7-29 and whether treatment programs are available and acceptable without court 
nroceedings Based on such information, the court may without taking any further 
action terminate the proceedings and dismiss the application. In any event if the 
examiner reports'orally, the examiner shall immediately send the report in writing to 
the clerk of the court. 
Notice of the commencement of proceedings fcr involuntary hospitalization, setting 
forth the allegations of the application and any reported facts, together with a copy of 
anv official order of detention, shall be provided by the court to a proposed patient 
Drior to or upon, admission to a mental health facility or, with respect to any 
individual presently in a mental health facility whose status is being changed .rem 
voluntary to involuntary, upon the filing of an application for that purpose with the 
court. A copy of such order of detention must be maintained at the place of detention. 
Notice of the commencement of such proceedings shall be provided by the court as 
soon as practicable to the applicant, any legai guardian, any immediate adult family 
members the legal counsel for the parties involved, and any other persons the 
proposed'patient or the court shall designate, and shall advise such persons that a 
hearing thereon may be held within the time provided by law, unless the patient has 
refused to permit release of such information in which case the extent of notice shall 
be determined by the court. 
,6) Proceedings lor .he involuntary ^ ^ ^ J ^ ^ Z ^ ^ n Z ^ 
eighteen years who is under the continuing junsd ct on ot t n e I "
 a c c o r dance 
commenced by the < ^ ^ w ; m e n e p p ^ „ m ; he - niie c . u ^ ^ ^ ^ .__ 
s T c I s S s a r n ^ ^ S w ^ h e same authority as the district court. 
,7, „ there are no appropriate^enta,healthresources^thir, t h e ^ ^ ^ 
Z ^ ^ ^ ™ ^ * ' ^ ^ 1 no,
 b e adverse to the interest 
of the proposed patient. 
(8) Within twenty-.our hours. exc,udin8 S a t u r d a y s ^ f ^ ^ ^ i r S y 0 ^ 
issuance of a judicial order^ or arte f ^ ^ ^ ^ Z u c n , the court shail 
proposed patient under cour, order f o r ^ e ' - ™ ° n
 d t j e n t . „ r e q u ested Py 
appint two ^signatedexam.nersto « « ™ ~ * ; ^ ,
 a s £ n e o f t h . e x aminers a 
is.r ^ h.'rr.r,.xbor T ^ I S L *.«• net ^ »^. * 
harmful effect on the patient's health. 
(5) 
A time shall be set for a hearing to be held within ten coun aayb ui mc
 QHKw.,... - . - -
the designatea examiners unless said examiners or the cl inical director of the mental 
health facility shall inform the court prior to said hearing date that the patient is net 
mentally ill, that the patient has agreed to become a voluntary patient pursuant to 
sggtinn RA-7>?Q or tha f :rgp*rr..3nt nrcgrams am available and acceptable without 
court proceedings in which event the cou^t may without taking any further action 
terminate the proceedings and dismiss the application. 
(9) Prior to the hearing, an opportunity to be reoresented by counsel shall be afforded to 
every proposed patient, and if neither the patient nor others nrovirip r.nunsel. the 
•r.nnr-t^iaii appnjpt nounse1 anri^aiinw qiiff icifint time to consult with the patient prior 
to the hearing. In the case of an indiaent_patient. the payment of reasonable 
attorney's feesjor counsei^as,determin^d hy thp r.onrt shall be made by the county in 
which the patient resides or was found. The proposed patient, the applicant, and all 
other persons to whom notice is reauired to be given shall be afforded an opportunity 
to aopear at the hearing, to testify, and to present and cross-examine wi tnesses, and 
the court may in its discretion receive the testimony of any other person. The court 
may allow a waiver of the patient's right to appear only for good cause shown, which 
cause shall be made a matter of court record. The court is authorized to exclude all 
persons not necessary for the conduct of the proceedings and may, upon movicn of 
counsel, require the testimony of each examiner to be given out of the presence of 
any other examiners. The hearing shail be conducted in as informal a manner sc> f ray 
be consistent with orderly procedure and in a physical setting not likely to have a 
harmful effect on the mental health of the proposed patient. The court shall receive 
all relevant and material evidence which may be offered subject to the rules of 
evidence. 
The mentai health facility or the physician in charge of the patient's care shall 
provide to the court at the time of the hearing the following information: the detent ion 
order, the admission notes, the diagnosis, any doctors' orders, the progress notes, 
the nursing notes and the medication records pertaining to the current 
hospitalization. Said information shall aiso be supplied to the patient's counsel at the 
time of the hearing and at any time prior thereto upon request. 
(10) The court shall order hospitalization if, upon completion of the hear ing and 
consideration of the record, the court finds by Gleacaadi iQi iv j j i r^^ that : 
(a) The proposed patient has a mental i l lness; and 
(b) Because of the patient's illness the proposed patient poses an immediate 
danger of physical injury to others or self, which may include the inabi l i ty to 
provide the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter, if 
allowed to remain at liberty; and 
(c) The patient lacks the ability to engage in a rational decis ion-making process 
regarding the acceptance of mental treatment as demonstrated by ev idence of 
inability to weigh the possible costs and benefits of treatment; and 
(d) There is no appropriate less restrictive alternative to a court order of 
hospitalization; and 
(e) The hospital or mental health facility in which the individual is to be hospital ized 
pursuant to this act can provide the individual with treatment that is adequate 
and appropriate to the individual's conditions and needs. In the absence of the 
required findings of the court after the hearing, the court shall forthwith d ismiss 
the proceedings. 
(11) (a) The order of hospitalization shall designate the period for which the individual 
shall be treated. When the individual is not under an order of hospitalization at 
the time of the hearing, this period shall not exceed six months without benefit of 
a review hearing. Upon such a review hearing, to be commenced prior to the 
expiration of the previous order, an order for hospitalization may be for an 
indeterminate period, if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 
required conditions in section 64-7-36(10) will last for an indeterminate period. 
(b) The court shall maintain a current list of all patients under its order of 
hospitalization, which list shall be reviewed to determine those patients who 
have been under an order of hsopitalization for the designated period. At least 
two weeks prior to the expiration of the designated period of any order of 
hospitalization still in effect, the court that entered the original order shall so 
inform the clinical director of the mental health facility reasponsible for the care 
of such patient. The director shall immediately reexamine the reasons upon 
which the order of hospitalization was based. If the director and staff determine 
that the conditions justifying such hospitalization no longer exist, the director 
shall discharge the patient from involuntary treatment and make an immediate 
report thereof to the court and to the division of mental health. Otherwise, the 
court shall immediately appoint two designated examiners and proceed under 
subsections (8) through (10) of this section. 
(c) The clinical director of mental health facility or a designee responsible for the 
care of a patient under an order of hospitalization for an indeterminate period 
shall at six-month intervals re-examine the reasons upon which the order of 
indeterminate hospitalization was based. If the clinical director or the designee 
determine that the conditions justifying such hospitalization no longer exist, the 
director shall discharge the patient from involuntary treatment and make an 
immediate report thereof to the court and the division of mental health. If the 
clinical director or designee has determined that the conditions justifying such 
hospitalization continue to exist, the director shall send a written report of such 
findings to the court and to the division of mental health. The patient and the 
patient's counsel of record shall be notified in writing that the involuntary 
treatment will be continued, the reasons for such, and that the patient has the 
right to a review hearing by making a request to the court. Upon receiving the 
request, the court shall immediately appoint two designated examiners and 
proceed under subsection (8) through (10) of this section. 
(12) In the event that the designated examiners are unable, because of rerusal of a 
proposed patient to submit to an examination, to complete such examinatin upon 
the first attempt to conduct the same, the court shall fix a reasonable 
compensation to be paid to such designated examiners for services in the cause. 
(13) Any person hospitalized under this act or a person's legally designated 
representative who is aggrieved by the findings, conclusions and order of the 
court, shall have the right to a rehearing upon a petition filed with the court within 
thirty days of the entry of the court order. In the event the petition alleges error or 
mistake in the findings, the court shall appoint three impartial designated 
examiners previously unrelated to the case who shall conduct an additional 
examination of the patient. The rehearing shall in all other respects be 
conducted in the manner otherwise permitted. 
(14) Costs of all proceedings under this section shall be paid by the county in which 
the proposed patient resides or is found. 
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Section 
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ture in representing the state, 
its branches, members, or em-
ployees. 
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— Request — Cooperation — 
Payment of judgment. 
63-30-1, Short title. 
This act shall be known and may 
Immunity Act." 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 1. 
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this 
act," as used in this section, means Laws 1965, 
ch. 139, §§ 1 to 37, codified as §§ 63-30-1 to 
63-30-34. 
Cross-References. — .Comparative negli-
gence, §§ 78-27-37, 78-27-38. 
NOTES TO 
ANALYSIS 
Application of act. 
Equitable claims. 
Governmental function of sanitary district. 
School districts. 
Application of act. 
Governmental Immunity Act applies only to 
entities and does not include the entities' em-
ployees. Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925 
(Utah 1977). 
This act applies only to governmental enti-
ties and does not affect the personal liability of 
individuals for their own torts. Madsen v. 
State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978). 
Judicial review of a decision of the Division 
of State Lands to cancel a lease was authorized 
by former § 65-1-9 and did not require compli-
ance with the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Adkins v. Division of State Lands, 719 P.2d 
524 (Utah 1986). 
Equitable claims. 
The Governmental Immunity Act did not 
abolish the common-law exception of equitable 
claims from governmental immunity; claims 
COLLATERAL 
Utah Law Review. — The Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act: An Analysis, 1967 Utah 
L. Rev. 120. 
Misapplication of Governmental Immunity 
— Epting v. Utah, 1976 Utah L. Rev. 186. 
Section 
63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and 
defense costs by government 
employee. 
63-30-38. Indemnification of governmental 
entity by employee not re-
quired. 
be cited as the "Utah Governmental 
Insect infestation emergency control activi-
ties, immunity, § 4-35-8. 
Limitation of actions on claims against cit-
ies, § 78-12-30. 
Mailing claims to state or political subdivi-
sions, § 63-37-1 et seq. 
Voluntary services for public entities, immu-
nity from liability, §§ 63-30b-l to 63-30b-4. 
DECISIONS 
for overcharges on water and sewer service and 
for discrimination in failing to provide usual 
city services were equitable in nature, and gov-
ernmental immunity and lack of notice were 
not available as defenses. El Rancho Enters., 
Inc., v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778 (Utah 
1977). 
Governmental immunity is not a defense to 
equitable claims. Bowles v. State ex rel. De-
partment of Transp., 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah 
1982). 
Governmental function of sanitary district. 
Operation of sewage facilities by sanitary 
district was governmental function and, prior 
to Governmental Immunity Act, district en-
joyed immunity from suit for damages. John-
son v. Salt Lake County Cottonwood San. Dist., 
20 Utah 2d 389, 438 P.2d 706 (1968). 
School districts. 
Nothing in this act transforms school dis-
tricts into entities separate and distinct from 
the state; action against school board is action 
against the state for sovereign immunity pur-
poses. Harris v. Tooele County School Dist., 
471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973). 
REFERENCES 
Recent Developments in Utah Law, 1980 
Utah L. Rev. 649. 
A New Perspective — Has Utah Entered the 
Twentieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981 Utah L. 
Rev. 495. 
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Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi- Schools: immunity of private schools and in-
cial Decisions — Torts, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 244. stitutions of higher learning from liability in 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal tort, 38 A.L.R.3d 480. 
Corporations, Counties and Other Political Sovereign immunity doctrine as precluding 
Subdivisions § 680 et seq.; 57 Am. Jur. 2d Mu- suit against sister state for tort committed 
nicipal, School, and State Tort Liability § 1 et within forum state, 81 A.L.R.3d 1239. 
seq.; 68 Am. Jur. 2d Schools §§ 16, 63, 66; 72 Official immunity of state national guard 
Am. Jur. 2d States, Territories, and Dependen- members, 52 A.L.R.4th 1095. 
cies §§ 99 to 128. Liability to one struck by golf ball, 53 
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Counties §§ 215 to 221, A.L.R.4th 282. 
297 to 338; 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations Liability of school authorities for hiring or 
§ 745 et seq.; 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations retaining incompetent or otherwise unsuitable 
§§ 2173 to 2214; 78 C.J.S. Schools and School teacher, 60 A.L.R.4th 260. 
Districts §§ 100,153, 238, 318 to 322; 79 C.J.S. Tort liability of United States under Claims 
Schools and School Districts §§ 423 to 444; Act for acts committed by aliens, 78 A.L.R. 
81A C.J.S. States §§ 196 to 202, 267 et seq. Fed. 683. 
A.L.R. — Contractors: right of contractor Calculations of attorneys' fees under Federal 
with federal, state, or local public body to lat- Tort Claims Act — 28 USCS § 2678, 86 A.L.R. 
ter's immunity from tort liability, 9 A.L.R.3d Fed. 866. 
382. Key Numbers. — Counties «=» 141 to 148, 
Schools: modern status of doctrine of sover- 197 to 228; Municipal Corporations ®=> 723 et 
eign immunity as applied to public schools and seq., 1001 to 1040; Schools and School Districts 
institutions of higher learning, 33 A.L.R.3d <s= 148(6), 88 to 89.19, 112 to 126, 147; States 
703. «=» 112, 169 et seq., 191. 
63-30-2, Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages 
against a governmental entity or against an employee. 
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, em-
ployees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing 
body, members of a board, members of a commission, or members of 
an advisory body, student teachers certificated in accordance with 
Section 53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing 
services to members of the public in the course of an approved medi-
cal, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training pro-
gram, volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent 
contractor. 
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsec-
tion (2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position re-
ceives compensation. 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivi-
sions as defined in this chapter. 
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, opera-
tion, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or 
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is char-
acterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental func-
tion, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential 
to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or 
could be performed by private enterprise or private persons. 
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any depart-
ment, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity. 
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of prop-
erty, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate, 
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent. 
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(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property 
damage. 
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school dis-
trict, public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement 
or taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corpora-
tion. 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, es-
tate, or interest m real or personal property. 
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, depart-
ment, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, 
university, or other instrumentality of the state. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 2; 1973, ch. 
103, § 2; 1978, ch. 27, § 1; 1981, ch. 116, § 1; 
1983, ch. 129, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 2; 1987 (1st 
S.S.), ch. 4, § 1; 1988, ch. 2, § 338. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment alphabetized the definitions of this sec-
tion and renumbered the subsections accord-
ingly, added present Subsection (4), and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctua-
tion 
The 1987 (1st S S ) amendment, effective 
June 3, 1987, designated the former provisions 
of Subsection (2) as (2)(a) and added subsection 
(2)(b), and substituted "includes a governmen-
tal entity's officers, employees, servants, 
trustees, commissioners, members of a govern-
ing body, members of a board, members of a 
commission, or members of an advisory body" 
for "means any officer, employee, oi servant of 
a governmental entity, whether or not compen-
sated, including" and inserted "but does not 
include an independent contractor" in Subsec-
tion (2)(a) 
The 1988 amendment, effective February 2, 
1988, in Subsection (2)(a) substituted "53A-6-
101" for "53-2-15 " 
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ANALYSIS 
"Governmental entity " 
"Injury " 
"Governmental entity." 
Complaint of inmate of state prison for dam-
ages from injuries inflicted by fellow prisoner 
was properly dismissed as to state which is 
governmental entity within meaning of statute 
defining "governmental entity" and because 
statute waiving sovereign immunity from neg-
ligent acts of all governmental entities specifi-
cally excepts injuries arising out of incarcera-
tion of any person in any state prison from the 
operation of the statute, although warden of 
the state prison is not "governmental entity" 
within statute and consequently was not im-
mune from suit for alleged negligence, com-
plaint against him was properly dismissed un-
der common-law rule that where one inmate 
has injured another, warden and other prison 
officers are protected by doctrine of sovereign 
immunity against claims of negligence so long 
as they are acting in good faith Sheffield v 
Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P 2d 367 (1968) 
"Injury." 
When state university constructed building, 
parking lot, and road which diverted surface 
water flow onto adjoining owner's land and 
basement, landowner was "injured" within 
meaning of Subsection (6) Sanford v Univer-
sity of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P 2d 741 
(1971) 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided m this chapter, all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nurs-
ing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in 
either public or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the con-
struction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental 
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entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental enti-
ties and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or 
damage resulting from those activities. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 3; 1978, ch. 27, 
§ 2; 1981, ch. 116, § 2; 1984, ch. 33, § 1; 1985, 
ch. 93, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
ment inserted "and other natural disasters" in 
the second paragraph. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Construction and application. 
Equitable claims. 
Escrowed fund disbursement. 
Extent of immunity. 
Failure or omission to act. 
Financial institution supervision. 
Golf courses. 
Governmental function. 
Health care facilities. 
Hospitals. 
Misrepresentation by city. 
Personal liability. 
Proprietary or governmental function. 
Recreational opportunities provided by city. 
Right to maintain action. 
Sewer system. 
Street repair and construction. 
Subdivision plan approval. 
Test for determining governmental immunity. 
Water system. 
Constitutionality. 
It is within power of legislature to impose 
such conditions upon right to sue cities and 
towns, which are merely arms of state govern-
ment, as in its judgment may seem wise and 
proper. Berger v. Salt Lake City, 56 Utah 403, 
191 P. 233, 13 A.L.R. 5 (1920). 
Construction and application. 
This section indicates an intention that the 
act be strictly applied to preserve sovereign im-
munity and to waive it only as clearly ex-
pressed therein. Holt v. Utah State Rd. Comm., 
30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 (1973); Epting v. 
State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976). 
Equitable claims. 
Governmental immunity is not a defense to 
equitable claims. Bowles v. State ex rel. De-
partment of Transp., 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah 
1982). 
Escrowed fund disbursement. 
The supervision of disbursement of escrowed 
funds is not of such a unique nature that it 
could only be performed by a governmental en-
tity and is not essential to the core of govern-
mental activity; therefore, disbursement of es-
crowed funds does not constitute a governmen-
tal function for purposes of this section and is 
not subject to the notice requirement of 
§ 63-30-11. Cox v. Utah Mtg. & Loan Corp., 
716 P.2d 783 (Utah 1986). 
Extent of immunity. 
Classification of operation of governmental 
entity as "governmental function" does not sig-
nal unconditional immunity under this section 
since the grant of immunity is expressly sub-
jected to operation of other sections of this act. 
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). 
Failure or omission to act 
This section provides immunity from suit for 
injuries resulting from both acts of commission 
and omission involving the exercise of a gov-
ernmental function. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 
P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). 
Financial institution supervision. 
State's supervision of financial institutions 
is of such a unique nature that it can only be 
performed by a governmental agency and con-
stitutes the exercise of a governmental func-
tion. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 
1983). 
Golf courses. 
Operation of a public golf course is not essen-
tial to governing and is therefore not a govern-
mental operation with result that city is not 
immune from tort liability related to its opera-
tion of golf course. Standiford v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980). 
Governmental function. 
A lender's complaint against the State Tax 
Commission, claiming that the commission 
and its employees negligently failed to advise 
the lender that a duplicate vehicle title had 
been issued and improperly issued to the bor-
rower the title certificate upon which the 
lender relied in making its loan, was barred by 
governmental immunity. The issuance of mo-
tor vehicle titles and recordkeeping responsi-
bilities are governmental functions and have 
immunity under this section. Further, the stat-
utory waiver of immunity for negligence does 
not apply, according to § 63-30-10(l)(c), when 
the alleged injury arises out of the issuance of 
a title certificate. Metropolitan Fin. Co. v. 
State, 714 P.2d 293 (Utah 1986). 
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The regulation of public safety needs and the 
evaluation, installation, maintenance and im-
provement of safety signals or devices at rail-
road crossings is a governmental function. 
Gleave v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 749 P.2d 660 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Health care facilities. 
While 1978 amendment was not expressly 
made retroactive, the Supreme Court was dis-
inclined, as a matter of judicial policy, to disre-
gard the obvious manifestation of legislative 
intent reflected in the amendment; for that 
reason, the court held, in a case which arose 
prior to the amendment, that operation of a 
governmentally owned health care facility 
such as a university medical center was a "gov-
ernmental function" as contemplated by the 
statute prior to amendment. Frank v. State, 
613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). 
County mental health facility was a "govern-
mental health care facility" within the mean-
ing of this section. Birkner v. Salt Lake 
County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989). 
Hospitals. 
The state's operation of a hospital at a prison 
facility for treatment of prisoners is a govern-
mental function. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 
(Utah 1978). 
Misrepresentation by city. 
City is immune to tort action for deceit and 
misrepresentation in its advertisement for con-
struction bids which failed to disclose to bid-
ders that a competitive advantage had been 
granted to one corporation. Rapp v. Salt Lake 
City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974). 
Personal liability. 
The Governmental Immunity Act has no ap-
plication to individuals; however, under com-
mon-law principles, a governmental agent per-
forming a discretionary function is immune 
from suit for injury arising therefrom, but an 
employee acting in a ministerial capacity is not 
so protected; psychologist working with univer-
sity medical center on contractual basis and 
alleged to have been negligent in his treatment 
of suicidal patient was performing ministerial 
rather than discretionary acts, and thus was 
not afforded immunity from suit. Frank v. 
State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). 
Proprietary or governmental function. 
Four factors to be considered in determining 
whether an activity is a proprietary or a gov-
ernmental function are: (1) whether the activ-
ity is something that is done for the general 
public good; (2) whether it is generally re-
garded as a public responsibility; (3) whether 
there is any special pecuniary benefit to the 
city; and (4) whether it is in competition with 
free enterprise. Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 
530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975). 
Recreational opportunities provided by 
city. 
Governmental immunity was not a bar to a 
negligence action against a city for injuries 
sustained by a child when child's sled collided 
with a post on a city owned golf course that 
was open to the public for sledding in the win-
ter. Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 
432 (Utah 1981). 
Right to maintain action. 
The right to maintain an action against the 
state or its political subdivisions can result 
from a finding that the injury did not result 
from the exercise of a governmental function, 
or from a finding that even though the injury 
resulted from the exercise of a governmental 
function, the government's immunity has been 
expressly waived. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 
P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). 
Sewer system. 
Governmental immunity was not a bar to an 
action by property owner against city for dam-
age sustained when water backed into his 
home due to city's alleged negligence in main-
taining the sewer system. Thomas v. Clearfield 
City, 642 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982). 
An action for negligence against a sanitary 
district is not subject to the one-year limita-
tions period for actions against the govern-
ment, since operation of a sewer system is a 
nongovernmental function, and thus not pro-
tected by governmental immunity. Dalton v. 
Salt Lake Sub. San. Dist, 676 P.2d 399 (Utah 
1984). 
Street repair and construction. 
Duty of city to repair or construct streets 
within its corporate limits is a governmental 
one, and in absence of statute no liability de-
volves on municipality for defective condition 
of its streets. Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 
Utah 573, 111 P.2d 800 (1941) (decided under 
former law). 
Subdivision plan approval. 
City was immune from a damage suit based 
on its refusal to approve a subdivision plan, 
since its actions were deemed to be a "govern-
mental function." Seal v. Mapleton City, 598 
P.2d 1346 (Utah 1979). 
Test for determining governmental immu-
nity. 
Test for determining governmental immu-
nity is whether the activity under consider-
ation is of such a unique nature that it can 
only be performed by a governmental agency 
or that it is essential to the core of governmen-
tal activity; this new standard broadens gov-
ernmental liability. However, the position is 
consistent with the plain legislative intent of 
this chapter to expand governmental liability. 
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Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 
1230 (Utah 1980). 
Test for determining governmental immu-
nity is whether the activity under consider-
ation is of such a unique nature that it can 
only be performed by a governmental agency, 
referring not to what government may do but 
to what government alone must do, or that it is 
essential to the core of governmental activity, 
referring to those activities not unique in 
themselves but essential to the performance of 
those activities that are uniquely governmen-
tal. Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 
432 (Utah 1981). 
Water system. 
Where city operated water system as a com-
mercial venture in a proprietary capacity, it 
was liable for injuries allegedly suffered by 
plaintiff when she stepped on loose water 
meter lid whether the meter was on plaintiffs 
property or in the street. Gordon v. Provo City, 
15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P.2d 430 (1964). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Defin-
ing Governmental Function Under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, 9 J. Contemp. L. 
193 (1983). 
Journal of Energy Law and Policy. — 
Comment, The Only Way to Manage a Desert: 
Utah's Liability Immunity for Flood Control, 8 
J. Energy L. & Pol'y 95 (1987). 
A.L.R. — Liability of municipality for per-
sonal injury or death under mob violence or 
anti-lynching statutes, 26 A.L.R.3d 1142. 
Liability of municipality for property dam-
age under mob violence statutes, 26 A.L.R.3d 
1198. 
Modern status of rule excusing governmen-
tal unit from tort liability on theory that only 
general, not particular, duty was owed under 
circumstances, 38 A.L.R.4th 1194. 
Governmental tort liability for failure to pro-
vide police protection to specifically threatened 
crime victim, 46 A.L.R.4th 948. 
Failure to restrain drunk driver as ground of 
liability of state or local governmental unit or 
officer, 48 A.L.R.4th 287. 
Governmental liability for failure to post 
highway deer crossing warning signs, 59 
A.L.R.4th 1217. 
State's liability for personal injuries from 
criminal attack in state park, 59 A.L.R.4th 
1236. 
Tort liability of public authority for failure 
to remove parentally abused or neglected chil-
dren from parents' custody, 60 A.L.R.4th 942. 
Tort liability of college or university for in-
jury suffered by student as a result of own or 
fellow student's intoxication, 62 A.L.R.4th 81. 
Medical malpractice: hospital's liability for 
injury allegedly caused by failure to have prop-
erly qualified staff, 62 A.L.R.4th 692. 
Liability to one struck by golf club, 63 
A.L.R.4th 221. 
Tort liability of college, university, frater-
nity, or sorority for injury or death of member 
or prospective member by hazing or initiation 
activity, 68 A.L.R.4th 228. 
Governmental liability for negligence in li-
censing, regulating, or supervising private 
day-care home in which child is injured, 68 
A.L.R.4th 266. 
Construction and application of Federal Tort 
Claims Act provision excepting from coverage 
claims arising out of assault and battery (28 
USCS § 2680(h)), 88 A.L.R. Fed. 7. 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or de-
nial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity — 
Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Lim-
itations on personal liability. 
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, shall be 
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility insofar as 
governmental entities or their employees are concerned. If immunity from 
suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is granted and liability of the 
entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as adversely affecting any 
immunity from suit which a governmental entity or employee may otherwise 
assert under state or federal law. 
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury 
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such 
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employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority 
is, after the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil action or 
proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or the 
estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless the 
employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice. 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity 
in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for 
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held 
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color of authority, 
unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or 
malice. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 4; 1978, ch. 27, 
§ 3; 1983, ch. 129, § 3. 
Cross-References. — Compromise and set-
tlement, § 63-30-18. 
ANALYSIS 
Governmental immunity. 
—Governmental function. 
Official sued in representative capacity. 
Personal liability. 
—Applicability of section. 
—Remedy for wrongful act. 
Suit in federal court. 
Cited. 
Governmental immunity. 
—Governmental function. 
While legislative delegation of certain 
powers and duties surely establishes that the 
exercise and performance thereof is a govern-
mental function for purposes of a political sub-
division's authority to operate, it does not auto-
matically follow that the function qualifies as a 
"governmental function" for purposes of gov-
ernmental immunity analysis. Loveland v. 
Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987). 
In a homeowner's suit based on failure to 
construct a fence around a canal adjacent to 
the house, the city's procedure in review and 
approval of the relevant subdivision plans did 
not constitute a governmental function. 
Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763 
(Utah 1987). 
Official sued in representative capacity. 
A governmental official or employee can 
only be sued in a representative capacity when 
the governmental entity is liable; commis-
sioner of Department of Financial Institutions 
could not be sued in a representative capacity 
where the state was not liable. Madsen v. 
Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). 
Payment of medical and similar expenses 
not admissible to prove liability for injury, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 409. 
Personal liability. 
This section precludes personal liability of a 
governmental employee for acts or omissions 
occurring during the performance of his duties, 
unless the employee acted or failed to act 
through gross negligence, fraud or malice. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983) 
(decided prior to 1983 amendment). 
This section barred negligence claims 
against individual police officers, where plain-
tiff did not allege that the officers acted with 
fraud or malice in beating him after an alleged 
wrongful arrest. Maddocks v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 740 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987). 
—Applicability of section. 
Where parents contended that they were not 
subject to the 1978 amendment of this section 
because their cause of action accrued at the 
time they received and relied upon the negli-
gent advice of the doctors in 1977 that they 
could safely have another child, it was held 
that the injury in a wrongful birth claim can-
not precede the birth of the child, which was 10 
months after the effective date of the 1978 
amendment to this section. Since there was no 
allegation of gross negligence, fraud, or malice 
this section precluded the personal liability of 
the doctors. Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743 
P.2d 186 (Utah 1987). 
The 1983 amendment of this section deleting 
the provision making employees personally lia-
ble for gross negligence should be applied pro-
spectively only. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 
245 (Utah 1988). 
—Remedy for wrongful act. 
The 1978 amendment to this section did not 
leave the parents without a remedy for their 
wrongful birth injury by granting immunity 
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for simple negligence to doctors employed by stand unless Utah has waived its rights under 
the state, since parents had a remedy against the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
t e state for injuries arising out of the negli- tion; nor does the appearance of the attorney 
gent acts of state employees, but the parents general and the ensuing defense at trial serve 
failed to give notice of their claim to the state to waive the Eleventh Amendment right of the 
within one year as required by § 63-30-12. state to be sued in its own court, which is a 
Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186 jurisdictional question and may be raised at 
(Utah 1987). any time. Richins v. Industrial Constr. Inc., 
Suit in federal court. 
Judgment for damages entered by federal Cited in Lancaster v. Utah State Prison, 740 
502 F.2d 1051 (10th Cir. 1974) 
district court against state of Utah cannot P.2d 261 (Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments A.L.R. — Probation officer's liability for 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Torts, negligent supervision of probationer, 44 
1989 Utah L. Rev. 334. A.L.R.4th 638. 
63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligations. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any contrac-
tual obligation. Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations shall 
not be subject to the requirements of Section 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 
63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 5; 1975, ch. substituting "Actions" for "and actions" at the 
189, § 1; 1978, ch. 27, § 4; 1983, ch. 129, § 4; beginning of the second sentence; and inserted 
1985, ch. 82, § 1. "63-30-14, 63-30-15" near the end of the sec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- tion. 
ment divided the section into two sentences, 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 
F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986). 
63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions involving prop-
erty. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery 
of any property real or personal or for the possession thereof or to quiet title 
thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other liens thereon or to determine any 
adverse claim thereon, or secure any adjudication touching any mortgage or 
other lien said entity may have or claim on the property involved. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 6. Quiet title actions, § 78-40-1 et seq. 
Cross-References. — Mortgage foreclosure 
actions, § 78-37-1 et seq. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Construction and application. 
The waiver of immunity from suit "for the 
recovery of any property real or personal or for 
the possession thereof does not include an ac-
tion for damages for impairment of access to 
property caused by construction of highway 
underpass; this act should be strictly construed 
to preserve sovereign immunity and to waive it 
only as clearly expressed therein Holt v Utah 
State Rd. Comm., 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P 2d 1286 
(1973). 
63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury from negligent op-
eration of motor vehicles — Exception. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury result-
ing from the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or other 
equipment during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employ-
ment, or under color of authority; provided, however, that this section shall 
not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as defined by law and while 
being driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 7; 1983, ch. 
129, § 5. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Admiralty jurisdiction maritime 
nature of tort — modern cases, 80 A.L.R. Fed 
105 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defec-
tive, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, 
bridges, or other structures. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury 
caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, 
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other 
structure located thereon. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 8. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Complaint, sufficiency of allegations. 
Construction 
Contributory negligence 
Dangerous objects 
Discretionary function 
Ice and snow on sidewalk 
Manholes. 
Negligent construction. 
New duties not created 
Nondelegable duty 
Private developments 
Traffic signs 
Complaint, sufficiency of allegations. 
Claim for injuries "sustained on or about 
January 15, 1902, while walking on the side-
walk along First West street between Seventh 
and Eighth South, * * * through the negligence 
of the city in suffering * * * a fence * * * to be 
on said sidewalk," not having misled the city, 
was sufficiently definite. Connor v Salt Lake 
City, 28 Utah 248, 78 P 479 (1904) 
Where plaintiff sustained damages to his au-
tomobile on city streets, and presented a claim 
for "necessary repairs to automobile $133," he 
cannot claim and recover additional damages 
for $1,000 for its "depreciation in value and 
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general impairment," since such claim was not 
included in original claim, and could not be 
said to be proximate consequence of injuries 
therein included. Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 
Utah 306, 134 P. 1167 (1913). 
In suit for personal injuries sustained by fall-
ing on sidewalk of defendant city, plaintiff 
could not recover for permanent injuries in ex-
cess of amount claimed in notice to city on 
ground that injuries were more serious than at 
first supposed, where she alleged no excuse 
why she could not initially state all conse-
quences of injuries described in complaint. Ber-
ger v. Salt Lake City, 56 Utah 403, 191 P. 233, 
13 A.L.R. 5 (1920). 
Construction. 
A city is required to exercise reasonable care 
to keep its streets in safe condition and may be 
held liable for injuries proximately resulting 
from failure to do so and, in an action against 
city for injuries, the failure of a city to warn of 
or protect a row of dirt left in the street during 
the installation of a curb and gutter justified 
finding that city was negligent. Nyman v. Ce-
dar City, 12 Utah 2d 45, 361 P.2d 1114 (1961). 
Contributory negligence. 
Ordinarily, a pedestrian with prior knowl-
edge of a sidewalk defect and an unobstructed 
daylight view who steps into a visible defect is 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law. 
Eisner v. Salt Lake City, 120 Utah 675, 238 
P.2d 416 (1951). 
In order that a temporary forgetfulness may 
be excused, the cause diverting a pedestrian's 
attention from a known danger in a sidewalk 
must be unexpected and substantial. Other-
wise, the forgetfulness itself may constitute 
contributory negligence. Eisner v. Salt Lake 
City, 120 Utah 675, 238 P.2d 416 (1951). 
Dangerous objects. 
It is primary duty of city to exercise reason-
able care to maintain streets in reasonably safe 
condition, and to guard against injury to per-
sons and property by removing or making rea-
sonably safe any dangerous objects in streets. 
Morris v. Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 474, 101 P. 
373 (1909). 
Discretionary function. 
Power of public service commission under 
§ 54-4-14 to require public utility to construct 
and maintain appropriate safety devices at 
grade crossings is a discretionary function, and 
therefore § 63-30-10 excepts the commission 
from waiver of immunity for injuries caused by 
failure to require warnings at crossing. 
Velasquez v. Union Pac. R.R., 24 Utah 2d 217, 
469 P.2d 5 (1970). 
The design of a system of traffic-control 
semaphores did not involve "the basic policy 
making level" nor constitute a discretionary 
act for which § 63-30-10 would provide immu-
nity to the state in a tort action alleging dan-
gerously designed, constructed and maintained 
electric traffic-control semaphore caused an 
auto accident resulting in personal injury. Big-
elow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980). 
Ice and snow on sidewalk. 
Cities and towns are not liable for failure to 
keep sidewalks free from natural accumula-
tions of ice and snow, but may be held liable for 
injuries arising from such snow and ice upon 
streets or sidewalks which are placed there by 
their own acts. Berger v. Salt Lake City, 56 
Utah 403, 191 P. 233, 13 A.L.R. 5 (1920) (de-
cided under former law). 
Manholes. 
A city was liable for damages sustained 
when right rear wheel of automobile crashed 
through a defective manhole lid because the 
city was negligent in failing to maintain street 
in a reasonably safe condition for vehicular 
traffic by allowing a broken and cracked man-
hole lid to remain in the street. Wilson v. Salt 
Lake City, 13 Utah 2d 234, 371 P.2d 644 
(1962). 
Negligent construction. 
Where university construction diverted flow 
of surface water, flooding basement and caus-
ing other damage to adjoining landowner, gov-
ernmental immunity was waived and univer-
sity was liable to landowner. Sanford v. Uni-
versity of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 
(Utah 1971). 
There was adequate evidence to support jury 
finding that highway project of the state, in-
cluding the storm drain system, was unneces-
sarily defective or dangerous and had resulted 
in damage to plaintiffs' property by diversion 
of rainwater from channels which had previ-
ously carried it to points beyond the plaintiffs' 
properties. Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 
(Utah 1975). 
New duties not created. 
This section did not create any new duties 
but merely waived immunity, and since county 
had no duty to correct conditions on private 
property that obstructed motor bike driver's 
view of county road, it could not be held liable 
for driver's injuries caused as result of obstruc-
tion. Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 25 Utah 2d 
168, 478 P.2d 496 (1970). 
Nondelegable duty. 
A city is charged with a nondelegable duty to 
exercise due care in maintaining its streets 
and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition 
and may incur tort liability for breach of this 
duty by virtue of this section. Murray v. Ogden 
City, 548 P.2d 896 (Utah 1976). 
Private developments. 
This section's waiver of immunity applies 
only with regard to property in the public use, 
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not to private developments, such as an irriga-
tion canal owned by a private company. 
Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763 
(Utah 1987). 
Traffic signs. 
The maintenance and repair of traffic signs 
A.L.R. — Highways: governmental duty to 
provide curve warnings or markings, 57 
A.L.R.4th 342. 
Governmental tort liability as to highway 
median barriers, 58 A.L.R.4th 559. 
Governmental tort liability for injury to rol-
ler skater allegedly caused by sidewalk or 
street defects, 58 A.L.R.4th 1197. 
ANALYSIS 
Latent defective condition. 
Negligent construction. 
Notice to city. 
Nuisance action. 
Other public improvement. 
Private developments. 
Cited. 
Latent defective condition. 
Defect in a county storm drain that was dis-
coverable by a reasonable inspection was not a 
latent defect. Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 
P.2d 105 (Utah 1978). 
Negligent construction. 
Where university construction diverted flow 
of surface water, flooding basement and caus-
ing other damage to adjoining landowner, gov-
ernmental immunity was waived and univer-
sity was liable to landowner. Sanford v. Uni-
versity of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 
(1971). 
Notice to city. 
Requirement that notice of claim be given to 
political subdivision within ninety days (now 
is a governmental function for which immu-
nity from suit has been expressly waived and 
which is not within the discretionary function 
exception. Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 
(Utah 1985). 
Legal aspects of speed bumps, 60 A.L.R.4th 
1249. 
Highway contractor's liability to highway 
user for highway surface defects, 62 A.L.R.4th 
1067. 
State and local government liability for in-
jury or death of bicyclist due to defect or ob-
struction in public bicycle path, 68 A.L.R.4th 
204. 
one year) in § 63-30-13 is applicable to this 
section. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d 
1086 (Utah 1975) (decided under former law). 
Nuisance action. 
Intent of legislature was to include within 
the waiver of immunity an action for private 
nuisance in so far as the action is predicated on 
a dangerous or defective condition of a public 
improvement that unreasonably interferes 
with the use and enjoyment of the claimant's 
property. Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 
Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971). 
Other public improvement. 
Damages to house and basement partially 
incurred from defective conditions of sewer 
drain and canal fell under purview of this sec-
tion. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d 
1086 (Utah 1975). 
Private developments. 
This section's waiver of immunity for inju-
ries caused by defective conditions applies only 
with regard to conditions on property in the 
public use, not on private developments such 
as an irrigation canal owned by a private com-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or 
defective public building, structure, or other 
public improvement — Exception. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury 
caused from a dangerous or defective condition of any public building, struc-
ture, dam, reservoir or other public improvement. Immunity is not waived for 
latent defective conditions. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 9. 
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pany. Loveland v Orem City Corp., 746 P 2d Cited in Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 
763 (Utah 1987). 126 (Utah 1987) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Energy Law and Policy. — A.L.R. — State and local government liabil-
Comment, The Only Way to Manage a Desert: ity for injury or death of bicyclist due to defect 
Utah's Liability Immunity for Flood Control, 8 or obstruction in public bicycle path, 68 
J. Energy L. & Pol'y 95 (1987) A.L.R.4th 204. 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negli-
gent act or omissiqn of employee — Exceptions — 
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth 
amendment rights [Effective until July 1, 1990], 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
or 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, mali-
cious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or 
civil rights; or 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by 
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, li-
cense, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection or by reason of making 
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; or 
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or admin-
istrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; or 
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it 
is negligent or intentional; or 
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public dem-
onstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; or 
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment 
of taxes; or 
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison, 
county, or city jail or other place of legal confinement; or 
(k) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any 
activity authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(1) arises out of the activities of: 
(i) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(ii) fighting fire; 
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or 
hazardous waste; or 
(iv) emergency evacuations; or 
(m) arises out of research or implementation of cloud management or 
seeding for the clearing of fog. 
528 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 63-30-10 
(2) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth 
amendment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall be the 
exclusive remedy for injuries to those protected rights. 
(b) If Section 78-16-5 or Subsection 77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are 
held invalid or unconstitutional, this Subsection (2) shall be void and 
governmental entities shall remain immune from suit for violations of 
fourth amendment rights. 
Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent 
act or omission of employee — Exceptions — 
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth 
amendment rights [Effective July 1, 1990], 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of: 
(a) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prose-
cution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, inter-
ference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or civil rights; 
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization; 
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or 
negligent inspection of any property; 
(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative pro-
ceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; 
(f) a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it is negligent 
or intentional; 
(g) or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, 
mob violence, and civil disturbances; 
(h) or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(i) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city 
jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
(k) any natural condition on state lands or as the result of any activity 
authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(1) the activities of: 
(i) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(ii) fighting fire; 
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or 
hazardous wastes; or 
(iv) emergency evacuations; or 
(m) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for 
the clearing of fog. 
(2) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth 
amendment rights under Chapter 16, Title 78, which is the exclusive 
remedy for injuries to those protected rights. 
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(b) If Section 78-16-5 or Rule 12(g), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
or any parts of either of them are held invalid or unconstitutional, this 
subsection is void and governmental entities remain immune from suit 
for violations of fourth amendment rights. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch. 
194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, ch. 169, § 1; 
1989, ch. 185, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 3; 1989, 
ch. 268, § 29. 
Amended effective July 1, 1990. — Laws 
1989, ch. 187, § 3 amends this section effective 
July 1, 1990. See fourth paragraph of amend-
ment note below. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
ment, effective March 18, 1985, added Subsec-
tion (1)(1) and made minor changes in phraseol-
ogy. 
The 1989 amendment by ch. 185, effective 
April 24, 1989, added Subsection (l)(m) and 
designated the first and second sentences of 
Subsection (2) as Subsections (2)(a) and (b). 
The 1989 amendment by ch. 268, effective 
July 1,1989, substituted "Board of State Lands 
and Forestry" for "State Land 3oard" in Sub-
section (1)00, subdivided Subsection (1)(1) and 
made related punctuation changes, and re-
wrote Subsection (l)(l)(iii), which had read, 
"handling hazardous materials." 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Discretionary function. 
Escaped prisoner. 
False arrest. 
Foster care of children. 
Incarceration in state prison. 
Individual agents' immunity. 
Injunctions. 
Legislative intent. 
Misrepresentation in advertisement. 
Release from Youth Detention Center. 
Sale of recovered stolen property. 
State hospital patient. 
State prison inmate. 
Trees negligently cut. 
Vehicle title certificate. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
Because the good faith exception to the ex-
clusionary rule announced in United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 
2d 677 (1984), can never apply to investigatory 
stops and searches, and because Subsection 
77-35-12(g) purports to create a "good faith" 
exception to such searches, the Fourth Amend-
ment Enforcement Act (which added Subsec-
tion (2) to this section, amended §§ 67-15-5 
The 1989 amendment by ch. 187, effective 
 July 1, 1990, added "arises out of to the intro-
> ductory paragraph in Subsection (1) and de-
leted it from the beginning of each subsection 
3
 of Subsection (1); substituted "Board of State 
1
 Lands and Forestry" for "State Land Board" in 
Subsection (1)00; substituted "Rule 12(g), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure" for "Sub-
section 77-35-12(g)" in Subsection (2); and 
made minor stylistic changes. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
k Office of Legislative Research and General 
j Counsel. 
p Compiler's Notes. — Sections 78-16-5 and 
77-35-12(g) (Criminal Procedure Rule 12(g)), 
; cited in Subsection (2)(b), were held unconsti-
\ tutional in State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 
(Utah 1987). See case note under catchline 
I "Constitutionality," below. 
Cross-References. — Indemnification of 
public officers and employees, §§ 63-30-36 to 
63-30-38. 
and 77-35-12, and enacted §§ 77-23-12 and 
78-16-1 to 78-16-11) violates the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987). 
Discretionary function. 
Power of Public Service Commission under 
§ 54-4-14 to require public utility to construct 
and maintain appropriate safety devices at 
grade crossings is a discretionary function, so 
this section excepts the commission from 
waiver of immunity for injuries caused by fail-
ure to require warnings at crossings. 
Velasquez v. Union Pac. R.R., 24 Utah 2d 217, 
469 P.2d 5 (1970). 
The decision of a road supervisor to use 
berms as the sole method for warning a trav-
eler of a cut in an abandoned road was not a 
basic policy decision essential to the realiza-
tion or accomplishment of some basic govern-
mental policy, program, or objective, and 
therefore was not within the discretionary ex-
ception of this section. Carroll v. State Rd. 
Comm., 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972). 
Although the decision to build a highway 
and the general location of the highway were 
discretionary functions of the state, prepara-
tion of plans and specifications and supervision 
of the manner in which the work was carried 
out were not "discretionary" within the mean-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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ing of this section and did not exempt state 
from tort liability. Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 
1117 (Utah 1975). 
Psychiatric care of an individual patient is a 
ministerial, rather than a discretionary, func-
tion. Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). 
The design of a system of traffic-control 
semaphores did not involve "the basic policy 
making level" nor constitute a discretionary 
act for which this section would provide immu-
nity to the state in a tort action alleging dan-
gerously designed, constructed and maintained 
electric traffic-control semaphore caused an 
auto accident resulting in personal injury. Big-
elow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980). 
Failure of Department of Transportation to 
install different safety signals or devices at a 
particular railroad crossing was a purely dis-
cretionary function within the meaning of Sub-
section (l)(a). Gleave v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 
749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Escaped prisoner. 
State had not waived its immunity from suit 
for negligence in permitting escape of state 
prisoner who subsequently killed plaintiffs' 
mother; prisoner had escaped from a work re-
lease program in which he was placed at the 
discretion of prison authorities; therefore, 
state's negligence, if any, arose out of exercise 
of discretionary function and it was immune 
from suit under Subsection (1) (now (l)(a)) of 
this section; likewise, state was immune under 
Subsection (10) (now (l)(j)) because alleged 
negligence arose out of escapee's incarceration 
in a state prison. Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242 
(Utah 1976). 
False arrest. 
City was immune from suit claiming that 
plaintiff was arrested on a bench warrant due 
to city court clerk's failure to enter in the 
docket book that plaintiff had paid his fine. 
Connell v. Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 
1977). 
Foster care of children. 
Failure of Division of Family Services to 
properly evaluate the foster home, its failure to 
supervise the child's placement and its failure 
to protect her from harm was a breach of con-
duct implemental in nature, and when found to 
be negligent entitled the parents, upon the 
death of their child after she was placed in fos-
ter care, to maintain a wrongful death action 
against the Division of Family Services, which 
had obtained custody and guardianship of the 
child and placed her in foster care. Little v. 
Utah State Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49 
'Utah 1983). 
Incarceration in state prison. 
The exception of the waiver of governmental 
immunity for injuries arising out of the incar-
ceration of a person in the state prison is not a 
denial of equal protection nor is it against pub-
lic policy. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 
1978). 
This section barred a wrongful death action 
against the state and board of corrections for 
death of a prisoner due to alleged negligent 
treatment of the prisoner after surgery in the 
prison hospital. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 
(Utah 1978). 
State is immune under Subsection (10) (now 
(l)(j)) of this section from claim of inmate for 
negligent deprivation of property, but individ-
ual employees of the state are not immune. 
Schmitt v. Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979). 
This section barred an action by an inmate 
against the state prison for personal injuries he 
received in a fire at the prison where he was 
lawfully incarcerated. Lancaster v. Utah State 
Prison, 740 P.2d 261 (Utah 1987). 
Individual agents' immunity. 
Under Subsection (10) (now (l)(j)) of this sec-
tion, individual defendants are not immune 
from liability for their own torts. Schmitt v. 
Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979). 
Psychologist working with university medi-
cal center on contractual basis and alleged to 
have been negligent in his treatment of sui-
cidal patient was acting in a ministerial rather 
than discretionary capacity and thus was not 
immune from suit. Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 
517 (Utah 1980). 
Injunctions. 
The Utah State Tax Commission, as an 
agency of the state of Utah, has immunity from 
suits seeking to enjoin an investigation to de-
termine whether a taxpayer has violated any 
provision of the state individual income tax 
law. Hamilton v. Mengel, 629 F. Supp. 1110 
(D. Utah 1986). 
Legislative intent. 
Since the waiver of immunity in § 63-30-8 
and § 63-30-9 encompasses a much broader 
field of tort liability than merely negligent con-
duct of employees within the scope of their em-
ployment, the Legislature could not have in-
tended that this section, with its exceptions, 
should modify the preceding two sections even 
though it be conceded that the negligent con-
duct of an employee might be involved in an 
action for injuries caused by the creation or 
maintenance of a dangerous or defective condi-
tion. Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 
285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971). 
Misrepresentation in advertisement. 
City is immune to tort action for deceit and 
misrepresentation in its advertisement for con-
struction bids which failed to disclose to bid-
ders that a competitive advantage had been 
granted to one corporation. Rapp v. Salt Lake 
City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974). 
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Release from Youth Detention Center. 
In a guardian's suit on behalf of her ward 
who was raped, sodomized, and stabbed by a 
juvenile, summary judgment for the state and 
a Youth Detention Center superintendent was 
reversed and remanded for a trial to determine 
whether the ward's injuries resulted from the 
superintendent's negligence in monitoring pre-
scribed treatment after making a discretionary 
decision to release the juvenile into the com-
munity. Mary Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 
(Utah 1985). 
Sale of recovered stolen property. 
Where plaintiffs motorcycle was stolen, re-
covered, held for trial of alleged thief, then sold 
by State Tax Commission without notice to 
plaintiff (who never received notice letter), the 
motorcycle's sale did not involve such exercise 
of "basic policy evaluation" as to make it a dis-
cretionary decision under Subsection (1) (now 
(l)(a)) of this section, but rather the decision to 
sell was an operation function and not immune 
from attack; also, since defendant tax commis-
sion never claimed taxes were owing on the 
motorcycle and no taxes were deducted from 
the sale price, and since the motorcycle was 
being held as evidence in a criminal prosecu-
tion, the commission could not claim immunity 
on basis of the tax exception under Subsection 
(8) (now (l)(h)) of this section. Morrison v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 600 P.2d 553 (Utah 1979). 
State hospital patient. 
State was immune from liability for wrong-
ful death of patient who voluntarily entered 
state hospital since she was "incarcerated" or 
"confined" within the meaning of this section; 
"other place of legal confinement" includes the 
hospital. The fact that decedent was voluntary 
patient did not preclude conclusion that she 
was "incarcerated" since she had not sought 
release and had she done so, superintendent 
could obtain court order preventing her re-
lease. Emery v. State, 26 Utah 2d 1, 483 P.2d 
1296 (1971). 
State's immunity from suit was waived un-
der this section in action alleging negligent 
treatment of suicidal patient by psychiatrist 
and psychologist at university medical center. 
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). 
State prison inmate. 
Complaint of inmate of state prison for dam-
Utah Law Review. — Misapplication of 
Governmental Immunity — Epting v. Utah, 
1976 Utah L. Rev. 186. 
Journal of Energy Law and Policy. — 
Comment, The Only Way to Manage a Desert: 
ages from injuries inflicted by fellow prisoner 
was properly dismissed as to state which is 
governmental entity within meaning of statute 
defining "governmental entity" and because 
statute waiving sovereign immunity from neg-
ligent acts of all governmental entities specifi-
cally excepts injuries arising out of the incar-
ceration of any person in any state prison from 
the operation of the statute; although warden 
of state prison is not "governmental entity" 
within statute and consequently was not im-
mune from suit for alleged negligence, com-
plaint against him was properly dismissed un-
der common-law rule that where one inmate 
has injured another, warden and other prison 
officers are protected by doctrine of sovereign 
immunity against claims of negligence so long 
as they are acting in good faith. Sheffield v. 
Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 (1968). 
Trees negligently cut. 
City and sidewalk contractor were liable for 
damage sustained by abutting homeowner 
when trees were blown down as result of un-
necessary and negligent cutting of roots. Mor-
ris v. Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 474, 101 P. 373 
(1909). 
Vehicle title certificate. 
A lender's complaint against the State Tax 
Commission, claiming that the commission 
and its employees negligently failed to advise 
the lender that a duplicate vehicle title had 
been issued and that it had improperly issued 
to the borrower the title certificate upon which 
the lender relied in making its loan, was 
barred by governmental immunity. The issu-
ance of motor vehicle titles and recordkeeping 
responsibilities are governmental functions 
and have immunity under § 63-30-3. Further, 
the statutory waiver of immunity for negli-
gence does not apply, under Subsection (l)(c) of 
this section, when the alleged injury arises out 
of the issuance of a title certificate. Metropoli-
tan Fin. Co. v. State, 714 P.2d 293 (Utah 1986). 
Cited in Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 
126 (Utah 1987); Maddocks v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 740 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987); Loveland v. 
Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987); 
Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 
(Utah 1989). 
Utah's Liability Immunity for Flood Control, 8 
J. Energy L. & Pol'y 95 (1987). 
A.L.R. — Liability of municipality for build-
ing inspector's negligent performance of duties, 
41 A.L.R.3d 567. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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Municipal liability for negligent fire inspec-
tion and subsequent enforcement, 69 A.L.R.4th 
739. 
Applicability of libel and slander exception 
to waiver of sovereign immunity under Federal 
Tort Claims Act (28 USCS § 2680(h)), 79 
A.L.R. Fed. 826. 
Applicability of 28 USCS §§ 2680(a) and 
2680(h) to Federal Tort Claims Act liability 
arising out of government informant's conduct, 
85 A.L.R. Fed. 848. 
63-30-10-5- Waiver of immunity for taking private prop-
erty without compensation. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recov-
ery of compensation from the governmental entity when the governmental 
entity has taken or damaged private property without just compensation. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according to the require-
ments of Chapter 34, Title 78. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-10.5, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 75, § 3. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Development 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Civil Pro-
cedure, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 166. 
63-30-11, Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service 
— Legal disability. 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the 
claim were against a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against an employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall 
file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is character-
ized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are 
known. 
(b) The notice of claim shall be signed by the person making the claim 
or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian, and shall be 
directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity according 
to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, mentally incompetent 
and without a legal guardian, or imprisoned at the time the claim arises, 
Validity and construction of statute autho-
rizing or requiring governmental unit to in-
demnify public officer or employee for liability 
arising out of performance of public duties, 71 
A.L.R.3d 90. 
Governmental tort liability for failure to pro-
vide police protection to specifically threatened 
crime victim, 46 A.L.R.4th 948. 
Failure to restrain drunk driver as ground of 
liability of state or local governmental unit or 
officer, 48 A.L.R.4th 287. 
Liability of hospital or sanitarium for negli-
gence of physician or surgeon, 51 A.L.R.4th 
235. 
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the claimant may apply to the court to extend the time for service of 
notice of claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court 
may extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applica-
ble statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall 
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substan-
tially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the 
merits. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 11; 1978, ch. 
27, § 5; 1983, ch. 131, § 1; 1987, ch. 75, §> 4. 
Amendment Note. — The 1987 amend-
ment, in Subsection (2), added "before main-
taining an action, regardless of whether or not 
the function giving rise to the claim is charac-
terized as governmental" to the end of the sub-
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Action based on exercise of governmental func-
tion. 
Assignment of municipal debt. 
Clear statement of claims required. 
Conditions for right to recover. 
Damages not specified. 
Failure to file claim. 
Notice. 
Sufficiency of notice. 
Waiver of objections by city. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
Functions of the notice of claim requirement 
in giving the affected governmental entity an 
opportunity to promptly investigate and rem-
edy defects immediately, in avoiding unneces-
sary litigation, and in minimizing difficulties 
which might attend changes in administration 
provide sufficient justification for its imposi-
tion as to governmental but not other tort-fea-
sors, and therefore this section does not consti-
tute a denial of equal protection. Sears v. 
Southworth, 563 P.2d 192 (Utah 1977). 
Action based on exercise of governmental 
function. 
Action against state which was predicated 
on governmental supervision of financial insti-
tutions involved the exercise of a governmen-
tal function and was barred where there was 
no compliance with the notice of claim provi-
sions of §§ 63-30-11 and 63-30-12. Madsen v. 
Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). 
Assignment of municipal debt. 
Assignment directing city to pay debt it owes 
section; added the subsection designations 
within Subsections (3) and (4); in Subsection 
(4)(a), added "at the time the claim arises, the 
claimant may apply to the court to extend the 
time for service of notice of claim"; and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
assignor to assignee is not kind of claim re-
quired to be submitted to city in accordance 
with this statute. Cooper v. Holder, 21 Utah 2d 
40, 440 P.2d 15 (1968) (decided under former 
law). 
Clear statement of claims required. 
The purpose of this section is to require 
every claimant to state clearly all of the ele-
ments of his claims to the board of commis-
sioners or city council for allowance as a condi-
tion precedent to his right to sue the city and 
recover his damages in an ordinary action. 
Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 
1167 (1913). 
Conditions for right to recover. 
Statutory right to recover can be availed of 
only when there has been a compliance with 
the conditions upon which right is conferred. 
One who seeks to enforce the right must by 
allegation and proof bring himself within the 
conditions prescribed thereby. Hamilton v. Salt 
Lake City, 99 Utah 362, 106 P.2d 1028 (1940). 
Damages not specified. 
A claim which stated the time, place and 
general nature of the injury and the sidewalk 
defect causing it fulfilled the purpose of former 
section even though the amount of damages 
was not stated; since the claim had to be filed 
within thirty days of the injury, the exact 
amount of damages was impossible to ascer-
tain. Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 
362, 412 P.2d 449 (1966) (decided under former 
law). 
Failure to file claim. 
Where no claim was filed as required by this 
section, action to recover moneys expended to 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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construct bridge which city had agreed to con-
struct was barred. Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. 
Salt Lake City, 87 Utah 370, 49 P.2d 405 
(1934). 
Notice. 
The supervision of disbursement of escrowed 
funds is not of such a unique nature that it 
could only be performed by a governmental en-
tity and is not essential to the core of govern-
mental activity; therefore, disbursement of es-
crowed funds does not constitute a governmen-
tal function for purposes of § 63-30-3 and is not 
subject to the notice requirement of this sec-
tion. Cox v. Utah Mtg. & Loan Corp., 716 P.2d 
783 (Utah 1986). 
Service of notice is a precondition to suit. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988). 
Sufficiency of notice. 
Under this section, a notice in which dam-
ages were specified as "for general impair-
ment" of an automobile was an insufficient de-
scription of the damages and one which could 
not be cured by amendment. Sweet v. Salt 
A.L.R. — Amount of damages stated in no-
tice of claim against municipality or county as 
limiting amount of recovery, 24 A.L.R.3d 965. 
Incapacity caused by accident in suit as af-
fecting notice of claim required as condition of 
holding state and local governmental unit lia-
ble for personal injury, 44 A.L.R.3d 1108. 
Attorney's mistake or neglect as excuse for 
failing to file timely notice of tort claim 
against state or local governmental unit, 55 
A.L.R.3d 930. 
Waiting period: plaintiffs right to bring tort 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 12; 1978, ch. 
27, § 6; 1983, ch. 131, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment near the end of the section substituted 
"Section 63-30-11" for "Subsection 63-30-11(4)" 
and added "regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is character-
 Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1167 (1913) 
(decided under former law). 
> Waiver of objections by city. 
In action against city for injuries sustained 
as result of defective sidewalk, objection that 
plaintiffs claim was not verified and did not 
i
 sufficiently describe extent of injury was 
b
 waived by city, where it did not decline to con-
sider claim, but acted upon it. Bowman v. 
- Ogden City, 33 Utah 196, 93 P. 561 (1908) (de-
cided under former law). 
Failure to file claim barred action against 
 town; and consideration of claim by town did 
not waive the filing requirement. Hurley v. 
1 Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213 
(1924). 
City council had no discretion to waive veri-
fication of notice of street or sidewalk injury 
claims; evidence of waiver or estoppel by city 
employees respecting filing of notice was inad-
missible where not alleged. Hamilton v. Salt 
. Lake City, 99 Utah 362, 106 P.2d 1028 (1940) 
(decided under former law). 
I Cited in Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165 
: (Utah 1988). 
action against municipality prior to expiration 
of statutory waiting period, 73 A.L.R.3d 1019. 
Class action: maintenance of class action 
against governmental entity as affected by re-
quirement of notice of claim, 76 A.L.R.3d 1244. 
Local government tort liability: minority as 
affecting notice of claim requirement, 58 
A.L.R.4th 402. 
Insufficiency of notice of claim against mu-
nicipality as regards statement of place where 
accident occurred, 69 A.L.R.4th 484. 
ized as governmental" and made minor 
changes in phraseology. 
Cross-References. — Actions arising out of 
contractual rights or obligations not subject to 
this section, § 63-30-5. 
Health Care Malpractice Act, § 78-14-1 et 
seq. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time for 
filing notice. 
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employ-
ment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with 
the attorney general and the agency concerned within one year after the claim 
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Mailing claims to state or political subdivi-
sions, § 63-37-1 et seq. 
Claims for death. 
Compliance with section. 
Federal claim. 
Notice. 
Quiet title actions. 
Remedy for wrongful act. 
Claims for death. 
In cases involving claims for death, the stat-
utory period would commence to run on the 
date of death of the person injured, inasmuch 
as that is the date upon which the damage ac-
crues to the personal representative or third 
party entitled to recover for such wrongful 
death. Nelson v. Logan City, 103 Utah 356, 
135 P.2d 259 (1943) (decided under former 
law). 
Compliance with section. 
Complaint alleging that tax commission and 
its agent acted maliciously and arbitrarily in 
attempting to enforce payment of excise taxes 
and in compelling plaintiff to supply a surety 
in greater amount than was reasonable to en-
sure payment of the tax, requesting damages 
both compensatory and punitive was fatally 
defective in that it did not allege compliance 
with this section; tax commission and its agent 
were immune from suit for damages where the 
acts complained of were performed in good 
faith and within the statutory authority 
granted to them. Roosendaal Constr. & Mining 
Corp. v. Holman, 28 Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446 
(1972). 
Plaintiffs complied with this section where, 
within a year after the cause of action arose, 
they filed notice of claim with the attorney 
general and the agency concerned on the same 
day they filed the original complaint with the 
court, and amended complaint alleging compli-
ance with the Governmental Immunity Act 
was filed, as a matter of right, within one year 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Torts, 
1989 Utah L. Rev. 334. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d States, Ter-
ritories, and Dependencies §§ 124, 126. 
after denial of the claim or after the end of the 
90-day period in which the claim is deemed to 
have been denied. Johnson v. Utah State Re-
tirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980). 
Action against state which was predicated 
on governmental supervision of financial insti-
tutions involved the exercise of a governmen-
tal function and was barred where there was 
no compliance with the notice of claim provi-
sions of §§ 63-30-11 and 63-30-12. Madsen v. 
Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). 
Federal claim. 
A federal claim under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 may 
not be barred by failure to meet state statutory 
requirements, such as the "notice of claim" re-
quirement in this section. Edwards v. Hare, 
682 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1988). 
Notice. 
Service of notice is a precondition to suit. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 97 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 
1988). (But see note under catchline "Federal 
claim" above.) 
Quiet title actions. 
Notice of a claim for quiet title complies with 
this section if it is given not more than one 
year after plaintiffs right to possession has 
been disturbed or encroached upon by the 
state. Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1977). 
Remedy for wrongful act. 
The 1978 amendment to § 63-30-4 did not 
leave the parents without a remedy for their 
wrongful birth injury by granting immunity 
for simple negligence to doctors employed by 
the state, since parents had a remedy against 
the state for injuries arising out of the negli-
gent acts of state employees, but the parents 
failed to give notice of their claim to the state 
within one year as required by this section. 
Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186 
(Utah 1987). 
C.J.S. — 81A C.J.S. States §§ 269, 271, 272, 
310. 
A.L.R. — See A.L.R. Annotations set forth 
under § 63-30-11. 
Key Numbers. — States «= 174, 177, 197. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its em-
ployee — Time for filing notice. 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its employee for an act or 
omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after 
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted 
under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise 
to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 13; 1978, ch. 
27, § 7; 1983, ch. 131, § 3; 1987, ch. 75, § 6. 
Amendment Notes, — The 1987 amend-
ment near the end of the section substituted 
"Section 63-30-11" for "Subsection 63-30-11(4)" 
and added "regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is character-
ized as governmental." 
Cross-References. — Actions arising out of 
contractual rights or obligations not subject to 
this section, § 63-30-5. 
Mailing claims to state or political subdivi-
sions, § 63-37-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Administrative proceedings. 
Claims barred. 
Claims by minors. 
Claims for death. 
Contract action. 
Estoppel. 
Full compliance required. 
Necessity for presentation of claim. 
Notice. 
Cited. 
Administrative proceedings. 
Tenured teacher seeking reinstatement fol-
lowing decision to terminate his services had 
no claim for breach of contract until after ad-
verse result at administrative hearing pro-
vided for by the school termination provisions 
(now § 53A-8-101 et seq.); therefore, where he 
filed his notice of claim within the statutory 
period after termination of the hearing, he 
complied with the requirements of this section. 
Pratt v. Board of Educ, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 
1977) (decided under former law). 
Claims barred. 
Neither actual knowledge by county officials 
of circumstances which resulted in death of 
four-year-old child's mother in an automobile 
accident nor minority of the child dispensed 
with necessity of filing timely claim in action 
against county in which it was alleged that 
death was due to inadequate warning signs 
and an improperly constructed guardrail; 
timely claim against county was necessary 
even though county highway department em-
ployee allegedly advised child's attorney, incor-
rectly, that highway in question was main-
tained by state, resulting in initial filing of 
claim against state. Varoz v. Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 
158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973). 
Trial court properly dismissed complaint 
against county where notice of the claim was 
not filed with the county commission during 
the year following plaintiff's discovery of her 
injuries. Yates v. Vernal Family Health Cen-
ter, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980). 
Claims by minors. 
Failure of a minor to give notice within the 
time provided in this section does not bar the 
minor's claim as the time for notice is tolled 
during minority by § 78-12-36. Scott v. School 
Bd., 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977). 
Claims for death. 
In cases involving claims for death, the stat-
utory period would commence to run on the 
date of death of the person injured, inasmuch 
as that is the date upon which the damage ac-
crues to the personal representative or third 
party entitled to recover for such wrongful 
death. Nelson v. Logan City, 103 Utah 356, 
135 P.2d 259 (1943) (decided under former 
law). 
Contract action. 
An action on a contractual obligation is a 
claim permitted under this chapter, and notice 
of such claim must be filed in accordance with 
this section. Baugh v. Logan City, 27 Utah 2d 
291, 495 P.2d 814 (1972). 
Estoppel. 
County was not estopped from pleading the 
filing deadline of the statutory period as a bar 
to the claim of a boy who had been injured at 
school while playing with dangling wires, even 
though the principal of the school erroneously 
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informed the mother that public service com-
pany was responsible for the wires, and she did 
not discover until after the filing deadline that 
the county tree-trimming employees were in 
fact responsible. Scarborough v. Granite School 
Dist, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975) (decided under 
former law). 
Full compliance required. 
Before suit against a political subdivision 
can be allowed, plaintiff must have fully com-
plied with the statutory requirements; and 
thus, prior to filing suit, a claim must be filed 
which (1) is in writing, (2) states the facts and 
the nature of the claim, (3) is signed by the 
claimant, (4) is directed and delivered to some-
one authorized to receive it, and (5) has been 
filed within the prescribed time. Scarborough 
v. Granite School Dist., 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 
1975). 
Necessity for presentation of claim. 
Plaintiff had no cause of action for damages 
to his crops caused by seepage of water from 
defendant city's canal where no claim was pre-
sented therefor to city within a year. Dahl v. 
Salt Lake City, 45 Utah 544, 147 P. 622 (1915) 
(decided under former law). 
Presentation of claim within time fixed by 
law is a condition precedent to bringing action 
against municipality. Brown v. Salt Lake City, 
33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570, 14 L.R.A. (n.s.) 619, 
126 Am. St. R. 828, 14 Ann. Cas. 1004 (1908); 
Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 
P. 213 (1924) (decided under former law). 
Notice. 
The fact that employees of the county in fact 
knew of the plaintiffs injuries at the time they 
occurred does not dispense with the necessity 
of filing a timely claim. Edwards v. Iron 
County ex rel. Valley View Medical Center, 
531 P.2d 476 (Utah 1975). 
Notice provision in this section is applicable 
to § 63-30-9. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 
P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975) (decided under former 
law). 
Cited in Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 
(Utah 1985); Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165 
(Utah 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal 
Corporations, Counties, and Other Political 
Subdivisions § 680 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Counties §§ 297, 298, 
323; 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 2173, 
2174, 2199; 79 C.J.S. Schools and School Dis-
tricts §§ 423, 433. 
A.L.R. — See A.L.R. Annotations set forth 
under § 63-30-11. 
Key Numbers. — Counties =^> 200, 203, 213; 
Municipal Corporations <§= 1001, 1005, 1008, 
1021; Schools and School Districts ®=> 112, 115. 
63-30-14. Claim for injury — Approval or denial by gov-
ernmental entity or insurance carrier within 
ninety days. 
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental entity or its 
insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the claimant in writing of its 
approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end 
of the ninety-day period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has 
failed to approve or deny the claim. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 14. 
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time 
for filing action against governmental entity. 
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district 
court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity. 
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the 
claim or within one year after the denial period specified in this chapter has 
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expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 15; 1983, ch. 
129, § 6; 1985, ch. 82, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 7. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
ment substituted "or an employee of the en-
tity" for "in those circumstances in which im-
munity from suit has been waived in this chap-
ter" at the end of the first sentence. 
The 1987 amendment added the designa-
tions to the previously undesignated section; in 
Subsection (2), added at the end "regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the 
claim is characterized as governmental"; and 
made minor changes in phraseology. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Amended complaint. 
Estoppel. 
Extension of time for filing suit. 
Waiver for contractual obligations. 
Amended complaint. 
Plaintiffs complied with this section where, 
within a year after the cause of action arose, 
they filed notice of claim with the attorney 
general and the agency concerned on the same 
day they filed the original complaint with the 
court, and amended complaint alleging compli-
ance with the Governmental Immunity Act 
was filed, as a matter of right, within one year 
after denial of the claim or after the end of the 
90-day period in which the claim is deemed to 
have been denied. Johnson v. Utah State Re-
tirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980). 
Estoppel. 
Whether city was estopped to assert statute 
of limitations in suit for injuries sustained by 
child in cave-in at city-owned clay bank adja-
cent to municipally maintained park was a 
question of fact; entry of no cause of action 
judgment was precluded where evidence pre-
sented dispute as to whether plaintiffs' attor-
ney had been "lulled" into not filing suit by 
assurances there would be a settlement within 
insurance policy limits. Whitaker v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 522 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1974). 
Governmental entity was not estopped from 
asserting the statute of limitations on the basis 
that an adjustor of its insurance carrier 
"lulled" plaintiff into delay where plaintiff was 
at all times represented by an attorney. 
Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977). 
Extension of time for filing suit. 
Where plaintiff sustained injuries from al-
leged fall from negligently maintained 
bleachers on school grounds and evidence indi-
cated that delay in filing claim was caused by 
misrepresentations of school's insurance agent, 
trial court erred in dismissing complaint with 
prejudice on grounds that statute of limitations 
barred such claim. Rice v. Granite School Dist., 
23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969), distin-
guished, Scarborough v. Granite School Dist., 
531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975). 
Waiver for contractual obligations. 
Where a sanitary district sewer line became 
clogged, resulting in damages to houses owned 
by a private citizen, a subsequent action 
against the sewer district was not subject to 
the one-year limitations period for actions 
against the government insofar as it was based 
on breach of contract. Dalton v. Salt Lake Sub. 
San. Dist., 676 P.2d 399 (Utah 1984). 
63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over actions — Ap-
plication of Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over any action 
brought under this chapter, and such actions shall be governed by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure in so far as they are consistent with this chapter. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 16; 1983, ch. 
129, § 7. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS mitted in his official capacity since this section 
is not in conflict with Utah Const., Art. VII, 
District court jurisdiction
 S e c 1 3 Hulbert v. State, 607 P.2d 1217 (Utah 
Sovereign immunity in federal courts. 1980) 
District court jurisdiction.
 0 . ., . r , . , 
The district court had exclusive, original ju- Sovereign immunity^ in federal courts. 
risdiction of an action by the former chairman T h l s a c t l a c k s t h e c l e a r m t e n t necessary 
and director of the state liquor control commis- u n d e r Eleventh Amendment to U.S. Constitu-
sion for attorneys' fees incurred in the success- tion to waive state's immunity from suit in fed-
ful defense of twelve indictments issued eral court. Harris v. Tooele County School 
against him for alleged acts or omissions com- Dist., 471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973). 
63-30-17. Venue of actions. 
Actions against the state may be brought in the county in which the claim 
arose or in Salt Lake County. Actions against a county may be brought in the 
county in which the claim arose, or in the defendant county, or, upon leave 
granted by a district court judge of the defendant county, in any county con-
tiguous to the defendant county. Leave may be granted ex parte. Actions 
against all other political subdivisions including cities and towns, shall be 
brought in the county in which the political subdivision is located or in the 
county in which the claim arose. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 17; 1983, ch. 
129, § 8. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Federal court actions. Amendment to U.S. Constitution. Harris v. 
This section indicates Utah does not intend Tooele County School Dist., 471 F.2d 218 (10th 
to waive sovereign immunity under Eleventh Cir. 1973). 
63-30-18. Compromise and settlement of actions. 
A political subdivision, after conferring with its legal officer or other legal 
counsel if it has no such officer, may compromise and settle any action as to 
the damages or other relief sought. 
The risk manager in the Department of Administrative Services may com-
promise and settle any claim for damages filed against the state up to and 
including $10,000 for which the Risk Management Fund may be liable, and 
may, with the concurrence of the attorney general or his representative and 
the executive director of the Department of Administrative Services, compro-
mise and settle a claim for damages in excess of $10,000 for which the Risk 
Management Fund may be liable. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 18; 1981, ch. not admissible to prove liability for injury, 
250, § 6; 1983, ch. 303, § 2; 1983, ch. 320, Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 409. 
§ 54« Rescission of release or settlement by injured 
Cross-References. — Governmental Immu- person, §§ 78-27-32 to 78-27-36. 
nity Act provisions not construed as admission
 R i s k m a n ager in Department of Administra-
or denial of liability, § 63-30-4
 t i v e Services, § 63-1-45 et seq. 
Payment of medical and similar expenses 
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63-30-19. Undertaking required of plaintiff in action. 
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall file an undertaking in a 
sum fixed by the court, but in no case less than the sum of $300, conditioned 
upon payment by the plaintiff of taxable costs incurred by the governmental 
entity in the action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails to 
recover judgment. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 19. contractual rights or obligations not subject to 
Cross-References. — Actions arising out of this section, § 63-30-5 
63-30-20. Judgment against governmental entity bars ac-
tion against employee. 
Judgment against a governmental entity in an action brought under this 
act shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of 
the same subject matter, against the employee whose act or omission gave rise 
to the claim. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 20. Cross-References. — Indemnification of 
Meaning of "this act." — See the note un- public officers and employees, §§ 63-30-36 to 
der the same catchhne following § 63-30-1 63-30-38 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Judgment against governmental entity re- employee was not barred where claim against 
quired. the entity was dismissed for failure to file it 
There must first be a judgment against the within the prescribed time limits Cornwall v 
governmental entity before this section bars a Larsen, 571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977). 
claim against an employee; claim against an 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of stat- liability arising out of performance of public 
ute authorizing or requiring governmental duties, 71 A.L.R.3d 90. 
unit to indemnify public officer or employee for 
63-30-21. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 63-30-21, as enacted by state, territory, nation or governmental entity, 
Laws 1965, ch. 139, § 21 prohibiting claims was repealed by Laws 1978, ch. 27, § 12. 
under the act by the United States or any 
63-30-22. Exemplary or punitive damages prohibited — 
Governmental entity exempt from execution, at-
tachment or garnishment. 
No judgment shall be rendered against the governmental entity for exem-
plary or punitive damages; nor shall execution, attachment or garnishment 
issue against the governmental entity. 
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History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 22. Salaries of public officers subject to garnish-
Cross-References. — Archives and Records ment, § 78-27-15. 
Service and Information Practices Act, exem- Tax levy for payment of punitive damages 
plary damages under, § 63-2-88. awarded against elected official or employee, 
Health Care Malpractice Act, relation to this § 63-30-27. 
chapter, § 78-14-10. 
63-30-23. Payment of claim or judgment against state — 
Presentment for payment. 
Any claim approved by the state as defined by Subsection 63-30-2(1) or any 
final judgment obtained against the state shall be presented to the state risk 
manager, or to the office, agency, institution or other instrumentality in-
volved for payment, if payment by said instrumentality is otherwise permit-
ted by law. If such payment is not authorized by law then said judgment or 
claim shall be presented to the board of examiners and the board shall proceed 
as provided in Section 63-6-10. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 23; 1983, ch. ment substituted "Subsection 63-30-2(1)" for 
129, § 9; 1987, ch. 75, § 8. "Subsection 63-30-2(5)." 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
63-30-24. Payment of claim or judgment against political 
subdivision — Procedure by governing body. 
Any claim approved by a political subdivision or any final judgment ob-
tained against a political subdivision shall be submitted to the governing body 
thereof to be paid forthwith from the general funds of said political subdivi-
sion unless said funds are appropriated to some other use or restricted by law 
or contract for other purposes. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 24. 
63-30-25. Payment of claim or judgment against political 
subdivision — Installment payments. 
If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or award during the current 
fiscal year it may pay the claim or award in not more than ten ensuing annual 
installments of equal size or in such other installments as are agreeable to the 
claimant. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 25. 
63-30-26. Reserve funds for payment of claims or pur-
chase of insurance created by political subdivi-
sions. 
Any political subdivision may create and maintain a reserve fund or may 
jointly with one or more other political subdivisions make contributions to a 
joint reserve fund, for the purpose of making payment of claims against the 
co-operating subdivisions when they become payable pursuant to this chapter, 
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or for the purpose of purchasing hahility insurance to protect the co-operating 
subdivisions from any or all risks created by this chapter. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 26; 1983, ch. 
129, § 10. 
63-30-27. Tax levy by political subdivisions for payment of 
claims, judgments, or insurance premiums. 
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, all political sub-
divisions may levy an annual property tax sufficient to pay the following: 
(a) any claim; 
(b) any settlement; 
(c) any judgment, including any judgment against an elected official or 
employee of any political subdivision, including peace officers, based upon 
a claim for punitive damages but the authority of a political subdivision 
for the payment of any judgment for punitive damages is limited in any 
individual case to $10,000; 
(d) the costs to defend against any claim, settlement, or judgment; or 
(e) the establishment and maintenance of a reserve fund for the pay-
ment of claims, settlements, or judgments as may be reasonably antici-
pated. 
(2) It is legislative intent that the payments authorized for punitive dam-
age judgments or to pay the premium for such insurance as authorized is 
money spent for a public purpose within the meaning of this section and 
Article XIII, Sec. 5, Utah Constitution, even though as a result of the levy the 
maximum levy as otherwise restricted by law is exceeded. No levy under this 
section may exceed .0001 per dollar of taxable value of taxable property. The 
revenues derived from this levy may not be used for any other purpose than 
those stipulated in this section. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 27; 1973, ch. 1985, ch 165, § 81, to the extent that a de-
165, § 1; 1978, ch. 27, § 8; 1985, ch. 165, § 81; tailed comparison is impracticable 
1988, ch. 3, § 234. Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1988, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- ch 3, § 269 provides that the act has retrospec-
m$nt substituted " 0001" for "one-half mill" tive operation to January 1, 1988 
near the end of the section Cross-References. — No judgment for pu-
The 1988 amendment, effective February 9, nitive damages to be rendered against govern-
1988, rewrote the section, as amended by Laws mental entity, § 63-30-22 
63-30-28. Liability insurance — Purchase of insurance or 
self-insurance by governmental entity authorized 
— Establishment of trust accounts for self-insur-
ance. 
Any governmental entity within the state may purchase commercial insur-
ance, self-insure, or self-insure and purchase excess commercial insurance in 
excess of the statutory limits of this chapter against any risk created or recog-
nized by this chapter or any action for which a governmental entity or its 
employee may be held liable. 
In addition to any other reasonable means of self-insurance a governmental 
entity may self-msure with respect to specified classes of claims by establish-
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ing a trust account under the management of an independent private trustee 
having authority with respect to claims of that character to expend both 
principal and earnings of the trust account solely to pay the costs of investiga-
tion, discovery, and other pretrial and litigation expenses including attorneys, 
fees, and to pay all sums for which the governmental entity may be adjudged 
liable or for which a compromise settlement may be agreed upon. The monies 
and interest earned on said trust fund shall be subject to investment pursuant 
to Chapter 7, Title 51, the State Money Management Act of 1974, and shall be 
subject to audit by the state auditor. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, 
the trust agreement between the governmental entity and the trustee may 
authorize the trustee to employ counsel to defend actions against the entity 
and its employees and to protect and safeguard the assets of the trust, to 
provide for claims investigation and adjustment services, to employ expert 
witnesses and consultants, and to provide such other services and functions 
necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of the trust. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 28; 1978, ch. 
27, § 9; 1979, ch. 94, § 1; 1983, ch. 130, § 1; 
1985, ch. 21, § 32. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
ment substituted "Chapter 7, Title 51, the 
State Money Management Act of 1974" for "the 
State Money Management Act, 51-7-1 to 
51-7-2" in the second sentence of the second 
paragraph. 
Cross-References. — Department of Alco-
Utah Law Review. — Utah Legislative 
Survey — 1979, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 155. 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of stat-
ute authorizing or requiring governmental 
63-30-29. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 63-30-29, as amended 
by Laws 1978, ch. 27, § 10 relating to provi-
holic Beverage Control to maintain liability in-
surance on its motor vehicles, § 32A-1-18. 
Professional liability insurance for health 
care providers, § 78-14-9. 
Settlement of claim under liability insurance 
policy not admission of liability, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 409. 
Waiver of policy provisions or defenses, what 
does not constitute, § 31A-21-312. 
unit to procure liability insurance covering 
public officers or employees for liability arising 
out of performance of public duties, 71 
A.L.R.3d 6. 
sions of liability insurance policies, was re-
pealed by Laws 1983, ch. 130, § 5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Right to hire legal counsel. tion to the general authority of the attorney 
This section provides University of Utah general to perform legal services for any 
Hospital with authority to hire independent le- agency of state government. Hansen v. Utah 
gal counsel; this section does not violate attor- State Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332 (Utah 
ney general's authority under Art. VII, Sec. 16 1977). 
of the state constitution and provides an excep-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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63-30-29.5. Liability insurance — Government vehicles op-
erated by employees outside scope of employ-
ment. 
A governmental entity that owns vehicles driven by employees of the gov-
ernmental entity with the express or implied consent of the entity, but which, 
at the time liability is incurred as a result of an automobile accident, is not 
being driven and used within the course and scope of the driver's employment 
is considered to provide the driver with the insurance coverage required by 
Chapter 12a, Title 41. However, the liability coverages considered provided 
are the minimum limits under Section 31A-22-304. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-29.5, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 128, § 1; 1985, ch. 242, § 53. 
63-30-30. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 63-30-30, as enacted by defense of sovereign immunity and to pay all 
Laws 1965, ch. 139, § 30, requiring that any sums for which it would otherwise be liable 
liability policy purchased under act include under policy, was repealed by Laws 1978, ch. 
provision whereby insurer agreed not to assert 27, § 12. 
63-30-31. Liability insurance — Construction of policy not 
in compliance with act. 
Any insurance policy, rider or endorsement hereafter issued and purchased 
to insure against any risk which may arise as a result of the application of 
this chapter, which contains any condition or provision not in compliance with 
the requirements of the chapter, shall not be rendered invalid thereby, but 
shall be construed and applied in accordance with such conditions and provi-
sions as would have applied had such policy, rider or endorsement been in full 
compliance with this chapter, provided the policy is otherwise valid. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 31; 1983, ch. 
129, § 11. 
63-30-32. Liability insurance — Methods for purchase or 
renewal. 
No contract or policy of insurance may be purchased or renewed under this 
chapter except upon public bid to be let to the lowest and best bidder; except 
that the purchase or renewal of insurance by the state shall be conducted in 
accordance with the provisions of Sections 63-56-1 through 63-56-73. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 32; 1981, ch. 
250, § 7; 1983, ch. 129, § 12. 
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63-30-33. Liability insurance — Insurance for employees 
authorized — No right to indemnification or con-
tribution from governmental agency, 
(1) (a) A governmental entity may insure any or all of its employees 
against liability, in whole or in part, for injury or damage resulting from 
an act or omission occurring during the performance of an employee's 
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, re-
gardless of whether or not that entity is immune from suit for that act or 
omission. 
(b) Any expenditure for that insurance is for a public purpose. 
(c) Under any contract or policy of insurance executed under authority 
of this section, the insurer has no right to indemnification or contribution 
from the governmental entity or its employee with respect to any loss or 
liability covered by the contract or policy. 
(2) Any surety covering a governmental entity or its employee under any 
faithful performance surety bond has no right to indemnification or contribu-
tion from the governmental entity or its employee with respect to any loss 
covered by that bond based on any act or omission for which the governmental 
entity would be obligated to defend or indemnify under the provisions of 
Section 63-30-36. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 33; 1979, ch. sions, making minor stylistic changes, and 
94, § 2; 1983, ch. 130, § 2; 1989, ch. 220, § 1. added Subsection (2). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- Cross-References. — Indemnification of 
ment, effective April 24, 1989, subdivided and public officers and employees, §§ 63-30-36 to 
designated as Subsection (1) the existing provi- 63-30-38. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of stat- Validity and construction of statute autho-
ute authorizing or requiring governmental rizing or requiring governmental unit to in-
unit to procure liability insurance covering demnify public officer or employee for liability 
public officers or employees for liability arising arising out of performance of public duties, 71 
out of performance of public duties, 71 A L R 3d 90 
A.L.R.3d 6. 
63-30-34. Limit of judgment against governmental entity 
or employee. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for damages for 
personal injury against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a gov-
ernmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $250,000 for one person in 
any one occurrence, or $500,000 for two or more persons in any one occur-
rence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the injury is characterized as gov-
ernmental. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for property damage 
against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity 
has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $100,000 in any one occurrence, the court 
shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the damage is characterized as governmental. 
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(3) The damage limits established in this section do not apply to damages 
awarded as compensation when a governmental entity has taken or damaged 
private property without just compensation. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-34, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 130, § 3; 1987, ch. 75, § 9. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1983, 
ch. 130, § 3 repealed former § 63-30-34, as 
amended by Laws 1979, ch. 94, § 3, relating to 
excess judgments, and enacted present 
§ 63-30-34. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment added to the end of Subsections (1) and 
(2) "regardless of whether or not the function 
giving rise to the injury is characterized as 
governmental," rewrote Subsection (3), and 
made minor changes m phraseology 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
The recovery limits provisions are unconsti-
tutional as applied to University Hospital in 
Salt Lake City, a teaching hospital associated 
with the University of Utah School of Medicine 
and essentially supported by non-state funds. 
Condemann v. University Hosp , 107 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 5 (1989). 
Cited in Payne ex rel. Payne v Myers, 743 
P.2d 186 (Utah 1987) 
63-30-35. Comprehensive liability plan — Providing cover-
age — Expenses of attorney general, general 
counsel for state judiciary, and general counsel 
for the Legislature in representing the state, its 
branches, members, or employees, 
(1) After consultation with appropriate state agencies, the risk manager in 
the Department of Administrative Services shall provide a comprehensive 
liability plan, with limits not lower than those set forth in Section 63-30-34, 
which will protect the state and its indemnified employees from claims and 
liability. Deductibles and maximum limits of coverage shall be determined by 
the risk manager in consultation with the executive director of the Depart-
ment of Administrative Services. 
(2) The risk manager may expend funds from the Risk Management Fund 
established in Section 63-1-47, to procure and provide coverage to all state 
agencies and their indemnified employees, except those specifically exempted 
by law, and shall apportion the cost of such coverage in accordance with 
Section 63-1-47. Unless specifically authorized by statute to do so, including 
Subsection 63-1-47(8), no agency other than the risk manager may procure or 
provide liability insurance for the state. 
(3) (a) The Office of the Attorney General has primary responsibility to 
provide legal representation to the judicial, executive, and legislative 
branches of state government in cases where Risk Management Fund 
coverage applies. 
(b) When the attorney general has primary responsibility to provide 
legal representation to the judicial or legislative branches, the attorney 
general shall consult with the general counsel for the state judiciary and 
with the general counsel for the Legislature, to solicit their assistance in 
defending their respective branch, and in determining strategy and mak-
ing decisions concerning the disposition of those claims. The decision for 
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settlement of monetary claims in those cases, however, lies with the at-
torney general and the state risk manager. 
(4) (a) If the Judicial Council, after consultation with the general counsel 
for the state judiciary, determines that the Office of the Attorney General 
cannot adequately defend the state judiciary, its members, or employees 
because of a conflict of interest, separation of powers concerns, or other 
political or legal differences, the Judicial Council may direct its general 
counsel to separately represent and defend it. 
(b) If the general counsel for the state judiciary undertakes indepen-
dent legal representation of the st#te judiciary, its members, or em-
ployees, the general counsel shall notify the state risk manager and the 
attorney general in writing, prior to undertaking that representation. 
(c) If the state judiciary elects to be represented by its own counsel 
under this section, the decision for settlement of claims against the state 
judiciary, its members, or employees, where Risk Management Fund cov-
erage applies, lies with the general counsel for the state judiciary and the 
state risk manager. 
(5) (a) If the Legislative Management Committee, after consultation with 
general counsel for the Legislature, determines that the Office of the 
Attorney General cannot adequately defend the legislative branch, its 
members, or employees because of a conflict of interest, separation of 
powers concerns, or other political or legal differences, the Legislative 
Management Committee may direct its general counsel to separately rep-
resent and defend it. 
(b) If the general counsel for the Legislature undertakes independent 
legal representation of the Legislature, its members, or employees, the 
general counsel shall notify the state risk manager and the attorney 
general in writing, prior to undertaking that representation. 
(c) If the legislative branch elects to be represented by its own counsel 
under this section, the decision for settlement of claims against the legis-
lative branch, its members, or employees, where Risk Management Fund 
coverage applies, lies with the general counsel for the Legislature and the 
state risk manager. 
(6) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 67-5-3 or any other provision 
of this code, the attorney general, the general counsel for the state judiciary, 
and the general counsel for the Legislature may bill the Department of Ad-
ministrative Services for all costs and legal fees expended by their respective 
offices, including attorneys' and secretarial salaries, in representing the state 
or any indemnified employee against any claim for which the Risk Manage-
ment Fund may be liable and in advising state agencies and employees re-
garding such claims. The risk manager shall draw funds from the Risk Man-
agement Fund for this purpose. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-5, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 250, § 8; 1983, ch. 130, § 4; 1987, 
ch. 92, § 115; 1988, ch. 221, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, in the last sentence of Subsection (1), 
substituted "executive director of the Depart-
ment of Administrative Services" for "director 
of Administrative Services" and substituted 
"Subsection 63-1-47(8)" for "Subsection 
63-1-47(9)" in the last sentence in Subsection 
(2) 
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 
1988, added Subsections (3) to (5), redesignated 
former Subsection (3) as Subsection (6) and in 
the first sentence of Subsection (6) substituted 
"attorney general, the general counsel for the 
state judiciary, and the general counsel for the 
Legisla'are may bill the Department of Ad-
ministrative Services for all costs and legal 
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fees expended by their respective offices" for Applicability. — Laws 1983, ch. 130, § 6 
"state attorney general may bill the Depart- made the act applicable only to claims that 
ment of Administrative Services for all costs arise on or after the effective date of the act, 
and legal fees expended by the attorney gen- j u i y it 1983 
eral." 
63-30-36. Defending government employee — Request — 
Cooperation — Payment of judgment 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), a governmental entity 
shall defend any action brought against its employee arising from an act or 
omission occurring: 
(a) during the performance of the employee's duties; 
(b) within the scope of the employee's employment; or 
(c) under color of authority. 
(2) (a) Before a governmental entity may defend its employee against a 
claim, the employee shall make a written request to the governmental 
entity to defend him: 
(i) within ten days after service of process upon him; or 
(ii) within a longer period that would not prejudice the governmen-
tal entity in maintaining a defense on his behalf; or 
(iii) within a period that would not conflict with notice require-
ments imposed on the entity in connection with insurance carried by 
the entity relating to the risk involved, 
(b) If the employee fails to make a request, or fails to reasonably coop-
erate in the defense, the governmental entity need not defend or continue 
to defend the employee, nor pay any judgment, compromise, or settlement 
against the employee in respect to the claim. 
(3) The governmental entity may decline to defend an action against an 
employee if it determines: 
(a) that the act or omission in question did not occur: 
(i) during the performance of the employee's duties; or 
(ii) within the scope of his employment; or 
(iii) under color of authority; or 
(b) that the injury or damage resulted from the fraud or malice of the 
employee; or 
(c) that the injury or damage on which the claim was based resulted 
from: 
(i) the employee driving a vehicle, or being in actual physical con-
trol of a vehicle: 
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal to or greater by weight 
than the established legal limit; or 
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any drug to a de-
gree that rendered the person incapable of safely driving the 
vehicle; or 
(C) while under the combined influence of alcohol and any 
drug to a degree that rendered the person incapable of safely 
driving the vehicle; or 
(ii) the employee being physically or mentally impaired so as to be 
unable to reasonably perform his job function because of the use of 
alcohol, because of the nonprescribed use of a controlled substance as 
defined in Section 58-37-4, or because of the combined influence of 
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alcohol and a nonprescribed controlled substance as defined by Sec-
tion 58-37-4. 
(4) (a) Within ten days of receiving a written request to defend an em-
ployee, the governmental entity shall inform the employee whether or not 
it shall provide a defense, and, if it refuses to provide a defense, the basis 
for its refusal. 
(b) A refusal by the entity to provide a defense shall not be admissible 
for any purpose in the action in which the employee is a defendant. 
(5) If a governmental entity conducts the defense of an employee, the gov-
ernmental entity shall pay any judgment based upon the claim, or any com-
promise or settlement of the claim, except as provided in Subsection (6). 
(6) A governmental entity may conduct the defense of an employee under 
an agreement with the employee that the governmental entity reserves the 
right not to pay a judgment, if the conditions set forth in Subsection (3) are 
established. 
(7) (a) Nothing in this section or Section 63-30-37 affects the obligation of a 
governmental entity to provide insurance coverage according to the re-
quirements of Subsection 41-12a-301(3) and Section 63-30-29.5. 
(b) A governmental entity may refuse to defend an action against its 
employee under the conditions set forth in Subsection (3), but shall still 
provide coverage up to the amount specified in Sections 31A-22-304 and 
63-30-29.5. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-36, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 131, § 4; 1987, ch. 30, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1987, added Subsection 
(1), redesignated former Subsection (1) as 
present Subsection (2), adding the internal des-
ignations and making minor word changes, 
added Subsections (3) and (4), redesignated for-
mer Subsection (2) as present Subsection (5), 
inserting "the claim" following "based upon" 
and substituting "Subsection (6)" for "Subsec-
tion (3)," redesignated former Subsection (3) as 
present Subsection (6), rewriting that subsec-
tion which formerly read "A governmental en-
tity may conduct the defense of an employee 
under an agreement with the employee that 
ANALYSIS 
Liability of insurer. 
Cited. 
Liability of insurer. 
School district and its insurer and not the 
teacher and his insurer were liable to defend 
and respond to action by a student against the 
the government entity reserves the right not to 
pay the judgment, compromise, or settlement 
unless it is established that the claim arose out 
of an act or omission occurring during the per-
formance of his duties, within the scope of his 
employment, or under color of authority," and 
added Subsection (7). 
Cross-References. — Judgment against 
government bar to action against employee, 
§ 63-30-20. 
Liability insurance for employees, purchase 
by government, § 63-30-33. 
Negligent act or omission of employee, 
waiver of governmental immunity for injury 
from, § 63-30-10. 
teacher for an alleged tort committed by the 
teacher within the scope of his duties. Gulf Ins. 
Co. v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 567 P.2d 158 
(Utah 1977) (decided under former Title 63, 
Chapter 48). 
Cited in Schaefer v. Wilcock, 676 F. Supp. 
1092 (D. Utah 1987). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur 2d Municipal A.L.R. — Validity and construction of stat-
Corporations, Counties, and Other Political ute authorizing or requiring governmental 
Subdivisions §§ 208, 804; 57 Am Jur 2d Mu- unit to indemnify public officer or employee for 
nicipal, School, and State Tort Liability § 34; liability arising out of performance of public 
63A Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and Em- duties, 71 A.L.R 3d 90 
ployees § 319
 K e y ' Numbers. — Counties «=» 88, 146, In-
C J.S - 20 C J S. Counties §§139 220, 42
 d e m m t y „ 6 Municipal Corporations « . 170, 
C J S . Indemnity § 10; 62 C J S . Municipal
 m ? 4 2 ? 4 7 > 0 f f i c e r s ^ n 9 ; S c h o d s a n d 
Corporations § 545 67 C J S Officers §§ 251
 S c h o o l D ^ 6 2 g 9 n 5 u g ^ 
to 254, 78 C J S Schools and School Districts
 7 S 7Q 1 9 
§§ 129,153, 238, 320, 81A C J S . States § 126. / i5' / y ' iU' 
63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and defense costs by 
government employee. 
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), if an employee pays a judgment entered 
against him, or any portion of it, which the governmental entity is required to 
pay under Section 63-30-36, the employee may recover from the governmental 
entity the amount of the payment and the reasonable costs incurred in his 
defense. 
(2) If a governmental entity does not conduct the defense of an employee 
against a claim, or conducts the defense under an agreement as provided in 
Subsection 63-30-36(6), the employee may recover from the governmental 
entity under Subsection (1) if: 
(a) the employee establishes that the act or omission upon which the 
judgment is based occurred during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of his employment, or under color of authority, and that he 
conducted the defense in good faith; and 
(b) the governmental entity does not establish that the injury or dam-
age resulted from: 
(i) the fraud or malice of the employee; 
(ii) the employee driving a vehicle, or being in actual physical 
control of a vehicle: 
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal to or greater by weight 
than the established legal limit; 
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any drug to a de-
gree that rendered the person incapable of safely driving the 
vehicle; 
(C) while under the combined influence of alcohol and any 
drug to a degree that rendered the person incapable of safely 
driving the vehicle; or 
(iii) the employee being physically or mentally impaired so as to be 
unable to reasonably perform his job function because of the use of 
alcohol, because of the nonprescribed use of a controlled substance as 
defined in Section 58-37-4, or because of the combined use of alcohol 
and a nonprescribed controlled substance as defined in Section 
58-37-4. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-37, enacted by L. employee may recover from the governmental 
1983, ch. 131, § 5; 1987, ch. 30, § 2. entity the amount of the payment and the rea-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- sonable costs incurred in his defense" for "the 
ment, effective July 1, 1987, substituted "the employee is entitled to recover the amount of 
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such payment and the reasonable costs in- 63-30-36(6)" for "or does conduct the defense 
curred in his defense from the governmental under an agreement as provided in Subsection 
entity" in Subsection (1) and, in Subsection (2), 63-30-36(3)" in the introductory paragraph and 
substituted "or conducts the defense under an added the provisions in Subsections (b)(ii) and 
agreement as provided in Subsection (b)(iii). 
63-30-38. Indemnification of governmental entity by em-
ployee not required. 
If a governmental entity pays all or part of a judgment based on or a com-
promise or settlement of a claim against the governmental entity or an em-
ployee, the employee may not be required to indemnify the governmental 
entity for the payment. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-38, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 131, § 6. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Liability shifted. its insurer. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Horace Mann Ins. 
This section shifts liability from the em- Co., 567 P2d 158 (Utah 1977) (decided under 
ployee and his insurer to the public entity and former § 63-48-5). 
CHAPTER 30a 
REIMBURSEMENT OF LEGAL FEES 
AND COSTS TO OFFICERS 
AND EMPLOYEES 
Section Section 
63-30a-l. Definitions. and court costs incurred in de-
63-30a-2. Indictment or information against fense. 
officer or employee — Reim- 63-30a-3. Payment of reimbursement of at-
bursement of attorneys' fees torneys' fees and court costs. 
63-30a-l. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Officer or employee" means any individual who at the time of an 
event giving rise to a claim under this act is or was elected or appointed to 
or employed by a public entity, whether or not compensated, but does not 
include an independent contractor. 
(2) "Public entity" means the state or any political subdivision of it or 
any office, department, division, board, agency, commission, council, au-
thority, institution, hospital, school, college, university, or other instru-
mentality of the state or any such political subdivision. 
History: L. 1977, ch. 245, § 1. ch. 245, §§ 1 to 3 which are codified as 
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this §§ 63-30a-l and 63-30a-2. 
act," as used in this section, means Laws 1977, 
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History: C. 1953, 63-29a-101, enacted by 
L. 1987, ch. 164, § 1; 1988, ch. 149, § 1; 1990, 
ch. 56, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, in the first sen-
tence in Subsection (5), deleted "or" before 
"other" and added the phrase at the end begin-
ning "or the building official." 
63-29a-103. Liquefied Petroleum Gas Board — Creation 
Composition — Appointment — Terms of office 
Meetings — Compensation. 
Sunset Act. — Section 63-55-263 provides 
that the Liquefied Petroleum Gas Board is re-
pealed July 1, 1997. 
CHAPTER 30 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
Section 
63-30-7. 
63-30-10. 
63-30-18. 
Waiver of immunity for injury 
from negligent operation of mo-
tor vehicles — Exception. 
Waiver of immunity for injury 
caused by negligent act or omis-
sion of employee — Exceptions. 
Compromise and settlement of ac-
tions. 
Section 
63-30-35. Expenses of attorney general, 
general counsel for state judi-
ciary, and general counsel for 
the Legislature in representing 
the state, its branches, mem-
bers, or employees. 
63-30-1- Short title. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Construction and application of 
Federal Tort Claims Act provision excepting 
from coverage claims arising out of interfer-
ence with contract rights (28 USCS § 2680(h)), 
92 A.L.R. Fed. 186. 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Construction and application. 
Creek drainage system. 
Prisoners. 
Schools and school districts. 
Construction and application. 
The 1984 amendment to this section could 
not be applied retroactively to bar a valid 
cause of action that had already arisen when 
the amendment went into effect. Irvine v. Salt 
Lake County, 785 P.2d 411 (Utah 1989); Rocky 
Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989). 
Creek drainage system. 
Construction, operation, and maintenance of 
a creek drainage system was a governmental 
function. Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989). 
Prisoners. 
Bailiffs action against state for gunshot 
wound inflicted by a prisoner was properly dis-
missed, because either: (1) the prisoner had 
totally escaped the control of the officers es-
corting him and was thus acting on his own so 
the officers were not responsible for him, or (2) 
he was still under the control of the officers, in 
which case the officers would be immune from 
suit under the statute. Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 
1255 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Schools and school districts. 
School, in pumping water out of its base-
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ment, was not engaged as a governmental en- gence in the resurfacing of a school parking lot 
tity in the "management of flood waters" so as which resulted in surface water runoff on an 
to be immune from suit. Branam v. Provo adjoining landowner's property. Williams v 
School Dist, 780 P.2d 810 (Utah 1989). Carbon County Bd. of Educ, 780 P.2d 816 
School district was not shielded from possi- (Utah 1989). 
ble liability for damages arising from its negli-
63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury from negligent op. 
eration of motor vehicles — Exception. 
(1) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
resulting from the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle 
or other equipment during the performance of his duties, within the scope 
of employment, or under color of authority. 
(b) This subsection does not apply to the operation of emergency vehi-
cles as defined by law and while being driven in accordance with the 
requirements of Section 41-6-14. 
(2) (a) All governmental entities employing peace officers retain and do not 
waive immunity from liability for civil damages for personal injury or 
death or for damage to property resulting from the collision of a vehicle 
being operated by an actual or suspected violator of the law who is being, 
has been, or believes he is being or has been pursued by a peace officer 
employed by the governmental entity in a motor vehicle. 
(b) Enactment of this subsection does not state nor imply that this 
immunity was ever previously waived or this liability specifically or im-
plicitly recognized. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 7; 1983, ch. ment, effective April 23, 1990, designated the 
129, § 5; 1990, ch. 204, § 1. former section as Subsection (1); added Subsec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- tion (2); and made related stylistic changes. 
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or 
defective public building, structure, or other 
public improvement — Exception, 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989). 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negli-
gent act or omission of employee — Exceptions. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proxi-
mately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prose-
cution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, inter-
ference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or civil rights; 
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(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or 
negligent inspection of any property; 
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative pro-
ceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; 
(6) a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it is negligent 
or intentional; 
(7) or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, 
mob violence, and civil disturbances; 
(8) or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city 
jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
(11) any natural condition on state lands or as the result of any activity 
authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for 
the clearing of fog; or 
(13) the activities of: 
(a) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(b) fighting fire; 
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or haz-
ardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; or 
(e) intervening during dam emergencies. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch. Subsection (2), waiving immunity from suit for 
194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, ch. 169, § 1; violation of Fourth Amendment rights and 
1989, ch. 185, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 3; 1989, making the provisions of Chapter 16 of Title 78 
ch. 268, § 29; 1990, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch. the exclusive remedy for injuries caused by 
319, §§ 1, 2. such violations. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- The 1990 amendment by ch. 319, effective 
ment by ch. 15, effective July 1, 1990, deleted July 1, 1990, added Subsection (13)(e) and 
the subsection designation (1) from the begin- made a related stylistic change, 
ning of the section, redesignated former Sub- This section is set out as reconciled by the 
sections (l)(a) to (1)(1) as Subsections (1) to (13) Office of Legislative Research and General 
and made related changes, and deleted former Counsel. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Decisions regarding the design, capacity, 
and construction of a flood control system were 
Discretionary function. discretionary functions. Rocky Mt. Thrift 
Escaped prisoner. Stores, Inc. v Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P 2d 
Licenses 459 (Utah 1989) 
Discretionary function. Escaped prisoner. 
Alleged negligent conduct of a county em- Bailiffs action against state for gunshot 
ployee in operating a backhoe pursuant to a wound inflicted by a prisoner was properly dis-
regular program of dredging stream channels missed, because either (1) the prisoner had 
to clear away silt, gravel deposits, debris, and totally escaped the control of the officers es-
other matter which obstructed the flow of corting him and was thus acting on his own so 
water did not fall within the discretionary the officers were not responsible for him, or (2) 
function exception of Subsection (1). Irvine v. he was still under the control of the officers, in 
Salt Lake County, 785 P.2d 411 (Utah 1989). which case the officers would be immune from 
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suit under the statute. Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d had resulted in investors' losses, where the 
1255 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). claims asserted were for injuries arising out of 
Licenses. licensing decisions allegedly made in a negli-
Governmentai immunity provisions barred a gent fashion. Gillman v. Department of Fin. 
negligence action against the Department of Insts., 782 P.2d 506 (Utah 1989); Hilton v. 
Financial Institutions alleging that the depart- Borthick, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (1989). 
ment's failure to regulate supervised lenders 
63-30-12, Claim against state or its employee — Time for 
filing notice. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Forsman v. Forsman, 779 P.2d 218 
(Utah 1989). 
63-30-18. Compromise and settlement of actions. 
(1) A political subdivision, after conferring with its legal officer or other 
legal counsel if it does not have a legal officer, may compromise and settle any 
action as to the damages or other relief sought. 
(2) The risk manager in the Department of Administrative Services may: 
(a) compromise and settle any claim of $25,000 or less in damages filed 
against the state for which the Risk Management Fund may be liable; 
and 
(b) with the concurrence of the attorney general or his representative 
and the executive director of the Department of Administrative Services, 
compromise and settle any claim of more than $25,000 in damages for 
which the Risk Management Fund may be liable. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 18; 1981, ch. state" for "for damages filed against the state 
250, § 6; 1983, ch. 303, § 2; 1983, ch. 320, up to and including $10,000" in present Sub-
§ 54; 1990, ch. 97, § 9. section (2)(a); substituted "any claim of more 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- than $25,000 in damages" for "a claim for dam-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted the
 a g e s j n excess of $10,000" in present Subsec-
subsection designations; substituted "of
 t l o n (2)(b); and made stylistic changes. $25,000 or less in damages filed against the 
63-30-35. Expenses of attorney general, general counsel 
for state judiciary, and general counsel for the 
Legislature in representing the state, its 
branches, members, or employees, 
(1) (a) After consultation with appropriate state agencies, the state risk 
manager shall provide a comprehensive liability plan, with limits not 
lower than those set forth in Section 63-30-34, that will protect the state 
and its indemnified employees from claims and liability. 
(b) The risk manager shall establish deductibles and maximum limits 
of coverage in consultation with the executive director of the Department 
of Administrative Services. 
(2) (a) The Office of the Attorney General has primary responsibility to 
provide legal representation to the judicial, executive, and legislative 
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branches of state government in cases where Risk Management Fund 
coverage applies. 
(b) When the attorney general has primary responsibility to provide 
legal representation to the judicial or legislative branches, the attorney 
general shall consult with the general counsel for the state judiciary and 
with the general counsel for the Legislature, to solicit their assistance in 
defending their respective branch, and in determining strategy and mak-
ing decisions concerning the disposition of those claims. The decision for 
settlement of monetary claims in those cases, however, lies with the at-
torney general and the state risk manager. 
(3) (a) If the Judicial Council, after consultation with the general counsel 
for the state judiciary, determines that the Office of the Attorney General 
cannot adequately defend the state judiciary, its members, or employees 
because of a conflict of interest, separation of powers concerns, or other 
political or legal differences, the Judicial Council may direct its general 
counsel to separately represent and defend it. 
(b) If the general counsel for the state judiciary undertakes indepen-
dent legal representation of the state judiciary, its members, or em-
ployees, the general counsel shall notify the state risk manager and the 
attorney general in writing before undertaking that representation. 
(c) If the state judiciary elects to be represented by its own counsel 
under this section, the decision for settlement of claims against the state 
judiciary, its members, or employees, where Risk Management Fund cov-
erage applies, lies with the general counsel for the state judiciary and the 
state risk manager. 
(4) (a) If the Legislative Management Committee, after consultation with 
general counsel for the Legislature, determines that the Office of the 
Attorney General cannot adequately defend the legislative branch, its 
members, or employees because of a conflict of interest, separation of 
powers concerns, or other political or legal differences, the Legislative 
Management Committee may direct its general counsel to separately rep-
resent and defend it. 
(b) If the general counsel for the Legislature undertakes independent 
legal representation of the Legislature, its members, or employees, the 
general counsel shall notify the state risk manager and the attorney 
general in writing before undertaking that representation. 
(c) If the legislative branch elects to be represented by its own counsel 
under this section, the decision for settlement of claims against the legis-
lative branch, its members, or employees, where Risk Management Fund 
coverage applies, lies with the general counsel for the Legislature and the 
state risk manager. 
(5) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 67-5-3 or any other provi-
sion of this code, the attorney general, the general counsel for the state 
judiciary, and the general counsel for the Legislature may bill the De-
partment of Administrative Services for all costs and legal fees expended 
by their respective offices, including attorneys' and secretarial salaries, in 
representing the state or any indemnified employee against any claim for 
which the Risk Management Fund may be liable and in advising state 
agencies and employees regarding any of those claims. 
(b) The risk manager shall draw funds from the Risk Management 
Fund for this purpose. 
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History: C. 1953, 63-30-5, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 250, § 8; 1983, ch. 130, § 4; 1987, 
ch. 92, § 115; 1988, ch. 221, § 1; 1990, ch. 97, 
§ 9. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, designated the 
first and second sentences in Subsection (1) as 
Subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b); deleted former 
Subsection (2), relating to the provision of lia-
bility insurance for state agencies and em-
ployees; designated former Subsections (3) to 
(6) as Subsections (2) to (5); and made stylistic 
changes. 
CHAPTER 31 
BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
Sunset Act. — Section 63-55-263 provides that this chapter is repealed July 1, 1992. 
CHAPTER 33 
COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
Part 1 
Department of Community and 
Economic Development 
Section 
63-33-1. Department of Community and 
Economic Development — Cre-
ation — Divisions within de-
partment. 
Part 3 
Shared Foreign Sales Corporations 
63-33-13. Creation of shared foreign sales 
corporations. 
Section 
63-33-14. Shared foreign sales corporations 
management fees. 
Part 4 
Child Care Advisory Committee 
63-33-15. Definitions. 
63-33-16. Creation of office. 
63-33-17. Functions and duties of office. 
63-33-18. Duties of director. 
63-33-19. Creation of committee. 
PART 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
63-33-1. Department of Community and Economic Devel-
opment — Creation — Divisions within depart-
ment. 
There is created within state government the Department of Community 
and Economic Development which is responsible for community and economic 
development within the state and for the administration and coordination of 
all state or federal grant programs which are, or become, available for commu-
nity and economic development or for any of the programs over which the 
department has administrative supervision. The Department of Community 
and Economic Development is also responsible for the administrative supervi-
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64-7-31. Release of voluntary patient. 
A voluntary patient who requests release or whose release is requested, in 
writing, by the patient's legal guardian, parent, spouse, or adult next of kin 
shall be released forthwith except that: 
(1) If the patient were admitted on the patient's own application and 
the request for release is made by a person other than the patient, release 
may be conditioned upon the agreement of the patient thereto, and 
(2) If the patient, by reason of age, was admitted on the application of 
another person, any release prior to becoming sixteen years of age may be 
conditioned upon the consent of the patient's parent or guardian, and 
(3) If the clinical director of the mental health facility or a designee is 
of the opinion that release of a patient would be unsafe for the patient or 
others, release of the patient may be postponed for up to 48 hours exclud-
ing weekends and holidays provided that the clinical director or a desig-
nee must cause to be instituted involuntary hospitalization proceedings 
with the district court within the specified time period unless cause no 
longer exists for instituting such proceedings. Written notice of such de-
nial with the reasons for such denial must be given to the patient without 
undue delay. No judicial proceedings shall be commenced with respect to 
a voluntary patient unless release of the patient has been requested by 
the patient or, if under the age of sixteen, by the patient's parent or 
guardian. 
History: C. 1943, 85-7-58, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Limitation of applica-
1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1971, tion as to criminally insane, § 64-7-54. 
ch. 172, § 6 [a]; 1975, ch. 198, § 19; 1979, ch. 
97, § 13. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Incompetent Governmental tort liability for injuries 
Persons §§ 44 to 48. caused by negligently released individual, 6 
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Asylums and Institutional A L R 4th 1155 
?,arn ? | c i l T i t i e s § i1' 4 1 C:J7S0 H o s P l t a l s § 7*> Key Numbers. - Asylums o 5; Hospitals 
A T P fne f nSf§ KI' <r * ^ 5 ; Mental Health *. 59. 
A.L.R. — Immunity of public officer from 
liability for injuries caused by negligently re-
leased individual, 5 A.L.R.4th 773. 
64-7-32. Involuntary hospitalization — General proce-
dures. 
No person shall be involuntarily hospitalized by reason of mental illness 
except under the following provisions: 
(1) emergency procedures for temporary hospitalization upon medical 
or designated examiner certification as provided in Subsection (1) of 
§ 64-7-34. 
(2) emergency procedures for temporary hospitalization without en-
dorsement of medical or designated examiner, certification as provided in 
Subsection (2) of § 64-7-34. 
(3) hospitalization on court order as provided in § 64-7-36. 
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into all the hospital departments of labor and expenses, and a careful exami-
nation of the buildings, property and general condition of the hospital, at least 
once in every three months. The division shall estimate and determine as 
nearly as may be the actual expense per annum of keeping and taking care of 
a patient in the hospital and such amount or portion thereof shall be assessed 
to and paid by the applicant, patient, spouse, parents, child or children who 
are of sufficient financial ability to do so, or by the guardian of the patient 
who has funds of the patient that may be used for such purpose. 
History: R.S. 1898, § 2159; L. 1903, ch. 
115, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 2159; C.L. 1917, § 5389; 
R.S. 1933, 85-7-6; L. 1941, ch. 71, § 1; C. 1943, 
85-7-6; L. 1945, ch. 121, § 1; 1947, ch. 123, 
§ 1; 1951, ch. 113, § 2; 1967, ch. 174, § 117. 
Cross-References. — Liability of estate for 
care and treatment, § 64-7-18. 
Limitation of application as to criminally in-
sane, § 64-7-54. 
Order in which relatives liable for support, 
§ 17-14-2. 
State Building Board, § 63-1-33 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Criminally insane. 
This section is inapplicable to one declared 
insane prior to determination of guilt in crimi-
nal prosecution and committed to state hospi-
tal; therefore, guardian cannot be compelled to 
pay cost of care and treatment. Ollerton v. 
Diamenti, 521 P.2d 899 (Utah 1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Incompetent 
Persons §§ 55 to 61. 
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Asylums and Institutional 
Care Facilities §§ 3, 4; 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 4; 
44 C.J.S. Insane Persons §§ 73 to 76. 
A.L.R. — Constitutionality of statute impos-
ing liability upon estate or relatives of insane 
person for his support in asylum, 20 A.L.R.3d 
363. 
Civil liability for physical measures under-
taken in connection with treatment of men-
tally disordered patient, 8 A.L.R.4th 464. 
Key Numbers. — Asylums «=» 2; Hospitals 
«=» 2; Mental Health <s=> 71 to 86. 
64-7-7. Supervision and treatment of mentally ill persons 
by division. 
The Division of Mental Health shall have the responsibility for supervision 
and treatment of mentally ill persons in the state, who have been admitted to 
its care under the provisions of this act, whether residing in the hospital or 
elsewhere. 
History: R.S. 1898, § 2610; L. 1903, ch. 
115, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 2160; C.L. 1917, § 5390; 
R.S. 1933,85-7-7; L. 1941, ch. 71, § 1; C. 1943, 
85-7-7; L. 1951, ch. 113, § 2; 1963, ch. 159, 
§ 1; 1967, ch. 174, § 118; 1975, ch. 198, § 4. 
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this 
act," referred to in this section, means Laws 
1963, ch. 159, § 1, which appears as §§ 64-7-7, 
64-7-33, and 64-7-48. 
Cross-References. — Limitation of applica-
tion as to criminally insane, § 64-7-54. 
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History: R.S. 1898, § 2197; L. 1903, ch. 
115, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 2197; C.L. 1917, § 5427; 
R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 85-7-49; L. 1975, ch. 198, 
§ 14. 
Cross-References. — Escape of patient 
committed for causing fire, duty to report, 
§ 63-29-25. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
64-7-24.5. Escape of criminals. 
Any person committed to the Utah State Hospital under the provisions of 
Title 77, Chapters [Chapter] 48 or 49, or under the provisions of § 77-24-15, 
who escapes or leaves without proper legal authority shall be deemed guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 175, § 1; 1979, ch. 97, 
§ 10. 
Compiler's Notes. — Section 77-24-15 and 
Chapters 48 and 49 of Title 77, referred to in 
this section, were repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 
15, § 1. For present provisions relating to com-
mitment on findings of incompetency in crimi-
nal proceedings, see Chapters 15 and 16 of Ti-
tle 77. 
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
64-7-25. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 64-7-25 (R.S. 1898, 
§ 2198; L. 1903, ch. 115, § 1; C.L. 1907, 
§ 2198; C.L. 1917, § 5428; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 85-7-50; L. 1951, ch. 113, § 2), relating to 
penalties for bringing a mentally ill person 
into the state with intent to make such person 
a charge upon the state, was repealed by Laws 
1975, ch. 198, § 35. 
64-7-26. Violation of chapter — Penalty. 
Any person who willfully and knowingly violates any of the provisions of 
this chapter, except where another penalty is provided by law, shall be guilty 
of a class C misdemeanor. 
History: R.S. 1898, § 2199; L. 1903, ch. 
115, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 2199; C.L. 1917, § 5429; 
R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 85-7-51; L. 1975, ch. 198, 
§ 15. 
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
64-7-27. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 64-7-27 (L. 1935, ch. 95, 
§ 2; 1941, ch. 71, § 1; C. 1943, 85-7-54; L. 
1945, ch. 121, § 1; 1951, ch. 113, § 2; 1967, ch. 
174, § 129), relating to boarding out of indi-
gent patients who were quiet and not danger-
ous with suitable families, was repealed by 
Laws 1975, ch. 198, § 35. 
64-7-28. Words and phrases defined. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Mental illness" means a psychiatric disorder as defined by the 
current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders which 
substantially impairs a person's mental, emotional, behavioral, or related 
functioning. 
(2) "Patient" means an individual under observation, care, or treat-
ment in a mental health facility. 
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(3) "Licensed physician" means an individual licensed under the laws 
of this state to practice medicine or a medical officer of the government of 
the United States while in this state in the performance of official duties. 
(4) "Designated examiner" means a licensed physician, preferably a 
psychiatrist, designated by the Division of Mental Health as specially 
qualified by training or experience in the diagnosis of mental or related 
illness or another licensed mental health professional designated by the 
Division of Mental Health as specially qualified by training and at least 
five years' continual experience in the treatment of mental or related 
illness. At least one designated examiner in any case shall be a licensed 
physician. No person who is the applicant, or who signs the certification, 
under § 64-7-36 may be a designated examiner in the same case. 
(5) "Comprehensive community mental health center" means a com-
munity mental health center providing essential services to residents of a 
designated geographic area and complying with the state standards for 
comprehensive community mental health centers. 
(6) "Mental health facility" means the Utah State Hospital, a compre-
hensive community mental health center, or a hospital inpatient unit 
which has been accredited for care and treatment of involuntary patients 
by the Board of Mental Health. 
(7) "Mental health officer" means an individual designated by the Divi-
sion of Mental Health to interact with and transport persons to any men-
tal health facility. 
(8) "Hospitalization" means admission to inpatient treatment in a 
mental health facility followed by partial or outpatient treatment in a 
variety of settings as required by the patient's needs. 
(9) "Institution" means a hospital, jail, prison, or health facility li-
censed under the provisions of § 26-21-9. 
(10) "Chief executive officer" means the individual who has the ulti-
mate responsibility for the operation of the mental health facility. All 
medical functions shall be designated to a physician who is the clinical 
director or a designee. 
(11) "Designee" means a physician who has responsibility for medical 
functions including admission and discharge. 
History: C. 1943, 85-7-55, enacted by L. troductory language and "health facility li-
1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1971, ch. 172, § 4; 1975, censed" for "agency duly registered" and 
ch. 198, § 16; 1979, ch. 97, § 11; 1985, ch. 49, "§ 21-26-9" for "section 58-15-2" in Subsection 
§ 7. (9). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- Cross-References. — Limitation of applica-
ment substituted "chapter" for "act" in the in- tion as to criminally insane, § 64-7-54. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Designated examiner. qualified to act as a designated examiner on a 
. re-examination pursuant to § 64-7-45. In re 
™ -
e f a m m a ^ l o n -
 +u . . . .. .. Wahlquist (1978) 585 P.2d 437. 
The doctor who signs the original application 
for commitment as provided in § 64-7-36 is dis-
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History: C. 1943, 85-7-58, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Inquiry into defen-
1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1971, dant's sanity, Chapter 15 of Title 77. 
ch. 172, § 6 [b]; 1975, ch. 198, § 20; 1979, ch. Limitation of application as to criminally m-
97, § 14. sane, § 64-7-54. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Incompetent Key Numbers. — Mental Health «=» 37 to 
Persons §§ 8 to 25, 39 to 42. 46. 
C.J.S. — 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons §§ 14 to 
34. 
64-7-33. Repealed-
Repeals. — Section 64-7-33 (C. 1943, mission to the Utah State Hospital on certifica-
85-7-59, enacted by L. 1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. tion by examiners, was repealed by Laws 1975, 
1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1963, ch. 159, § 1; 1967, ch. ch. 198, § 35. 
174, § 130; 1971, ch. 172, § 7), relating to ad-
64-7-34. Temporary admission to mental health facility — 
Requirements and procedures — Costs. 
(1) Any individual may temporarily be admitted to a mental health facility 
upon: 
(a) written application by a responsible person who has reason to know, 
stating a belief that the individual is likely to cause serious injury to self 
or others if not immediately restrained, and the personal knowledge of 
the individual's condition or circumstances which lead to such belief, and 
(b) a certification by a licensed physician or designated examiner stat-
ing that the physician or designated examiner has examined the individ-
ual within a three-day period immediately preceding said certification 
and is of the opinion that the individual is mentally ill and, because of the 
individual's mental illness, is likely to injure self or others if not immedi-
ately restrained. 
Such an application and certificate shall authorize any mental health or 
peace officer to take the individual into custody and transport the individual 
to a mental health facility. 
(2) If a duly authorized mental health officer or peace officer observes a 
person involved in conduct which leads the officer to have probable cause to 
believe that such person is mentally ill, as defined by this act, and that, 
because of such apparent mental illness and conduct, there is a substantial 
likelihood of serious harm to that person or to others pending proceedings for 
examination and certification as provided in this act, the officer may take the 
person into protective custody. A peace officer may transport a patient pursu-
ant to this provision either on the basis of his own observation or on the basis 
of the observation of a mental health officer, reported to him by the mental 
health officer. Immediately thereafter, the officer shall transport the person to 
a mental health facility and there make application for the person's admission 
therein. The application shall be upon a prescribed form and shall include the 
following: 
(a) a statement by the officer that the officer believes on the basis of 
personal observation or on the basis of the observation of a mental health 
officer reported to him by the mental health officer that the person is, as a 
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result of a mental illness, a substantial and immediate danger to self or 
others. 
(b) the specific nature of the danger. 
(c) a summary of the observations upon which the statement of danger 
is based. 
(d) a statement of facts which called the person to the attention of the 
officer. 
(3) Any person admitted under this section may be held for a maximum of 
24 hours excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays. At the expiration 
of that time period, the person shall be released unless application for invol-
untary hospitalization has been commenced pursuant to § 64-7-36. If such 
application has been made, an order of detention may be entered pursuant to 
Subsection (3) of § 64-7-36. If no order of detention is issued, the patient shall 
be released, except when the patient has made voluntary application for ad-
mission. 
(4) Cost of all diagnosis and treatment under this section shall be paid by 
the county in which such person is found, unless the county participates in the 
state social services medical program as outlined in § 55-15a-3, in which 
event the state shall pay, or unless the person is financially able to pay the 
same in which event that person shall pay. 
History: C. 1943, 85-7-60, enacted by L. of a mental health officer reported to him by 
1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1963, the mental health officer" in Subsection (2)(a). 
ch. 159, § 1; 1971, ch. 172, § 8; 1975, ch. 198, Meaning of "this act". — The term "this 
§ 21; 1979, ch. 97, § 15; 1981, ch. 261, § 1.
 act," referred to in this section, means Laws 
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend- 1975,
 ch. 198, §§ 1 to 34, which appear as vari-
ment deleted "upon endorsement for such pur-
 o u s sections throughout Titles 26 and 64. See 
pose by a judge of the district court or a mem-
 T a b l e o f Session Laws in Parallel Tables vol-
ber of the board of county commissioners of the 
county in which the individual is present" after
 C o m p i l e r . s N o t e 8 . _ S e c t i o n 5 5 . ^ . 3 , 
certificate in the second paragraph of Subsec- •* j • o u *• /A\ • I J o 
tion (1); inserted "officer" after "mental f £ i " S u b s e c t l o n <4>> 1S reP«* l ed- See 
health" in the first sentence of Subsection (2); 9 1 „ *
 T . . .. 
inserted the second sentence of Subsection (2); Cross-References. Limitation of apphca-
and inserted "or on the basis of the observation t l o n a s to criminally insane, § 64-7-54. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Incompetent Key Numbers. — Mental Health <*=> 37 to 
Persons §§ 8 to 25, 39 to 42. 46. 
C.J.S. — 44 CJ.S. Insane Persons §§ 14 to 
34. 
64-7-35. Mental health commissioner — Appointment — 
Qualifications — Duties. 
The court is authorized to appoint a mental health commissioner to assist in 
the conduct of hospitalization proceedings who shall be an attorney licensed to 
practice law in this state and knowledgeable about mental health. In any case 
in which the court refers an application to the commissioner, the commis-
sioner shall promptly cause the proposed patient to be examined and, on the 
basis thereof, shall either recommend dismissal of the application or hold a 
hearing as provided in this chapter and make findings of fact and recommen-
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dations to the court regarding the order for involuntary hospitalization of the 
proposed patient. 
History: C. 1953, 64-7-35, enacted by L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1971, ch. 172, § 9), relating 
1979, ch. 97, § 16. to protective custody pending examination and 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1975, ch. 198, certification. 
§ 35 repealed former § 64-7-35 (C. 1943, Cross-References. — Admission to practice 
85-7-61, enacted by L. 1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. law, § 78-51-10. 
64-7-36. Involuntary hospitalization on court order — Ex-
amination of patient — Hearing — Power of court 
— Findings — Costs. 
(1) Proceedings for the involuntary hospitalization of an individual may be 
commenced by the filing of a written application with the district court of the 
county in which the proposed patient resides or is found, by a responsible 
person who has reason to know of the condition or circumstances of the pro-
posed patient which lead to the belief that the individual is mentally ill and 
should be involuntarily hospitalized. Any such application shall be accompa-
nied by: 
(a) a certificate of a licensed physician or a designated examiner stat-
ing that within a seven-day period immediately preceding the certifica-
tion the physician or designated examiner has examined the individual 
and is of the opinion that the individual is mentally ill and should be 
involuntarily hospitalized; or 
(b) a written statement by the applicant that the individual has been 
requested to but has refused to submit to an examination of mental condi-
tion by a licensed physician or designated examiner. Said application 
shall be sworn to under oath and shall state the facts upon which the 
application is based. 
(2) Prior to issuing a judicial order, the court may require the applicant to 
consult a mental health facility or may direct a mental health professional 
from a mental health facility to interview the applicant and the proposed 
patient to determine the existing facts and report them to the court. 
(3) If the court finds from the application, any other statements under oath, 
or any reports from a mental health professional that there is a reasonable 
basis to believe that the proposed patient's mental condition and immediate 
danger to self, others or property requires involuntary hospitalization pending 
examination and hearing, or if the proposed patient has refused to submit to 
an interview with a mental health professional as directed by the court, or to 
go to a treatment facility voluntarily, the court may issue an order directed to 
a mental health officer or peace officer to immediately take the proposed 
patient to any mental health facility, or a temporary emergency facility as 
provided in Section [Subsection] 64-7-38(2), there to be detained for the pur-
pose of examination. Within 24 hours of the issuance of the order for examina-
tion, the clinical director of a mental health facility or a designee shall report 
to the court orally or in writing whether the patient is, in the opinion of the 
examiners, mentally ill, whether the patient has agreed to become a volun-
tary patient pursuant to § 64-7-29, and whether treatment programs are 
available and acceptable without court proceedings. Based on such informa-
tion, the court may without taking any further action terminate the proceed-
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ings and dismiss the application. In any event, if the examiner reports orally, 
the examiner shall immediately send the report in writing to the clerk of the 
court. 
(4) Notice of the commencement of proceedings for involuntary hospitaliza-
tion, setting forth the allegations of the application and any reported facts, 
together with a copy of any official order of detention, shall be provided by the 
court to a proposed patient prior to, or upon, admission to a mental health 
facility or, with respect to any individual presently in a mental health facility 
whose status is being changed from voluntary to involuntary, upon the filing 
of an application for that purpose with the court. A copy of such order of 
detention must be maintained at the place of detention. 
(5) Notice of the commencement of such proceedings shall be provided by 
the court as soon as practicable to the applicant, any legal guardian, any 
immediate adult family members, the legal counsel for the parties involved, 
and any other persons the proposed patient or the court shall designate, and 
shall advise such persons that a hearing thereon may be held within the time 
provided by law, unless the patient has refused to permit release of such 
information in which case the extent of notice shall be determined by the 
court. 
(6) Proceedings for the involuntary hospitalization of an individual under 
the age of eighteen years who is under the continuing jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court may be commenced by the filing of a written application with 
the juvenile court in accordance with the provisions of this section and said 
court shall have jurisdiction to proceed in such case in the same manner and 
with the same authority as the district court. 
(7) If there are no appropriate mental health resources within the district, 
the court may in its discretion transfer the case or patient's custody to any 
other district court within the state of Utah provided that said transfer will 
not be adverse to the interest of the proposed patient. 
(8) Within twenty-four hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal hol-
idays, of the issuance of a judicial order or after admission at a mental health 
facility of a proposed patient under court order for detention or examination, 
the court shall appoint two designated examiners to examine the proposed 
patient. If requested by the proposed patient's counsel, the court shall appoint 
as one of the examiners a reasonably available qualified person designated by 
counsel. The examinations, to be conducted separately, shall be held at the 
home of the proposed patient, a hospital or other medical facility, or at any 
other suitable place not likely to have a harmful effect on the patient's health. 
A time shall be set for a hearing to be held within ten court days of the 
appointment of the designated examiners unless said examiners or the clini-
cal director of the mental health facility shall inform the court prior to said 
hearing date that the patient is not mentally ill, that the patient has agreed to 
become a voluntary patient pursuant to § 64-7-29, or that treatment pro-
grams are available and acceptable without court proceedings in which event 
the court may without taking any further action terminate the proceedings 
and dismiss the application. 
(9) Prior to the hearing, an opportunity to be represented by counsel shall 
be afforded to every proposed patient, and if neither the patient nor others 
provide counsel, the court shall appoint counsel and allow sufficient time to 
consult with the patient prior to the hearing. In the case of an indigent pa-
tient, the payment of reasonable attorney's fees for counsel as determined by 
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the court shall be made by the county in which the patient resides or was 
found. The proposed patient, the applicant, and all other persons to whom 
notice is required to be given shall be afforded an opportunity to appear at the 
hearing, to testify, and to present and cross-examine witnesses, and the court 
may in its discretion receive the testimony of any other person. The court may 
allow a waiver of the patient's right to appear only for good cause shown, 
which cause shall be made a matter of court record. The court is authorized to 
exclude all persons not necessary for the conduct of the proceedings and may, 
upon motion of counsel, require the testimony of each examiner to be given 
out of the presence of any other examiners. The hearing shall be conducted in 
as informal a manner as may be consistent with orderly procedure and in a 
physical setting not likely to have a harmful effect on the mental health of the 
proposed patient. The court shall receive all relevant and material evidence 
which may be offered subject to the rules of evidence. 
The mental health facility or the physician in charge of the patient's care 
shall provide to the court at the time of the hearing the following information: 
the detention order, the admission notes, the diagnosis, any doctors' orders, 
the progress notes, the nursing notes and the medication records pertaining to 
the current hospitalization. Said information shall also be supplied to the 
patient's counsel at the time of the hearing and at any time prior thereto upon 
request. 
(10) The court shall order hospitalization if, upon completion of the hearing 
and consideration of the record, the court finds by clear and convincing evi-
dence that: 
(a) The proposed patient has a mental illness; and 
(b) Because of the patient's illness the proposed patient poses an imme-
diate danger of physical injury to others or self, which may include the 
inability to provide the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, and 
shelter, if allowed to remain at liberty; and 
(c) The patient lacks the ability to engage in a rational decision-mak-
ing process regarding the acceptance of mental treatment as demon-
strated by evidence of inability to weigh the possible costs and benefits of 
treatment; and 
(d) There is no appropriate less restrictive alternative to a court order 
of hospitalization; and 
(e) The hospital or mental health facility in which the individual is to 
be hospitalized pursuant to this act can provide the individual with treat-
ment that is adequate and appropriate to the individual's conditions and 
needs. In the absence of the required findings of the court after the hear-
ing, the court shall forthwith dismiss the proceedings. 
(11) (a) The order of hospitalization shall designate the period for which 
the individual shall be treated. When the individual is not under an order 
of hospitalization at the time of the hearing, this period shall not exceed 
six months without benefit of a review hearing. Upon such a review 
hearing, to be commenced prior to the expiration of the previous order, an 
order for hospitalization may be for an indeterminate period, if the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the required conditions in 
Section [Subsection] 64-7-36(10) will last for an indeterminate period. 
(b) The court shall maintain a current list of all patients under its 
order of hospitalization, which list shall be reviewed to determine those 
patients who have been under an order of hospitalization for the desig-
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nated period. At least two weeks prior to the expiration of the designated 
period of any order of hospitalization still in effect, the court that entered 
the original order shall so inform the clinical director of the mental 
health facility responsible for the care of such patient. The director shall 
immediately reexamine the reasons upon which the order of hospitaliza-
tion was based. If the director and staff determine that the conditions 
justifying such hospitalization no longer exist, the director shall dis-
charge the patient from involuntary treatment and make an immediate 
report thereof to the court and to the Division of Mental Health. Other-
wise, the court shall immediately appoint two designated examiners and 
proceed under Subsections (8) through (10) of this section. 
(c) The clinical director of a mental health facility or a designee respon-
sible for the care of a patient under an order of hospitalization for an 
indeterminate period shall at six-month intervals reexamine the reasons 
upon which the order of indeterminate hospitalization was based. If the 
clinical director or the designee determine that the conditions justifying 
such hospitalization no longer exist, the director shall discharge the pa-
tient from involuntary treatment and make an immediate report thereof 
to the court and the Division of Mental Health. If the clinical director or 
designee has determined that the conditions justifying such hospitaliza-
tion continue to exist, the director shall send a written report of such 
findings to the court and to the Division of Mental Health. The patient 
and the patient's counsel of record shall be notified in writing that the 
involuntary treatment will be continued, the reasons for such, and that 
the patient has the right to a review hearing by making a request to the 
court. Upon receiving the request, the court shall immediately appoint 
two designated examiners and proceed under Subsections (8) through (10) 
of this section. 
(12) In the event that the designated examiners are unable, because of 
refusal of a proposed patient to submit to an examination, to complete such 
examination upon the first attempt to conduct the same, the court shall fix a 
reasonable compensation to be paid to such designated examiners for services 
in the cause. 
(13) Any person hospitalized under this act or a person's legally designated 
representative who is aggrieved by the findings, conclusions and order of the 
court, shall have the right to a rehearing upon a petition filed with the court 
within thirty days of the entry of the court order. In the event the petition 
alleges error or mistake in the findings, the court shall appoint three impar-
tial designated examiners previously unrelated to the case who shall conduct 
an additional examination of the patient. The rehearing shall in all other 
respects be conducted in the manner otherwise permitted. 
(14) Costs of all proceedings under this section shall be paid by the county 
in which the proposed patient resides or is found. 
History: C. 1943, 85-7-62, enacted by L. ment substituted "issuing a judicial order" in 
1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1963, Subsection (2) for "filing the application", in-
ch. 60, § 1; 1967, ch. 174, § 131; 1971, ch. serted "or to go to a treatment facility volun-
172, § 10; 1975, ch. 198, § 22; 1979, ch. 97, tarily" and "or a temporary emergency facility 
§ 17; 1981, ch. 261, § 2. as provided in section 64-7-38(2)" m the first 
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend- sentence of Subsection (3), added the last three 
58 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
tm. Jur. 2d Criminal 
iminal Law <&=* 59. 
inal responsibility of corporation or associ-
association is guilty of an offense when-
rt constituting the offense consists of an omission to dis-
duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations 
3y law; or 
ct constituting the offense is authorized, solicited re-
ided, or undertaken, performed, or recklessly tolerated 
irectors or by a high managerial agent acting within the 
loyment and in behalf of the corporation or association. 
204, enacted by L. not contain a Subsection (2); therefore, the 
compiler has deleted the "(1)" from the betnn-
S
 r n a <m» u1S. T ; n i n g a n d r e d e s i ^ a t e d former (a) and (b) as (1) lation "(1)" but did and (2). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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76-2-301- Person under fourteen years old not criminally 
responsible. 
A person is not criminally responsible for conduct performed before he 
reaches the age of fourteen years. This section shall in no way limit the 
jurisdiction of or proceedings before the juvenile courts of this state. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-301, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-301. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal 
Law § 38. 
C.J.S. — 43 C.J.S. Infants § 31, 32. 
A.L.R. — Burden of proof of defendant's age, 
in prosecution where attainment of particular 
age is statutory requisite of guilt, 49 A.L.R.3d 
526. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law <$=> 65. 
76-2-302. Compulsion. 
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when he engaged in the proscribed 
conduct because he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened imminent 
use of unlawful physical force upon him or a third person, which force or 
threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would not 
have resisted. 
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this section shall be unavailable 
to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly places himself in a 
situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress. 
(3) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the presence of her hus-
band, to any presumption of compulsion or to any defense of compulsion ex-
cept as in Subsection (1) provided. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-302, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-302. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Deviation from compelled behavior. 
Escape. 
—Instructions. 
Standard. 
Deviation from compelled behavior. 
Where wife was asked by imprisoned hus-
band to break into jail and get the keys and 
unlock the doors, but instead gave him hack-
saw blades, she was not incapable of commis-
sion of crime because she departed from his 
coercion and committed a crime of her own 
choosing. Farrell v. Turner, 26 Utah 2d 351, 
482 P.2d 117 (1971). 
Escape. 
In prosecution for escape from state prison, 
trial court did not err in refusing to submit to 
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in state criminal case during its progress as Key Numbers. — Criminal Law <s=» 857(1) 
ground for mistrial, new trial, or reversal, 46 
A L R 4 t h 11 
77-17-12. Defendant on bail appearing for trial may be 
committed. 
When a defendant who has given bail appears for trial, the court may, at 
any time after his appearance for trial, order him to be committed to the 
custody of the proper officer to await the judgment or further order of the 
court. 
History: C. 1953, 77-17-12, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Key Numbers. — Bail <s=» 80 
CHAPTER 18 
THE JUDGMENT 
Section 
77-18-1 
77-18-2 
77-18-3 
77-18-4 
Suspension of sentence — Proba-
tion — Supervision — Presen-
tence investigation — Stan-
dards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Resti-
tution — Termination, revoca-
tion, modification, or extension 
— Hearings 
Expungement and sealing of 
records 
Disposition of fines 
Sentence — Term — Construe 
tion 
Section 
77-18-5 
77-18-5 5 
77-18-6 
77-18-7 
77-18-8 
Reports by courts and prosecuting 
attorneys to Board of Pardons 
Judgment of death — Defendant 
to select method — Time of se-
lection 
Judgment to pay fine or restitu-
tion constitutes a hen 
Costs imposed on defendant — 
Restrictions 
Fine not paid — Commitment 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Probation — Supervi-
sion — Presentence investigation — Standards — 
Confidentiality — Terms and conditions — Resti-
tution — Termination, revocation, modification, 
or extension — Hearings. 
(1) (a) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any crime or of-
fense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and 
place the defendant on probation The court may place the defendant: 
d) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except m cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(in) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court. 
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(b) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of th 
department is with the Department of Corrections. The legal custody of 
all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court is vested as 
ordered by the court. The court has continuing jurisdiction over all proba-
tioners. 
(2) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish supervision and pre, 
sentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the de« 
partment. These standards shall be based on the type of offense, the 
demand for services, the availability of agency resources, the public 
safety, and other criteria established by the Department of Corrections to 
determine what level of services shall be provided. j 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-" 
ted to the Judicial Council and Board of Pardons on an annual basis for 
review and comment prior to adoption by the Department of Corrections. 
(c) The Judicial Council and department shall establish procedures to 
implement the supervision and investigation standards. < 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (2)(a) 
and other criteria as they consider appropriate. ;*| 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an' 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations^ 
committee. vj 
(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Department of Corrections 
is not required to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C, 
misdemeanors or infractions, or to conduct presentence investigation reports 
on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may super-
vise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department 
standards. ^ 
(4) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining £ 
presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections or 
information from other sources about the defendant. The presentence 
investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary dam-J 
ages, accompanied by a recommendation from the Department of Correc-
tions regarding the payment of restitution by the defendant. The contents 
of the report are confidential and not available except for purposes o( 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council and for use by the 
Department of Corrections. 4j 
(b) At the time of sentence, the court shall hear any testimony or infor-
mation the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present con-
cerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony or information shall be. 
presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.* 
(5) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may 
be required to perform any or all of the following: s 
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(b) pay amounts required under Chapter 32a, Title 77, Defense Costs; 
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(d) participate in available treatment programs; 
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(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year; 
(f) serve a term of home confinement; 
(g) participate in community service restitution programs; 
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims in accordance 
with Subsections 76-3-201(3) and (4); and 
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appro-
priate. 
(6) The Department of Corrections is responsible, upon order of the court, 
for the collection of fines and restitution during the probation period in cases 
for which the court orders supervised probation by the department. The prose-
cutor shall provide notice of the restitution order to the clerk of the court. The 
clerk shall place the order on the civil docket and shall provide notice of the 
order to the parties. The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(7) (a) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C 
misdemeanors or infractions. If the defendant, upon expiration or termi-
nation of the probation period, has outstanding fines or restitution owing, 
the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant 
on bench probation or place the defendant on bench probation for the 
limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines and restitution. Upon 
motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own motion, the court may 
require the defendant to show cause why his failure to pay should not be 
treated as contempt of court or why the suspended jail or prison term 
should not be imposed. 
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court 
and prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termi-
nation of supervised probation will occur by law. The notification shall 
include a probation progress report and complete report of details on 
outstanding fines and restitution orders. 
(8) (a) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after hav-
ing been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to 
revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total pro-
bation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke 
the probation. Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or 
decision concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of 
time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and condi-
tions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
(9) (a) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a 
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that 
the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. Probation may 
not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the 
conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts as-
serted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that 
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authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable 
cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is 
justified. If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hear-
ing, and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the 
hearing. The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. The 
order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be repre-
sented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if 
he is indigent. The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to 
present evidence. 
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of 
the affidavit. If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. The per-
sons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are 
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defen-
dant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. The defendant may 
call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. Upon a 
finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court 
may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire 
probation term commence anew. If probation is revoked, the defendant 
shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(10) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt for "willful 
and malicious injury" for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bank-
ruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 523, U.S.C.A. 1985. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L. of Subsection (8)(a), concerning the applicabil-
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 59, § 2; 1982, ch. lty of time served without violation while on 
9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, ch. 68, § 1; probation; deleted Subsection (8)(c), which pro-
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, ch. 20, § 1; 1985, ch. vided' "Nothing in this section precludes the 
212, § 17; 1985, ch. 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114, court from discharging a probationer at any 
§ 1; 1989, ch. 226, § 1. time, at the discretion of the court"; deleted 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- "Except as provided in Subsection (7)(c) of this 
ment rewrote this section, as last amended by chapter" from the beginning of Subsection 
Laws 1985, ch. 229, § 1, to the extent that a (9)(a); in Subsection (9)(b), inserted "a warrant 
detailed analysis is impracticable. for his arrest or" in the second sentence; and 
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, made stylistic changes throughout the section. 
1989, rewrote Subsections (1), (7)(a), and (8)(b), Severability Clause. — Section 3 of Laws 
inserted "the public safety" in the second sen- 1983, Chapter 85 provided: "If any provision of 
tence of Subsection (2)(a); inserted "on an an- this act, or the application of any provision to 
nual basis" in Subsection (2)(b); added Subsec- any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
tions (2)(c) through (2)(e) and (5)(j), making re- remainder of this act shall be given effect with-
lated changes in Subsection (5); added the "(a)" out the invalid provision or application." 
and "(b)" designations m Subsection (4), in- Cross-References. — Indecent public dis-
serted "upon order of the court" in the first play, incarceration without suspension of sen-
sentence of Subsection (6) and substituted "en- tence, § 76-10-1228. 
forceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Proce- Payment of costs of defense as condition of 
dure" for "under which the victim may seek probation or suspension, § 77-32a-6. 
civil remedy" in the last sentence of that sub- Presentence investigation reports, Rules 
section; deleted "45 days" following "in writ- 4-607, 6-301, Rules of Judicial Administration. 
ing" in the first sentence of Subsection (7)(b), Rules of Evidence inapplicable to sentencing 
deleted Subsection (7)(c), concerning extension and probation proceedings, Rules of Evidence, 
of probation; deleted the former first sentence Rule 1101. 
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His tory : L. 1965, ch. 165, § 53, formerly C. 
1953, 55-10-115 redes , as 78-3a-54; L. 1977, 
ch . 79, § 8; 1979, ch. 135, § 1; 1983, ch. 83, 
§ 12; 1986, ch . 104, § 1; 1987, ch. 182, § 5. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1983 amend-
ment, in the second paragraph, inserted "or 
forfeiture" in the first sentence, substituted 
"Funds" for "Fines" in the third sentence, and 
substituted "not encumbered by work orders 
fulfilled or in process" for "but not disbursed" 
in the third sentence. 
The 1986 amendment redesignated the first 
two paragraphs as Subsection (1), the first two 
sentences of the third paragraph as Subsection 
(2), the rest of the third paragraph as Subsec-
tion (3) and the last paragraph as Subsection 
(4); in the second paragraph of Subsection (1) 
substituted "25%" for "20%" and "provides for" 
for "supervises public service" in the first sen-
tence, in the second sentence inserted "and any 
private contributions to the rehabilitative em-
ployment program" following "provision" and 
substituted "are" for "shall be", and substi-
tuted "and private contributions are nonlaps-
ing and may be transferred for use among 
counties within the district in which they are 
donated or collected. The Board of Juvenile 
Court Judges shall establish policies for the 
use of the funds" for "not encumbered by work 
orders fulfilled or in process before the last day 
of the county fiscal year shall be paid to the 
county treasurer of the county in which they 
were collected." in the third sentence; in Sub-
sections (2) and (3) made minor word changes; 
and substituted "youth corrections facilities" 
for "the state industrial school" in Subsection 
(4) 
The 1987 amendment, effective July 1, 1987, 
in Subsection (1) inserted the designations and 
in Subsection (l)(a) substituted "state trea-
surer for deposit in the General Fund" for 
"county treasurer of the county in which they 
are collected," in Subsection (l)(c) in the second 
sentence deleted "and may be transferred for 
use amoung counties within the district in 
which they are donated or collected" from the 
end of the first sentence and made minor 
changes in phraseology, punctuation and style 
throughout this section. 
78-3a-55. Court records — Inspection — Fingerprints or 
photographs prohibited, exception. 
The court and the probation department shall keep such records as may be 
required by the board and the presiding judge. Court records shall be open to 
inspection by the parents or guardian, other parties in the case, the attorneys, 
and agencies to which custody of a child has been transferred; and with the 
consent of the judge, court records may be inspected by the child, by persons 
having a legitimate interest in the proceedings, and by persons conducting 
pertinent research studies. Probation officers' records and reports of social and 
clinical studies shall not be open to inspection, except by consent of the court 
given pursuant to rules adopted by the board. 
Without the consent of the judge, no fingerprints or photographs shall be 
taken of any child taken into custody, unless the case is transferred for crimi-
nal proceedings. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 54, formerly C. 
1953, 55-10-116 r edes , as 78-3a-55; L. 1983, 
ch . 83, § 13. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1983 amend-
ment inserted "or photographs" in the second 
paragraph. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Fingerprinting. 
Where the procedure of § 78-3a-25 is not fol-
lowed, there is no transfer of the case for crimi-
nal proceedings and the fingerprints of the 
child cannot be taken without the consent of 
the judge. H.A.G. v. Fillis, 577 P.2d 964 (Utah 
1978). 
Judge's consent to fingerprint a child re-
quires affirmative action by an individual ju-
venile judge; Rule 39 of the Utah State Juve-
nile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure 
which authorizes a blanket consent, unindivid-
ualized by juvenile judge, does not satisfy the 
consent requirement. H.A.G. v. Fillis, 577 P.2d 
964 (Utah 1978). 
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History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 53, formerly C. 
1953, 55-10-115 redes, as 78-3a-54; L. 1977, 
ch. 79, § 8; 1979, ch. 135, § 1; 1983, ch. 83, 
§ 12; 1986, ch. 104, § 1; 1987, ch. 182, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-
ment, in the second paragraph, inserted "or 
forfeiture" in the first sentence, substituted 
"Funds" for "Fines" in the third sentence, and 
substituted "not encumbered by work orders 
fulfilled or in process" for "but not disbursed" 
in the third sentence. 
The 1986 amendment redesignated the first 
two paragraphs as Subsection (1), the first two 
sentences of the third paragraph as Subsection 
(2), the rest of the third paragraph as Subsec-
tion (3) and the Last paragraph as Subsection 
(4); in the second paragraph of Subsection (1) 
substituted "25%" for "20%" and "provides for" 
for "supervises public service" in the first sen-
tence, in the second sentence inserted "and any 
private contributions to the rehabilitative em-
ployment program" following "provision" and 
substituted "are" for "shall be", and substi-
tuted "and private contributions are nonlaps-
ing and may be transferred for use among 
Fingerprinting. 
Where the procedure of § 78-3a-25 is not fol-
lowed, there is no transfer of the case for crimi-
nal proceedings and the fingerprints of the 
child cannot be taken without the consent of 
the judge. H.A.G. v. Fillis, 577 P.2d 964 (Utah 
1978). 
Judge's consent to fingerprint a child re-
counties within the district in which they are 
donated or collected. The Board of Juvenile 
Court Judges shall establish policies for the 
use of the funds" for "not encumbered by work 
orders fulfilled or in process before the last day 
of the county fiscal year shall be paid to the 
county treasurer of the county in which they 
were collected." in the third sentence; in Sub-
sections (2) and (3) made minor word changes; 
and substituted "youth corrections facilities" 
for "the state industrial school" in Subsection 
(4). 
The 1987 amendment, effective July 1, 1987, 
in Subsection (1) inserted the designations and 
in Subsection (l)(a) substituted "state trea-
surer for deposit in the General Fund" for 
"county treasurer of the county in which they 
are collected," in Subsection (l)(c) in the second 
sentence deleted "and may be transferred for 
use amoung counties within the district in 
which they are donated or collected" from the 
end of the first sentence and made minor 
changes m phraseology, punctuation and style 
throughout this section. 
quires affirmative action by an individual ju-
venile judge; Rule 39 of the Utah State Juve-
nile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure 
which authorizes a blanket consent, unindivid-
ualized by juvenile judge, does not satisfy the 
consent requirement. H.A.G. v. Fillis, 577 P.2d 
964 (Utah 1978). 
78-3a-55. Court records — Inspection — Fingerprints or 
photographs prohibited, exception. 
The court and the probation department shall keep such records as may be 
required by the board and the presiding judge. Court records shall be open to 
inspection by the parents or guardian, other parties in the case, the attorneys, 
and agencies to which custody of a child has been transferred; and with the 
consent of the judge, court records may be inspected by the child, by persons 
having a legitimate interest in the proceedings, and by persons conducting 
pertinent research studies. Probation officers' records and reports of social and 
clinical studies shall not be open to inspection, except by consent of the court 
given pursuant to rules adopted by the board. 
Without the consent of the judge, no fingerprints or photographs shall be 
taken of any child taken into custody, unless the case is transferred for crimi-
nal proceedings. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 54, formerly C. Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-
1953, 55-10-116 redes, as 78-3a-55; L. 1983, ment inserted "or photographs" in the second 
ch. 83, § 13. paragraph. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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